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lators around the world have adopted numerous regulations to increase corporate tax transpar-
ency. New settings and datasets have spurred empirical research in recent years. Our paper 
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elaborate on the conceptual underpinnings of tax transparency by drawing on established theo-
ries from financial accounting and CSR reporting research. Third, we survey empirical evidence 
on corporate tax transparency. We classify the findings into (i) determinants of firms’ tax dis-
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This study provides a thorough review of the emerging literature on corporate tax trans-
parency at the intersection of financial accounting and corporate tax planning research. Tax 
minimization strategies of large multinational enterprises (MNEs) have received considerable 
attention from the media, the public, and policymakers in the last decade. The OECD (2017) 
estimates that the worldwide annual revenue losses due to base erosion and profit shifting 
(BEPS) amount to USD 100 - 240 billion. Curbing this behavior is a challenging task for tax 
authorities and legislators. The underlying tax planning strategies are mostly legal and often 
exploit a lack of coordination of national tax laws. In addition to specific anti-avoidance rules, 
policymakers worldwide have adopted several tax disclosure mandates in recent years to in-
crease the transparency of corporate taxpayers. Tax transparency is expected to reduce MNEs’ 
tax avoidance through three channels: (1) Tax authorities could use the incremental information 
to enhance their audit scrutiny and efficiency; (2) legislators could discover legal loopholes and 
subsequently adjust tax law; and (3), in case of public disclosures, firms may be disciplined by 
increased accountability to the general public, which may exercise pressure on companies to 
pay their “fair share” of taxes. 
Academic interest in tax transparency started to grow in parallel to the developments on 
the political level. The increase in academic research was partially driven by the demand for 
empirical insights on the causes and effects of tax transparency. Moreover, new datasets and 
testable settings became available to researchers with the introduction of respective regulations. 
Figure 1 illustrates the trend in research on this topic.1 Given the surge of empirical research 
and the variety of settings examined, existing studies provide heterogeneous and partially con-
flicting findings, making it challenging to interpret the observed outcomes. We strive to solve 
this issue by providing a structured analysis of the diverse literature that allows us to put the 
empirical evidence into perspective and to derive general conclusions on the current state of 
research. In particular, we aim to address the following aspects concerning tax transparency. 
First, which factors determine the tax disclosure choices of firms? Second, are the different tax 
disclosure mandates effective and, relatedly, are there unintended side effects of increasing tax 
transparency?2 Third, how does tax disclosure relate to insights from financial reporting and 
                                                 
1  Given the novelty of the topic, we consider articles published in academic journals as well as working papers 
in our review. 
2  We note that it is not the purpose of our review to scrutinize the desirability of the political goal to reduce tax 
avoidance. While we consider potential unintended real effects (e.g., changes in firms’ investment and em-
ployment) in response to tax transparency, we discuss neither potential implications for global welfare nor 
societal effects regarding the perceived fairness of the tax system. 
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CSR reporting? Finally, we point out areas where we currently lack conclusive evidence and 
highlight promising avenues for future research.  
For the purpose of the study, we understand “tax transparency” as the state or outcome 
achieved by tax disclosure. In this vein, tax disclosure is defined as the communication of ini-
tially private tax-related information by an issuer to one or several recipients, either on a man-
datory or voluntary basis. Thus, tax disclosure covers a broad set of different disclosure types 
ranging from confidential3 tax reporting to public disclosures issued by firms and third parties 
(such as tax authorities or the media). Importantly, tax disclosures create transparency of the 
taxpayer towards either the tax authority or the public. To keep the length of our review tracta-
ble, we limit the focus to the transparency of corporations, where we can draw from established 
evidence and theories from accounting research. Further, we only consider transparency con-
cerning corporate income taxes, excluding other levies such as indirect taxes. 
Previous literature reviews in the field of tax research have advanced our understanding 
of income tax accounts in financial statements, their application for measuring tax avoidance, 
and corporate tax avoidance behavior in general (Graham et al., 2012; Wilde & Wilson, 2018; 
and, in particular, Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). However, surveys on the role of tax accounts are 
inherently confined to financial statements or even specific accounting regulations (e.g., 
FIN 48, see Blouin & Robinson, 2014) and neglect other potentially relevant sources of infor-
mation. Moreover, prior reviews instead focus on the accounting information contained in tax 
items relating to inferences about future firm performance, earnings quality, and earnings man-
agement (Graham et al., 2012; Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). In contrast, we mainly consider 
studies that examine the information content with regard to companies’ tax planning behavior. 
Nevertheless, we also briefly touch on current studies at the intersection of these topics. 
Since corporate decisions on the level of tax avoidance are not made independent of dis-
closure choices, it is essential to understand which factors determine tax disclosure behavior 
and how disclosure decisions interact with actual tax avoidance. Prior surveys on corporate tax 
avoidance comprehensively review studies that examine the tax behavior of multinational firms 
(Dharmapala, 2020; Dyreng & Hanlon, 2019) as well as the determinants and, more recently, 
the effects of corporate tax planning (Brühne & Jacob, 2019; Wilde & Wilson, 2018).4 While 
tax avoidance is typically measured using financial statements items, existing reviews pay little 
                                                 
3  We use the terms “private” and “confidential” disclosure interchangeably. 
4  Brühne and Jacob (2019) briefly point to the benefits of lower transparency for tax-aggressive firms, but do 
not discuss the nuances of this relationship, especially with regard to tax transparency. 
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attention to the role of tax disclosure. As tax transparency rules are designed to curb tax avoid-
ance, some overlap in reviewed studies may naturally arise. However, we complement existing 
reviews by adding the perspective of the recipients of tax-related disclosures. Specifically, we 
survey empirical evidence on the effects of corporate tax transparency on stakeholders, includ-
ing investors, analysts, consumers, and tax authorities. 
In light of the multitude of different disclosure channels and tax disclosure requirements, 
we propose a framework to classify disclosure types along with certain characteristics. Our 
primary distinction is between private and public disclosures due to the different sets of recipi-
ents. We further distinguish according to the issuer of the information and the degree of obli-
gation (mandatory versus voluntary) to account for differing disclosure incentives. Based on 
this structure, we provide a concise overview of selected types of disclosure in the paper and a 
detailed description of a multitude of initiatives and rules currently in place across countries in 
the Appendix. This overview serves as a basis to understand common features and heterogene-
ity in the settings and allows to assess the diversity in empirical findings of the reviewed studies. 
Besides, it may also help researchers to identify interesting research settings. 
Given the novelty of the topic, we elaborate on theoretical underpinnings of tax transpar-
ency by drawing on established disclosure theories from financial accounting and CSR report-
ing research (i.a., Beyer et al., 2010; Christensen et al., 2019; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). We point 
to common features and distinct characteristics of tax disclosure and argue that the results from 
accounting or CSR reporting research do not necessarily generalize to tax disclosure settings.5 
Moreover, we discuss the potential costs and benefits of tax transparency identified in concep-
tual and normative literature and link this conceptual discussion with the growing empirical 
evidence on tax transparency. To provide a structure for the review, we divide empirical re-
search into three categories, starting with analyses of the determinants of tax disclosure deci-
sions. Second, we assess recent evidence on the information content of tax disclosures, focusing 
on new datasets and new types of disclosure. Finally, we survey empirical studies that examine 
the effects of tax disclosure rules on firm behavior as well as the reactions of stakeholders to 
changes in the level of tax transparency.  
 Our analysis of extant empirical literature on tax transparency leads to the following 
conclusions. First, roughly one-third of the papers within our scope analyze determinants of tax 
disclosure decisions, with the reporting firm’s tax avoidance level being the most well-
                                                 
5  Regarding the empirical evidence on tax disclosure, we refer to insights from the financial reporting and CSR 
reporting literature where appropriate. 
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researched determinant. Empirical evidence suggests an ambiguous relationship. While tax-
aggressive firms are more inclined to reduce transparency by concealing sensitive hard-fact 
information in mandatory disclosures, they also tend to issue more supplemental tax-related 
information either to legitimize their tax arrangements or to reduce information asymmetries 
arising from their tax avoidance activities. Evidence on other firm characteristics and attributes 
is highly context-specific, making it difficult to draw general conclusions on the nature of the 
relationship.  
Second, regarding the informativeness of tax disclosures, recent studies show that the 
quantitative information contained in novel country-by-country reporting (CbCR) data may 
complement existing profits shifting estimations in terms of country coverage. However, miss-
ing variables and limited comparability across reports might limit their usefulness. Besides, 
early evidence on qualitative tax disclosures is mixed, and it remains up to future research 
whether such disclosures can enhance our understanding of corporate tax behavior. 
Third, most studies within our scope analyze the effects of tax transparency on firms and 
their stakeholders. Extant evidence shows that firms try to prevent falling under additional dis-
closure rules, suggesting that the disclosure is perceived as costly. Despite some evidence of 
affected firms adjusting certain tax planning strategies, the effects on overall tax avoidance are 
inconclusive for most regulations. Importantly, firms seem able to substitute scrutinized tax 
arrangements with alternative strategies. Moreover, recent studies document real responses by 
firms (e.g., changes in the location of investments and employment), implying further unin-
tended consequences of transparency mandates. 
Finally, regarding effects on recipients, it remains uncertain whether the proposed bene-
fits of disclosure actually materialize. Research on investors’ responses is concentrated on stock 
price reactions, which only capture the aggregate effect of all costs and benefits that investors 
expect. So far, little is known about how investors actually utilize the disclosed information. 
Similarly, there is no evidence whether analysts use tax disclosures from novel transparency 
regimes as existing studies on analysts are confined to the narrow setting of voluntary earnings 
forecasts and conference calls. Surveys and laboratory experiments show that revelations of 
corporate tax planning have adverse effects on firm perception by consumers. Yet, there is no 
conclusive or large-scale evidence that the reputational costs materialize in the form of changes 
in purchase behavior. Lastly, and despite their particular role as the primary recipient of tax 
disclosures, there is almost no evidence on whether and how tax authorities access or use infor-
mation from tax-related disclosures.  
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In sum, these findings question the effectiveness of tax disclosure mandates and, in par-
ticular, whether tax transparency efficiently achieves its envisioned purpose. As the strength of 
the documented effects varies across disclosure types, policymakers should carefully reconsider 
the design of the implemented measures. 
It becomes evident from our review of the empirical literature that we are still only at the 
beginning of empirical research on tax transparency despite the progress that has been made 
over the last years. Based on our conclusions, we derive seven promising areas that warrant 
additional research. First, future research would benefit from a comprehensive theoretical 
framework that incorporates the different incentives managers face concerning tax disclosure 
decisions. Such a framework would enable researchers to derive precise predictions on tax dis-
closure behavior and reconcile conflicting findings across various settings. Second, we suggest 
that future studies examine the role of (tax) executives regarding disclosure decisions within 
firms to shed light on the association with the simultaneous decisions on tax planning. Third, 
we look forward to research on the interaction effects between public and private disclosure 
requirements or between mandatory and voluntary disclosures. More precisely, future studies 
should examine whether different sets of disclosure act as substitutes or complements. Fourth, 
there is room for further research on the informativeness of qualitative disclosures, such as tax 
strategy reports or CSR reports, in light of their growing importance. For instance, such studies 
may address the questions of whether the disclosed information is verifiable or incrementally 
useful for recipients. Fifth, it seems worthwhile to combine and compare the information con-
tained in various quantitative and qualitative disclosure types and develop more nuanced tax 
avoidance measures. Sixth, future research should investigate confidential disclosure require-
ments for tax planning arrangements, with a particular focus on the effects on firms, intermedi-
aries, and tax authorities. Lastly, we encourage further research on how recipients process and 
prioritize tax-related information and how this ultimately affects their decision making and out-
comes.  
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. In Section 2, we define tax transpar-
ency and briefly explain its characteristics before we provide a structured overview of tax dis-
closures rules and initiatives. Section 3 illustrates the conceptual underpinnings of tax transpar-
ency, together with a discussion of potential costs and benefits. We review existing empirical 
literature based on the three categories outlined above in Sections 4 to 6. Finally, we summarize 
our findings and specify our suggestions for future research in Section 7. 
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2 Overview of tax transparency rules and initiatives 
2.1 Background, definitions, and scope 
The current landscape of tax transparency and tax disclosures is diverse. While we aim to 
give a broad picture of this area, we necessarily have to limit our review’s scope to a certain 
extent for coherence. In general, we understand “tax disclosure” as the communication of ini-
tially private tax-related information by an issuer to one or several recipients, either on a man-
datory or voluntary basis. “Tax transparency” describes the result or the state achieved by tax 
disclosures, i.e., improved recipients’ knowledge. Based on this general understanding, we de-
lineate the scope of our review as follows. 
First, our study only includes disclosures that convey information about a taxpayer, cre-
ating transparency of the taxpayer towards the tax authorities, towards other selected recipients, 
or towards the general public. Conversely, we do not review any forms of transparency of the 
tax administration towards the public (such as information about administrative rulings or ad-
ministrative efficiency). Second, we interpret the term “tax disclosure” rather broadly, contain-
ing not only explicit reporting about taxes but also any other kind of potentially tax-related 
information (e.g., geographic reporting). In the same vein, both quantitative and qualitative dis-
closures are included. Third, our study is confined to information about (multinational) enter-
prises and their income taxes. We do not examine the disclosures of individuals due to signifi-
cant differences regarding the costs and benefits of tax transparency and owing to a lack of 
comparability with financial and CSR reporting.  
Fourth, following economic and legal literature, we make a conceptual distinction be-
tween legal and illegal practices to reduce the income tax burden (Dharmapala, 2020; Gravelle, 
2009, 2015; Slemrod & Yitzhaki, 2002). Therefore, we define tax evasion as an intentional 
illegal activity (e.g., concealing taxable income from the tax authorities), which constitutes a 
criminal offense in many countries. In contrast, tax avoidance and tax planning denote legal 
measures undertaken by a company to minimize its tax payments. Importantly, these measures 
do not affect substantive economic outcomes (Dharmapala, 2017).6 Tax avoidance and tax plan-
ning encompass a wide range of instruments from the use of tax advantages explicitly granted 
by the legislator to rather aggressive transactions that may be perceived as “illegitimate”, “un-
ethical”, or complying only with the letter but not with the spirit of the law. Despite the clear 
theoretical separation, we acknowledge that there is a “grey area” between legal and illegal 
                                                 
6  This characteristic distinguishes tax avoidance and tax planning from behavioral responses to taxation (e.g., 
changes in investments and employment). 
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activities in practice. Delimitation problems arise from ambiguities in tax law, such as discre-
tion regarding the acceptable range of arm’ s-length transfer prices (Gravelle, 2009, 2015). Due 
to the resulting uncertainty, tax avoidance and tax planning can be subject to the risk that certain 
tax position cannot be sustained in a potential tax dispute (Blaufus et al., 2019). 
For the purpose of our study, we exclude transparency rules and initiatives that clearly 
aim at fighting tax evasion due to its distinct legal assessment. These measures are primarily 
targeted at individuals anyway (Dharmapala, 2020). Instead, we focus on disclosures conveying 
information about companies’ legal efforts to reduce their income tax burden. To prevent prac-
tical problems of delimitation, we also include the “grey area” of legally questionable activities 
in this category and collectively refer to it as tax avoidance or tax planning.7 Within this frame-
work, profit shifting, i.e., the (artificial) allocation of MNEs’ profits to low-tax countries, rep-
resents one important subset of tax avoidance instruments (Dharmapala, 2020). 
The following subsection presents a structured classification of the current landscape of 
tax-related disclosures. To this end, we extracted the different disclosure rules set out in the 
national reports on tax transparency for 29 countries contained in Başaran Yavaşlar and Hey 
(2019). We complemented this source by financial reporting regulations, international tax trans-
parency initiatives (e.g., by the OECD and the EU), and other types of mandatory or voluntary 
disclosures investigated by the empirical studies, which we review in Sections 4 to 6. From this 
collection, we selected all types of disclosures which match the criteria described above. 
2.2 Structured classification of tax transparency rules and initiatives 
In order to enable a comparison of the heterogeneous types of disclosure falling under our 
scope, Figure 2 provides a graphical overview of our classification. Table A.1 in the Appendix 
presents selected details for individual rules and initiatives of particular interest. 
The different disclosures could be distinguished along several dimensions, such as the 
issuing party or the character of the disclosure (mandatory or voluntary). However, our primary 
distinction criterion is between public disclosures (i.e., available to every recipient) and private 
                                                 
7  We note that extant literature has not agreed upon a uniform understanding of the terms “tax avoidance” and 
“tax planning”. While some authors define tax planning as the “ethical” and tax avoidance as the “unethical” 
forms of tax behavior (e.g., Middleton & Muttonen, 2020), others rather view tax planning as a generic term 
and tax avoidance as a subset (e.g., Wilde & Wilson, 2018). Since we do not attempt to distinguish according 
to moral or ethical dimensions, we follow Graham et al. (2014) and use tax avoidance and tax planning inter-
changeably to refer to all legal (and “grey-area”) measures to reduce a company’s tax burden. In contrast, the 
terms “approach to tax” and “tax strategy” describe a broader concept. In addition to a companies’ attitude 
towards tax planning, this concept comprises other components such as tax governance and the relationship 
with tax authorities. 
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disclosures (i.e., available only to selected recipients). As the potential costs and benefits largely 
depend on who has access to the information, we expect considerable differences between both 
groups. Besides, considering the specific role of the tax authority as a recipient, private disclo-
sure plays a much more important role in tax research than in the related areas of financial 
reporting and CSR reporting research. Within the broad category of public disclosure, a signif-
icant distinction can be made as to the issuer. If firms publish the information by themselves, 
they can usually exercise some discretion even within mandatory requirements. This is typically 
not the case if a third party carries out the publication. Consequently, extant research on the 
determinants of tax disclosure decisions (as surveyed in Section 4) is limited to settings of in-
formation communicated by firms. 
2.2.1 Public tax disclosure 
Tax-related disclosures contained in companies’ general-purpose financial reporting 
serve as our starting point. The main objective of financial reporting standards such as the US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and IFRS is to provide investors with de-
cision-useful information.8 Although not their primary goal, certain financial reporting disclo-
sures can indicate a firm’s tax planning. In this vein, the notes to the (consolidated) financial 
statements constitute the primary source of potential information. We briefly discuss the most 
relevant disclosures required in the financial statements of listed US and EU firms in the fol-
lowing (see Section I.A of Table A.1 for more details).9 
First of all, US firms registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are 
obliged to provide a breakdown of their pre-tax income and income tax expense into domestic 
and foreign. This rough geographical split gives a first indication of how the tax burden differs 
between domestic and foreign operations. EU firms do not face a similar requirement, but some 
report the information voluntarily. 
More details are revealed in the mandatory “tax reconciliation”, i.e., a reconciliation of 
the GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) to the statutory (federal) tax rate, either in absolute amounts 
or percentages. This disclosure can provide evidence of foreign earnings subject to tax in low-
tax countries. However, their occurrence does not necessarily point to profit shifting but may 
simply reflect a company’s international distribution of real activities. Deviations between the 
                                                 
8  See Section 3.1 for a detailed discussion of the objectives of general-purpose financial reporting. 
9  Note that our examination of financial reporting is limited to disclosure requirements (and their information 
content with regard to tax planning). For a summary of material accounting rules on the recognition and meas-
urement of income tax items, see Graham et al. (2012) and the appendix of Hanlon and Heitzman (2010). 
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ETR and the statutory tax rate can also arise due to permanent book-tax differences (BTDs), 
i.e., differences between the accounting and tax treatment of certain transactions that will not 
revert future periods. Such permanent BTDs are potentially indicative of non-conforming tax 
avoidance. 
In contrast, temporary BTDs (i.e., differences between the accounting and tax valuation 
of an asset or liability which will revert at some time in the future) have to be recognized as 
deferred tax assets or liabilities, accompanied by comprehensive disclosure obligations. Within 
an MNE group, temporary BTDs can also arise from retained earnings of foreign subsidiaries. 
However, under certain prerequisites, firms may designate such retained earnings as perma-
nently reinvested to avoid recognizing a deferred tax liability for any taxes due upon repatria-
tion. In this case, specific disclosures are required in the notes. Under the former worldwide tax 
system in the US, this option was highly relevant for US MNEs in the context of tax planning 
through low-tax subsidiaries.10 
Another item often perceived as particularly informative of tax planning are the so-called 
unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs). According to US GAAP, companies have to record a con-
tingent liability to accrue tax expense for potential future tax authority adjustments. The issu-
ance of FIN 48 as of 2007 did not only reform the recognition and measurement of UTBs but 
also introduced comprehensive disclosure requirements in the notes, increasing transparency 
regarding a firm’s controversial tax positions. 
Apart from the tax footnote itself, other information in the notes may also indicate a com-
pany’s tax planning behavior. Both US GAAP and IFRS require certain geographic disclosures 
in the segment reporting. While most firms disaggregate their segments according to non-geo-
graphic criteria, MNEs are obliged to show at least a breakdown of their revenues and long-
lived assets into domestic and foreign. Combined with the corresponding analysis of pre-tax 
income and tax expense (see above), these disclosures may enable first inferences regarding the 
alignment of economic activity, profit allocation, and tax payments. However, the separation 
into domestic and foreign is still highly aggregated. Finally, the list of subsidiaries included in 
the consolidated financial statements can reveal an MNE’s number of tax haven presences. The 
EU Accounting Directive11 mandates disclosure of all subsidiaries in the notes. In contrast, US 
firms only have to report significant subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 to their 10-K filings. 
                                                 
10  While the relevance has decreased considerably after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, BTDs from invest-
ments in foreign subsidiaries can still arise, e.g., due to foreign withholding taxes or state taxes. 
11  Directive 2013/34/EU, hereinafter referred to as the Accounting Directive. 
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While a complete set of financial statements has to be published annually, listed firms 
have to file quarterly (US) or half-yearly (EU) interim reports, including condensed financial 
statements. These filings are accompanied by additional mandatory disclosures, such as the 
management discussion and analysis (MD&A) and risk factor disclosures (US) or the manage-
ment commentary (EU), which can also contain quantitative and qualitative information about 
tax planning (e.g., in the form of tax risks). Finally, many firms voluntarily issue (quarterly) 
earnings announcements as press releases, followed by conference calls with analysts. 
Due to the evolving trend towards more tax transparency, specific rules have been intro-
duced, which require public tax(-related) disclosures by firms, complementing the information 
from general-purpose financial reporting. One of the most important concepts is CbCR. It dis-
closes economic activity indicators, allocated pre-tax profits, and income taxes separately for 
each country where an MNE maintains subsidiaries or branches. This information is supposed 
to help recipients assess whether a company pays its “fair share” of income taxes in each coun-
try, corresponding to its economic activities. Section I.B of Table A.1 provides an overview of 
current public CbCR regimes. 
The idea of CbCR was first proposed for the extractive industries, driven by the objective 
of reducing corruption rather than tax avoidance. Accordingly, the items to be disclosed here 
are more focused on the different kinds of payments between firms and governments (including 
taxes) and less on economic activity. The EU, Canada, and the US have passed CbCR require-
ments for the extractive industries. Still, the publication has not come into effect in the US yet 
due to ongoing disagreement regarding the final rules to be issued by the SEC. In 2013, the EU 
adopted a public CbCR for financial institutions to restore trust in this sector after the financial 
crisis by creating transparency on corporate tax behavior and public subsidies. Finally, policy-
makers in the EU have discussed proposals of a general public CbCR requirement for all large 
MNEs since 2016, but no agreement has been reached so far. 
Unlike the quantitative information of CbCR, the UK has recently introduced the manda-
tory disclosure of a tax strategy report for firms above a certain size threshold. This report is 
supposed to state qualitative information about a company’s risk management and governance 
concerning tax, its attitude towards tax planning, and its relationship with the tax authority (see 
Section I.C. of Table A.1). While this type of disclosure principally demands the most explicit 
information about tax planning, its qualitative nature inherently bears the risk of firms using 
platitudes and boilerplate language, thereby limiting the reports’ usefulness. 
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Apart from all these mandatory rules, firms can, of course, always decide to publish tax-
relevant information voluntarily. This may be done by either adding supplemental explanations 
or figures to obligatory disclosures or issuing other kinds of tax-related information, e.g., within 
voluntary CSR reports or as a separate tax contribution report. While we cannot cover the whole 
variety, we briefly review two voluntary disclosure frameworks (see Section I.D. of Table A.1). 
The decision of whether to commit to these frameworks is completely voluntary. Still, if a firm 
wants to label its disclosure as compliant, it has to apply specific rules of the framework. The 
Australian Tax Transparency Code (TTC) proposes both quantitative elements (e.g., a recon-
ciliation of accounting profit to tax expense and income tax paid) and qualitative disclosures on 
the approach to tax (similar to the content of the UK tax strategy report). More importantly, the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), an international non-profit organization issuing the most 
widely adopted sustainability reporting standards, has recently adopted a new standard for re-
porting on tax practices (GRI, 2019). Besides qualitative information on the approach to tax 
and tax governance (again similar to the UK tax strategy report), this standard demands a public 
CbCR with a comprehensive list of tax-related items to be recorded per country. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, tax-related public disclosures can also be issued by a third party 
who has either access to private information or an advantage in interpreting certain information. 
Obviously, tax authorities receive such confidential data through firms’ tax returns and other 
filings. Section II of Table A.1 describes a selection of public tax return disclosure regimes that 
are (or were) in place in different countries worldwide. Most of these regimes have in common 
that tax authorities regularly publish certain items from annual tax returns (e.g., taxable income, 
taxes paid) of all or of the largest resident companies. The information is either accessible on a 
central website of the tax authority or upon request in local tax offices. The main objective of 
these regimes is usually to ensure transparency regarding companies’ domestic tax payments 
and hold the companies accountable towards the general public.12 Furthermore, a comparison 
of the public tax return data with financial statement information can improve the understanding 
of a firm’s tax planning behavior. 
Public disclosures by other regulators such as exchange supervisory authorities may also 
contain tax-related information. For example, the SEC regularly reviews US-listed firms’ an-
nual 10-K filings and issues comment letters when a filing is deficient or needs further 
                                                 
12  Note that the public tax return disclosure in Turkey and the THPC program in Pakistan (both outlined in Sec-




clarification. Upon resolution of the issue, the comment letter and the firm’s response are pub-
lished by the SEC. Tax-related deficiencies may reflect firms’ efforts to hide tax avoidance 
activities. 
Finally, at least two other parties can be identified as sources of public information about 
firms. First, analysts play an important role as information intermediaries on the stock market. 
For the largest firms, they issue their own earnings forecasts (implicitly including the expected 
ETR), which may or may not be superior to management’s forecasts. Second, confidential in-
formation on companies’ tax avoidance activities can also be revealed by whistle-blowers in 
the course of data leaks (such as Lux Leaks, Panama Papers, or Paradise Papers). Even apart 
from such major leaks, numerous press articles in the last decades have uncovered and dis-
cussed the tax planning strategies of individual MNEs (see Middleton & Muttonen, 2020). 
2.2.2 Private tax reporting 
We now turn to the second broad category, private disclosure, i.e., the communication of 
information to selected parties only. Private disclosures can either be made by the firms them-
selves or by other actors with access to the information (e.g., intermediaries such as banks and 
advisors). Since the related costs and benefits within this category largely depend on who ob-
tains the information, we further distinguish according to the recipient and start with the tax 
authorities as the most common one (see Figure 2). 
First, an essential disclosure requirement is the confidential CbCR proposed by the OECD 
(2015) as part of its BEPS Action Plan, which has already been implemented by more than 80 
countries worldwide (see Section III.A. of Table A.1). In contrast to the other CbCR regimes 
described above, the reports are not made public. Large MNEs have to file the report to the tax 
authority in charge (usually in the headquarter country). The national authorities of the partici-
pating countries automatically exchange the data between each other. As a part of the transfer 
pricing documentation, the CbCR information is supposed to help tax authorities to assess trans-
fer pricing risks and to identify and evaluate other profit shifting risks. 
Second, in the course of the trend towards more transparency, the international exchange 
of bank account and ownership data has considerably increased within the last decade. The 
development started with bilateral agreements between countries on the exchange of tax infor-
mation upon request (tax information exchange agreements, TIEAs). It progressed to frame-
works for the automatic exchange of information, such as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (FATCA) for the US and the multilateral Common Reporting Standard (CRS). We do not 
focus on these exchange agreements since they are primarily targeted at fighting tax evasion 
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(and other illegal activities) of wealthy individuals. Nevertheless, they can provide tax author-
ities with information on companies’ international tax avoidance activities to a certain extent. 
Third, several countries have adopted regimes requiring the disclosure of specific tax 
planning arrangements (see Section III.B of Table A.1 for an overview). These regimes set out 
specific criteria under which a transaction has to be reported to the tax authorities, typically 
including that a tax advantage constitutes the main benefit of the transaction. The disclosure 
obligation is usually upon the promoter of the arrangement and/or upon the company imple-
menting it. Tax authorities can then assess whether the reported transactions actually comply 
with tax law and can promptly inform legislators about necessary actions to close loopholes. 
The most important regime is DAC 6,13 which applies in the EU as of July 2020 and which 
stipulates an automatic exchange of the disclosed information between member states. 
Fourth, our classification includes two forms of supplementary reconciliations to be filed 
in the US, along with the annual tax return (see Section III.C of Table A.1). Schedule M-3 
requests a very detailed reconciliation of financial statement income to US taxable income, 
distinguishing between temporary and permanent differences. Schedule UTP, introduced about 
four years after FIN 48, requires firms to itemize and describe the US portion of UTBs, which 
are disclosed as an aggregate in the notes to the financial statements. Both Schedules provide 
the US tax authorities with incremental information compared to companies’ public disclosures, 
helping to detect tax avoidance and increase tax audit efficiency. 
Finally, firms may issue private disclosures to any other selected recipient who has the 
power to demand such information. For example, influential equity investors or creditors some-
times request the tax returns (usually of smaller firms), which can either serve them as an addi-
tional measure of firm performance or to assess the risks resulting from tax planning. 
 As shown in this subsection, even within our limited scope of tax transparency, there is 
a plethora of tax-related disclosures differing across several dimensions. It is crucial to be aware 
of this heterogeneity and the potential interplay between different kinds of disclosures when 
assessing the results of the empirical studies examining various settings. 
                                                 




3 Conceptual underpinnings of corporate tax disclosure 
3.1 Theories from financial reporting 
While research on tax transparency is just emerging, there is abundant theoretical, ana-
lytical, and empirical literature on financial reporting and accounting disclosure.14 To assess 
whether these insights might generalize to tax transparency, we provide a concise overview of 
the theoretical background of corporate disclosure. The demand for accounting information 
arises for two main reasons. First, ex-ante, managers usually have better information about the 
firm’s prospects than potential investors. In addition, managers have incentives to overstate the 
expected profitability of the firm. If capital providers cannot assess the true value, they will 
underprice (overprice) firms with high (low) profitability. This results in adverse selection re-
ferred to as the “lemons problem” (Akerlof, 1970; Healy & Palepu, 2001). Disclosure can solve 
this problem by mitigating information asymmetry, which constitutes the “valuation role” of 
accounting (Beyer et al., 2010). Second, ex-post, the separation between ownership and control 
gives rise to agency problems, as self-interested managers are able to expropriate investors’ 
funds (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Agency problems can be addressed by aligning the interests of 
managers and investors through optimal contracts. Disclosures are needed to monitor compli-
ance with these contracts, representing the “stewardship role” of accounting (Beyer et al., 
2010). It follows that (potential) outside investors on the capital markets are the primary ad-
dressees of financial reporting. 
One of the key questions of accounting research is whether (and to what extent) manda-
tory disclosure requirements are necessary. The unraveling argument posits that, under ideal 
conditions, firms will voluntarily disclose all information (Grossman & Hart, 1980; Grossmann, 
1981; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016; Milgrom, 1981). As described above, adverse selection leads to 
an underpricing of all firms with above-average projected profitability. Thus, above-average 
firms have an incentive to communicate private information to signal that they are better than 
their competitors (signaling theory). As soon as these firms have disclosed, investors will ra-
tionally adjust the other companies’ price downwards, creating incentives for those in the re-
maining group whose value is now above the new market price to disclose. In the end, all firms 
(except the very worst) voluntarily reveal their private information (Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). 
However, the unraveling argument rests on several assumptions that are not fulfilled in most 
settings (Beyer et al., 2010). Most importantly, disclosures are usually not costless for firms 
                                                 
14  We refer the reader to the excellent reviews of Beyer et al. (2010), Healy and Palepu (2001), Leuz and Wysocki 
(2016), and Verrecchia (2001). 
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(Verrecchia, 2001). Absent mandatory rules, rational managers will therefore decide to publish 
information only if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. 
The accounting literature has developed several economic-based theories and hypotheses 
that explain the incentives and disincentives for managers regarding their voluntary disclosure 
decisions. Based on the signaling theory and the “valuation role” of accounting, the capital 
market transaction hypothesis suggests that managers are particularly inclined to communicate 
information prior to issuing equity or debt since a reduction in information asymmetry will 
decrease the cost of capital (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Related to the agency theory and the “stew-
ardship role” of accounting, managers may voluntarily report information to reduce monitoring 
costs and convince shareholders that they act in their interests (A. Watson et al., 2002). Con-
versely, managers may decide to withhold information to avoid unwanted scrutiny by investors 
(Graham et al., 2005). Other theories focus on managers’ self-serving motivations to issue dis-
closure in more specific settings, including the stock-based compensation, corporate control 
contest, and management talent signaling hypothesis (Beyer et al., 2010; Healy & Palepu, 
2001). Finally, several economic-based theories reflect the different types of costs associated 
with disclosure. Proprietary costs (from submitting commercially sensitive information to com-
petitors), litigation costs (related to forward-looking disclosures), political costs (from un-
wanted attention and reactions of regulators), and the risk of setting a disclosure precedent con-
stitute considerable disincentives for managers (Dye, 1986; Graham et al., 2005; Healy & 
Palepu, 2001; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016; Verrecchia, 2001). 
In a perfect market, managers will optimally trade off the different costs and benefits so 
that their voluntary disclosure decisions result in an efficient level of information production 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Consequently, mandatory disclosures are only justified if they produce 
an outcome that is socially more desirable than the market solution (Beyer et al., 2010; Leuz & 
Wysocki, 2008). In this vein, a major argument for reporting requirements is that public disclo-
sures imply financial and real externalities. Disclosures of one firm potentially convey implicit 
information about other firms and affect their real decisions, so that the social value of disclo-
sure exceeds its private value to the publishing firm (Christensen et al., 2019; Leuz & Wysocki, 
2016). Besides, mandatory rules can cause market-wide cost savings due to enhanced compa-
rability of financial reporting. The threat of strict sanctions can serve as a cost-effective way to 
credibly commit to frequent disclosures (Beyer et al., 2010; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). Finally, 
disclosure regulation can inhibit potential deadweight losses arising from the expropriation of 
outside investors by managers (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008). Despite these social benefits, it has to 
be noted that the implementation and enforcement of mandatory disclosure regimes are costly 
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and associated with their own problems, e.g., firms trying to capture the regulatory process 
(Beyer et al., 2010). Thus, it is not self-evident whether mandatory rules actually achieve an 
outcome that is socially preferable to the market solution (Christensen et al., 2019).  
In summary, owing to the absence of a unifying and comprehensive theory, it remains 
rather challenging to justify the need for mandatory disclosure regimes (Beyer et al., 2010; 
Verrecchia, 2001). While the net effects of such regimes are ultimately an empirical issue, re-
cent reviews of Beyer et al. (2010) and Leuz and Wysocki (2016) emphasize that we still largely 
lack empirical evidence on real effects, market-wide effects, and externalities. Thus, they con-
clude that the pervasiveness of disclosure regulation in developed capital markets such as the 
US is an unanswered question to date, which warrants more research. 
We now briefly assess to what extent these theoretical underpinnings also generalize to 
tax disclosure. Financial reporting primarily serves the purpose of reducing information asym-
metry between managers and (potential) outside investors to mitigate adverse selection and 
agency problems. By construction, this also applies to tax information contained in general-
purpose financial reporting. In contrast, the main objective of most other types of tax disclosure 
is to reduce corporate tax avoidance and to align the international allocation of firms’ taxable 
income with the distribution of economic activity. These differing objectives are also reflected 
in the groups of addressees. While financial reporting is primarily targeted at outside investors 
on the capital market, the potential audience of tax disclosures is broader. Many tax-related 
disclosures are of interest to investors as well, since they inform about tax risks and may even 
contain other economic information (e.g., CbCR data also reveal the geographic distribution of 
activities). However, the primary addressees are usually tax authorities, legislators, and the gen-
eral public. Within this group, tax authorities undoubtedly play a particular role as firms’ tax 
planning decisions directly affect the tax revenues raised, and as tax authorities likely use the 
information disclosed when assessing a company’s tax liability. This particularity also mani-
fests in the fact that several tax transparency rules and initiatives stipulate a private disclosure 
to tax authorities only. Conversely, financial reporting inherently requires a publication of the 
information to fulfill its purpose. 
We conclude that, at least with regard to public tax-related disclosures, it is generally 
possible to build upon the insights of accounting research on the (dis)incentives affecting dis-
closure decisions and the implications of mandatory reporting regimes. Private disclosures to 
tax authorities, however, are a distinctive feature of the tax setting. 
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3.2 Theories from CSR reporting 
Apart from revelations about corporate tax avoidance, the growing size, power, and in-
ternationalization of the world’s largest companies have also more generally shifted the focus 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the general public to the issue of CSR (Mid-
dleton & Muttonen, 2020). Following Christensen et al. (2019), we define CSR as “corporate 
activities and policies that assess, manage, and govern a firm’s responsibility for and its impact 
on society and the environment.” To meet the rising demand, MNEs have increased their CSR 
activities and the related public disclosures (in the following referred to as “CSR reporting”), 
which has spurred theoretical and empirical research.15 In recent years, many countries have 
introduced some form of CSR-related reporting mandates that often follow the “comply or ex-
plain” principle. Due to the lack of uniform reporting requirements under this principle, man-
agers have substantial discretion regarding their CSR reporting decisions.16  
In addition to the economic-based theories described in the previous subsection, research-
ers have applied three socio-political theories to explain firms’ incentives for voluntary CSR 
reporting. First, the stakeholder theory suggests that CSR activities are undertaken, and disclo-
sures are issued if there is enough demand from stakeholders. Corporate decisions need to bal-
ance the potentially diverging interests of different stakeholders (Lanis & Richardson, 2013; 
Middleton & Muttonen, 2020). Second, legitimacy theory is based on the idea of a “social con-
tract”. Failing to conform to societal expectations may cause companies to lose their legitimacy. 
Firms conduct CSR activities and report on them to avoid this existential threat (Deegan, 2002; 
Hardeck & Kirn, 2016). Third, the institutional theory assumes that the extent of CSR activities 
and reporting depends on the institutions in the environment in which a company operates. 
Normative and coercive forces (e.g., the codification of CSR reporting standards) as well as 
mimetic forces (e.g., following best practice) drive companies CSR disclosure decisions (Mid-
dleton & Muttonen, 2020). 
As for financial reporting, rational managers will voluntarily publish CSR information if 
the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. Accordingly, mandatory disclosure regimes 
are only justified if they generate a socially more desirable outcome (Christensen et al., 2019). 
In this context, however, it has to be added that introducing mandatory reporting can impose 
social pressure on individual firms to improve their CSR performance. Since many CSR 
                                                 
15  Christensen et al. (2019) provide a thorough and comprehensive review of this literature. 
16  In the European Union, the Non-Financial Reporting Directive (Directive 2014/95/EU) introduced a mandatory 
CSR reporting requirement for listed firms as of 2017. Given the qualitative nature of the disclosure, firms 
have flexibility to disclose the information they consider most useful. 
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activities mitigate negative externalities (e.g., a reduction in pollution) or create public goods, 
a CSR reporting obligation can indirectly give rise to social benefits above those described for 
mandatory financial reporting (Christensen et al., 2019). 
The growing awareness for CSR and corporate tax behavior has initiated a discussion 
among academics and practitioners of whether a firm’s approach to tax constitutes an element 
of its CSR and, consequently, whether CSR reporting should contain certain tax-related disclo-
sures. Proponents argue that the tax contribution of an MNE is part of its economic responsi-
bility, as governments are supposed to use the tax revenues to the benefit of society (Middleton 
& Muttonen, 2020; Sikka, 2010). Opponents challenge the implicit assumption that the govern-
ment always employs the funds more efficiently for social benefits. They point out that compa-
nies can utilize tax savings for hiring employees, for R&D investments (which are typically 
associated with positive externalities), or for performing their own CSR activities (A. K. Davis 
et al., 2016; Middleton & Muttonen, 2020). Empirical evidence on the relationship between 
CSR activities and corporate tax behavior is mixed. Some studies document that higher CSR 
scores are associated with lower tax aggressiveness, suggesting that managers perceive CSR 
and responsible tax behavior as complements (Hoi et al., 2013; Lanis & Richardson, 2012). 
Other studies find that firms with better CSR performance exhibit higher levels of tax avoid-
ance, consistent with managers increasing CSR activities to offset adverse reputational effects 
from tax avoidance (A. K. Davis et al., 2016; Lanis & Richardson, 2013). L. Watson (2015) 
observes that the relationship between CSR and tax avoidance varies with firms’ earnings per-
formance. 
Despite their mixed results, all these studies provide evidence of at least some relation 
between the approach to tax and CSR. Moreover, descriptive analyses suggest that MNEs in-
creasingly include tax-related disclosures in their CSR reports (Hardeck & Kirn, 2016; Middle-
ton & Muttonen, 2020). This development is also reflected in the fact that the GRI as an issuer 
of the most widely adopted framework for voluntary CSR reporting has recently devoted a 
separate standard to reporting on tax practices (see Section 2.2.1). We thus infer that an analysis 
of tax transparency should also draw on the insights from CSR reporting research. Accordingly, 
some of the distinctive features of CSR reporting identified by Christensen et al. (2019) apply 
to tax disclosure as well. First, public tax disclosure is also characterized by a broader group of 
users than financial reporting, including less sophisticated recipients such as consumers. Sec-
ond, tax disclosures are – to some degree – subject to diverse objective functions since corporate 
tax behavior faces the conflict between profit maximization and fulfilling the interests of other 
stakeholders (e.g., tax authorities and the society in general). Third, while many forms of tax-
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related information are monetary by its nature, qualitative disclosures (e.g., on the tax strategy) 
bear the problem of diversity in measurement. Forth, although the obligation to pay tax is 
clearly based on legal provisions, managers can decide to what extent they want to engage in 
tax planning. Combined with the discretion in disclosure rules, tax disclosures – like CSR re-
porting – can also be subject to a dual endogeneity, which complicates empirical analyses 
(Christensen et al., 2019). 
In summary, the conceptual underpinnings of tax transparency are multi-faceted. Some 
elements of tax disclosure belong to (or at least are closely related to) financial reporting; some 
elements are perceived as part of (or share features with) CSR reporting; and to some extent, 
tax disclosures are distinct due to the particular role of tax authorities and the pervasiveness of 
private disclosures to this specific group of recipients. 
3.3 Conceptual discussion of tax disclosure 
Unlike financial and CSR reporting, theoretical literature dealing with (dis)incentives for 
voluntary tax disclosure is mostly missing (except for Middleton & Muttonen, 2020). However, 
considering the commonalities between the different corporate disclosure types, we show how 
economic-based and socio-political theories can also be applied to discretionary tax disclosure 
decisions. We focus on disclosure incentives first (Section 3.3.1) and discuss the disincentives 
later in the context of the firm-specific costs resulting from mandatory tax transparency regimes 
(Section 3.3.2). 
3.3.1 Theories on voluntary tax disclosure 
Among the economic-based theories, the signaling theory suggests that companies with 
favorable information have an incentive to disclose to differentiate from their competitors. With 
respect to corporate taxes, the theory posits that companies that assume that their tax-related 
information will be perceived positively as an indication of responsible tax behavior will dis-
close voluntarily (Hardeck & Kirn, 2016; Middleton & Muttonen, 2020). This mechanism may 
even explain voluntary private disclosures to tax authorities, sending a signal of tax compliance 
to reduce audit scrutiny. According to the agency theory, managers issue voluntary disclosures 
to reduce the costs of monitoring by shareholders (or refrain from publication to avoid unwanted 
shareholder scrutiny). As summarized by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), corporate tax planning 
is subject to specific agency implications. While (risk-neutral) shareholders expect managers to 
maximize profits, including efficient tax planning decisions, the interests of (risk-averse) man-
agers may differ. Contracts can be designed to align the interests, and disclosures can serve as 
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a control mechanism (Wilde & Wilson, 2018). In contrast, research has also provided evidence 
that managers exploit the complexity and opacity associated with tax avoidance activities to 
extract private benefits to the detriment of shareholders (Atwood & Lewellen, 2019; Desai et 
al., 2007; Desai & Dharmapala, 2006).17 In this vein, managers may issue voluntary disclosures 
to demonstrate that they abstain from such self-serving behavior.  
Turning to socio-political theories, the stakeholder theory explains voluntary disclosures 
as a response to certain stakeholders’ demand. Taxation is particularly salient from this per-
spective since tax authorities (or, more generally, governments) as a stakeholder group have a 
direct interest in the resulting tax revenues (Hardeck & Kirn, 2016; Middleton & Muttonen, 
2020). While this request could be satisfied by private disclosure, the increased attention to 
corporate tax behavior has also triggered the demand of other stakeholder groups for public 
disclosure. In line with the legitimacy theory, a firm’s aggressive tax behavior can be perceived 
as a breach of the “social contract” and potentially result in consumer boycotts. Companies 
facing such a threat have incentives to publicly disclose information to explain their behavior 
and regain their legitimacy (Lanis & Richardson, 2013; Middleton & Muttonen, 2020). Finally, 
the institutional theory posits that a firm’s institutional environment shapes the extent of volun-
tary tax disclosure. This environment includes normative and coercive forces (e.g., voluntary 
tax disclosure frameworks) as well as mimetic forces (e.g., companies adapting to the disclosure 
practices of their industry peers; Middleton & Muttonen, 2020). 
In summary, the incentives identified for voluntary accounting and CSR disclosures are 
also effective for public (and some even for private) tax disclosure decisions. While the eco-
nomic-based theories suggest that companies already paying their “fair share” of taxes are more 
inclined to disclose, socio-political theories rather predict disclosures of firms accused of ag-
gressive tax behavior and/or subject to increased tax-related stakeholder scrutiny (Hardeck & 
Kirn, 2016). Ultimately, it is an empirical question which incentives prevail under which con-
ditions. We review extant evidence on the determinants of tax disclosure decisions in Section 4. 
3.3.2 Costs and benefits of mandatory tax disclosure 
So far, the conceptual literature on tax transparency is primarily focused on assessing the 
potential costs and benefits arising from mandatory tax disclosure regimes and on evaluating 
whether the different regimes are likely to achieve the goal of reducing tax avoidance. In the 
                                                 
17  See also the following Section 3.3.2 for more details on the relationship between tax avoidance and extraction 
of private rents by managers. 
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following, we aim to give an outline of the current state of the discussion. Unless indicated 
otherwise, the respective costs and benefits pertain to both public and private disclosure. 
To begin with, tax transparency mandates are supposed to entail capital market benefits 
for firms for at least two reasons. First, to the extent that tax-related public disclosures contain 
incremental financial information about the firm, they can mitigate adverse selection problems 
on the capital market in the same manner as financial reporting. This results in increased stock 
market liquidity and reduced cost of capital (Cockfield & MacArthur, 2015; Healy & Palepu, 
2001). Second, as indicated above, some studies suggest a complementary relationship between 
tax avoidance and the extraction of private benefits by managers (Atwood & Lewellen, 2019; 
Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). Managers have an incentive to conceal their tax avoidance activ-
ities from tax authorities. To this end, they reduce the informativeness of both public and private 
disclosures. In turn, the resulting opaqueness creates some latitude for managers to divert pri-
vate rents from the tax savings at the expense of shareholders (Hanlon et al., 2014). Desai et 
al. (2007) posit that stronger tax enforcement can inhibit such behavior if tax authorities are 
able to identify cases of unacceptable tax avoidance.18 To the extent that additional tax disclo-
sure requirements render private rent extraction less attractive, outside shareholders may reward 
the reduced costs for the monitoring of managers. This effect may even occur in case of private 
disclosure to tax authorities, as the findings of Desai et al. (2007) suggest that improved moni-
toring by the tax administration can limit managerial diversion. 
Apart from capital market benefits, tax disclosure requirements can lead to an improved 
understanding of managers as they are forced to produce certain information (Hanlon, 2018). 
In combination with more effective monitoring by outsiders, managers may ultimately make 
more efficient investment decisions (Christensen et al., 2019; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). 
Most conceptual literature, however, deals with the various costs imposed on firms. Ob-
viously, many tax disclosure regulations give rise to direct costs, including one-off costs for the 
implementation of a reporting system and recurring costs for the preparation, auditing (if re-
quired), and publication of the data (Devereux et al., 2011; Evers et al., 2017). As parts of these 
costs are fixed, disclosure requirements can be particularly burdensome for smaller companies 
(Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). 
                                                 
18  While the tax authority may be regarded as minority shareholder due to its tax claim on corporate profits (Desai 
et al., 2007; Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010), it should be noted that the tax authority is not interested in reducing 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders per se. Its objective is to secure corporate tax payments 
in accordance with the applicable tax laws (Desai et al., 2007; Hanlon et al., 2014). 
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More importantly, mandatory tax disclosures imply several indirect or implicit costs for 
firms. First, it is the stated purpose of many regulations to curb corporate tax avoidance. If 
companies do not compensate for reduced tax planning opportunities (e.g., by relocating activ-
ity as described below), they will face increased tax expense. To the extent that firms bear the 
corporate tax burden, their after-tax profits will decline. A related, albeit unintended, side effect 
of certain tax disclosure rules (particularly of CbCR) lies in the risk that the tax authorities of 
some countries might use the information to justify unilateral transfer pricing adjustments 
(Evers et al., 2017; Hanlon, 2018). Consequently, MNEs are either confronted with double tax-
ation or at least with rising controversy costs. 
Second, the potential costs identified as disincentives for voluntary financial disclosure 
decisions (see Section 3.1) apply to tax transparency mandates as well.19 In this vein, several 
authors point out that public tax disclosure requirements (particularly CbCR) are associated 
with proprietary costs (Devereux et al., 2011; Evers et al., 2017). The data to be published may 
reveal commercially sensitive information about the profitability of certain activities or loca-
tions of an MNE, which can attract competitors or trigger suppliers or customers to renegotiate 
the terms of their contracts. Competitive disadvantages are especially likely if not all companies 
are subject to a disclosure regime (Murphy, 2003; Spengel, 2018). In contrast, others claim that 
the tax disclosure requirements in question are not specific and granular enough to actually 
contain trade secrets (Cockfield & MacArthur, 2015; Morris, 2015). The notion that tax infor-
mation is generally protected by tax secrecy laws in many countries and that disclosure rules 
may erode this principle (Lenter et al., 2003; Oats & Tuck, 2019) represents a tax-specific facet 
of the proprietary cost discussion.20 Like other corporate disclosures, tax transparency regimes 
can impose political costs on the affected companies in the form of increased regulatory scru-
tiny and adverse political actions (Leuz & Wysocki, 2016; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). It is 
one of the goals of (both public and private) tax disclosure rules to inform legislators about 
necessary tax law adjustments. 
Third, public tax disclosure requirements can expose companies to considerable reputa-
tional risks, such as public shaming of firms perceived as tax avoiders. Survey evidence sug-
gests that reputational concerns play a decisive role in firms’ tax planning decisions (Graham 
et al., 2014). While some tax transparency regimes build upon this mechanism to reduce tax 
                                                 
19  Litigation costs, however, are not supposed to play a major role in the context of tax disclosures. 
20  It has to be noted that the primary intent of tax secrecy laws is to protect privacy rights of individuals (Cockfield 




avoidance, unjustified accusations due to misinterpretation of the published data by non-experts 
can imply unintended adverse consequences (Lenter et al., 2003). The extent of reputational 
risks is likely to depend on a firms’ business model and industry (i.e., exposure to consumers 
and demand elasticity; Cockfield & MacArthur, 2015). 
Finally, tax disclosure mandates can cause adverse real effects. If the application is lim-
ited to specific locations or conditional on company size, firms will rationally try to avoid being 
subject to costly disclosures. This response can involve relocations and disincentives for eco-
nomic growth (Devereux et al., 2011). However, circumventing disclosure is probably not pos-
sible (or in itself too costly) for most firms. Prior research has provided ample evidence that 
corporate investment and employment are sensitive to corporate taxation (Clifford, 2019; De 
Mooij & Ederveen, 2003; Feld & Heckemeyer, 2011; Giroud & Rauh, 2019). Moreover, op-
portunities to shift profits out of a high-tax country are positively associated with economic 
activity in this country (Overesch, 2009; Suárez Serrato, 2019).21 Hence, if disclosure require-
ments reduce profit shifting opportunities (or, more generally, tax avoidance), they may induce 
affected firms to relocate investments and employment to low-tax countries. In the same vein, 
Hanlon (2018) conjectures that firms subject to CbCR regimes might react by adjusting their 
distribution of real activities to prevent being perceived as tax-aggressive and, at the same time, 
keep their tax burden constant. 
Regarding the recipients, most academic literature discusses whether the proposed bene-
fits of tax transparency regimes are likely to materialize. The main motivation, especially for 
private disclosures, is to provide tax authorities with information to enhance audit scrutiny and 
efficiency (Cockfield & MacArthur, 2015). However, as tax planning is mostly lawful, potential 
benefits are limited to identifying and scrutinizing tax avoidance cases in the “grey area” be-
tween legal and illegal measures (Spengel, 2018). Besides, several authors raise doubts regard-
ing the information content of specific tax disclosures. Their criticism relates to the basic con-
cept and lack of comparability of CbCR data (Devereux et al., 2011; Hanlon, 2018) as well as 
to the informative value of qualitative tax strategy disclosures (Oats & Tuck, 2019). 
Apart from the tax administration, legislators are also supposed to profit from tax trans-
parency regimes. They can utilize the information disclosed as a starting point to detect weak-
nesses of and develop necessary adjustments to tax law in order to restrict unintended tax plan-
ning possibilities. While private disclosures are generally sufficient for this purpose, a 
                                                 
21  Based on this notion, Dharmapala (2020) offers potential explanations why certain rules to prevent profit shift-
ing are not applied more extensively by high-tax countries. 
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publication can help to hold legislators publicly accountable for taking necessary actions (Dev-
ereux et al., 2011; Lagarden et al., 2020). However, as the pervasiveness of legal tax planning 
opportunities is mainly due to a lack of international consensus and coordination, the actual 
benefit of more disclosures remains questionable.  
Finally, proponents of public tax disclosure claim that such a disclosure enables the soci-
ety to assess MNEs’ tax behavior. The argument implies that consumers can incorporate this 
information into their purchase decisions (Forstater, 2017). Against this backdrop, researchers 
have argued for years about whether the general public actually has the expertise to interpret 
the reports correctly or whether this concern is too “paternalistic” (Devereux et al., 2011; Lenter 
et al., 2003). While the public disclosure of previously confidential tax information could 
strengthen the perceived fairness and equality of the tax system, some authors question whether 
paying a “fair share” of taxes according to the perspective of the general public constitutes an 
appropriate benchmark for assessing tax liabilities (Lagarden et al., 2020). 
The only kind of costs that recipients of tax disclosures face are the costs of processing 
the data. Ever-increasing amounts of available information can result in an information over-
load impairing the visibility of relevant details and ultimately reducing efficiency (Hanlon, 
2018; Middleton & Muttonen, 2020). The tax authorities are probably especially susceptible to 
this problem as they receive the largest amount of tax-related information about firms. 
Unsurprisingly, the conceptual literature arrives at mixed conclusions about whether tax 
transparency regimes will efficiently achieve their central purpose. Some authors are convinced 
that mandating tax disclosures will reduce tax avoidance and promote a better international 
alignment of taxable income and economic activities (Cockfield & MacArthur, 2015; Murphy, 
2003). Others emphasize that the multitude of potential consequences and responses makes it 
hard to predict whether the benefits will materialize and outweigh the costs (Evers et al., 2017; 
Hanlon, 2018; Oats & Tuck, 2019). Public disclosure requirements are seen as especially criti-
cal. They come along with higher expected costs, while the intended effect of mitigating tax 
avoidance might as well be achieved by private disclosure mandates (Devereux et al., 2011). 
Some authors point out that a requirement to publish the information can even have detrimental 
effects, such as increased comparability with peer firms leading to even more tax aggressive-
ness (Devereux et al., 2011) or companies diluting the informativeness of their tax return data 
in light of a subsequent publication (Lenter et al., 2003). After all, questions on the informa-
tiveness of, responses to, and net benefits of the different tax disclosure mandates need to be 
answered by empirical research. We review extant evidence in Sections 5 and 6. 
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4 Determinants of tax disclosure decisions 
After having discussed the theoretical concepts of tax disclosure, we now turn to the re-
view of the extant empirical literature on tax transparency. We start by assessing studies that 
investigate the determinants of corporate tax disclosure behavior in this section and continue 
with empirical studies on the informativeness of the disclosed data in Section 5. Finally, we 
review the empirical evidence on how firms and stakeholders respond to tax disclosure regula-
tions and increased corporate transparency in Section 6. A condensed overview of the surveyed 
literature on tax transparency following this structure can be found in Table A.2 in the Appen-
dix. 
The overall level of tax disclosure of a firm depends on (1) mandatory reporting rules, (2) 
the discretion exercised under mandatory reporting regimes, and (3) the amount of voluntary 
disclosure. Empirical research on disclosure determinants focuses on the two latter aspects and 
analyzes the factors related to firms’ discretionary or voluntary disclosure decisions. Owing to 
this research question, studies on the determinants of disclosure behavior are mainly based on 
public disclosures issued by the firms themselves. To survey this literature, we first describe 
firm attributes associated with firms’ tax disclosure decisions, with a particular focus on the 
role of corporate tax planning.22 Next, we outline how external pressure affects tax disclosure 
decisions and how firms behave when subject to various interacting reporting requirements. 
Given the proximity to disclosure research in related areas, we refer to findings from financial 
reporting and CSR literature where appropriate. 
4.1 Firm characteristics and activities 
4.1.1 Generic firm attributes and characteristics 
4.1.1.1 Firm size 
Among the various characteristics that influence firms’ tax disclosure decisions, several 
studies have identified a positive association between firm size and the level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure regulations. For instance, Belnap (2019a) finds that larger firms are more 
likely to comply with the UK requirement to disclose a tax strategy report mandated by the UK 
regulatory body and provide less boilerplate disclosures. The results confirm the expectation 
that large corporations are particularly sensitive to political and reputational costs due to their 
                                                 
22  We limit the discussion to selected firm attributes that we identified in the papers within our scope. Importantly, 




high visibility (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978).23 In a German setting, Evers et al. (2014) find a 
positive association between firm size and disclosure quality of deferred taxes under German 
GAAP. Similarly, the results of L. A. Robinson and Schmidt (2013) imply that larger firms are 
more compliant with reporting requirements under FIN 48. However, the authors also document 
that larger firms reduce the overall clarity of their disclosure. This finding is consistent with 
other studies that identify a negative relation between size and disclosure choice in voluntary 
disclosure settings (e.g., N. Chen et al., 2019) or in settings where firms have certain latitude in 
determining how much information they actually provide (Akamah et al., 2018; Ayers et al., 
2015; Krapat et al., 2016). One potential explanation for the mixed evidence could be that larger 
firms reduce overall disclosure quality to keep certain information private while technically 
complying with the reporting requirements (L. A. Robinson & Schmidt, 2013). Moreover, one 
should be aware that firm size captures different dimensions of firm characteristics (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001) such as operational complexity, which might create different disclosure incen-
tives (N. Chen et al., 2019; Ehinger et al., 2020). 
4.1.1.2 Corporate governance 
A large body of literature in accounting research examines agency conflicts in the context 
of corporate governance with fairly mixed results. While some studies support the notion that 
institutional investors lead to more disclosure due to tightened monitoring, other studies suggest 
that firms with large institutional ownership reduce voluntary disclosure to prevent information 
leakage to outside investors (for a thorough review of this literature, see Beyer et al., 2010). 
Evidence from the CSR literature implies that managers are more likely to issue CSR reports 
when firms have less concentrated ownership structures, which is consistent with the latter view 
(Christensen et al., 2019). 
In the context of tax disclosure, empirical research on the effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms is relatively scarce. Ayers et al. (2015) predict and find a negative association 
between the share of institutional investors and voluntary disclosure of deferred taxes on per-
manently reinvested earnings. The authors argue that institutional owners prefer to keep their 
informational advantage over other stakeholders. However, N. Chen et al. (2019) do not observe 
a significant relationship between institutional ownership and voluntary ETR forecasts in con-
ference calls. While differing agency issues in the setting of the two studies might explain the 
inconsistent findings, more research is needed to understand how governance structures and 
                                                 
23  Similarly, studies on CSR disclosure typically report a positive association between firm size and disclosure 
quantity and quality (Christensen et al., 2019; Hardeck et al., 2019). 
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managerial incentive schemes influence disclosure decisions on tax-related items and whether 
agency concerns are comparable to other disclosure settings. 
4.1.1.3 Information environment 
Corporate tax disclosure decisions are likely influenced by a firm’s general level of trans-
parency. In other words, transparent firms might be more inclined to provide additional infor-
mation about their tax positions. Extant financial accounting literature mainly relies on analyst 
coverage as a proxy for the quality of firms’ information environment.24 However, empirical 
findings concerning tax disclosure decisions are relatively mixed. Some studies suggest that the 
number of analysts following is positively associated with voluntary tax disclosure in confer-
ence calls, in line with the expectation mentioned above (Balakrishnan et al., 2019; N. Chen et 
al., 2019). In contrast, other studies either document a negative relationship between analyst 
coverage and voluntary tax disclosure (Ehinger et al., 2020) or find no significant relationship 
at all (Ayers et al., 2015; Dyreng et al., 2020). The conflicting findings cast some doubts on the 
interpretation of the measure as a proxy for the information environment.  
Alternatively, analyst coverage might be viewed as a measure of the level of monitoring 
and scrutiny by the capital market (Dyreng et al., 2020). In a recent study, Mauler (2019) ex-
ploits the variation in analysts’ issuance of tax forecasts to investigate the effects of analyst 
behavior on firms’ disclosure decisions more explicitly. The author documents that firms dis-
close more information in their tax footnotes if analysts issue tax forecasts. Thus, the results 
suggest that firms respond to higher levels of scrutiny on their tax accounts by increasing their 
tax transparency.  
4.1.1.4 Operating industry 
The operative environment is another factor that is likely correlated with the disclosure 
of tax-related information. Consistent with studies in financial accounting and CSR literature25, 
the results confirm that the sensitivity regarding tax disclosure decisions varies across indus-
tries. For example, Gleason and Mills (2002) report that firms in litigious sectors are more likely 
to disclose material contingent tax liabilities related to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
claims. Their evidence suggests that firms provide additional information by accruing tax losses 
when facing a higher risk of lawsuits. Other studies show that a firm’s business model is 
                                                 
24  For a discussion of how corporate disclosure relates to analysts’ behavior and outcomes, see Section 6.3.1. 
25  In line with the legitimacy theory, studies on CSR reporting show that firms operating in controversial indus-
tries, e.g., “sin industries”, have higher quality CSR disclosures to legitimize their activities or to influence 
public opinion on the firm (Christensen et al., 2019). 
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associated with the level of tax transparency. For example, Bilicka et al. (2020) report in a 
supplemental test that firms operating in consumer-oriented industries voluntarily provide more 
qualitative information on their tax strategies, potentially due to greater stakeholder attention 
on tax issues. Examining the relation between geographic segment aggregation and firm char-
acteristics, Akamah et al. (2018) also find that firms in retail, extractive, and in less competitive 
industries disclose, on average, more granular information about their geographic activities. 
However, these firms are incrementally more likely to aggregate geographic segments when 
having at least one tax havens presence. Hence, revealing tax haven presences seems costly for 
these firms, although the benefits of concealing information about the geographic distribution 
of business activities likely differ across industries. While firms in the extractive industries 
might anticipate potential political costs, retail businesses are rather concerned about reputa-
tional effects in terms of consumer boycotts. 
4.1.2 The role of tax aggressiveness 
One of the most frequently examined firm characteristics in the context of tax transpar-
ency is the level of tax planning. Note that we do not discuss the informativeness of tax-specific 
financial accounting items concerning the level of tax planning in this section.26 Instead, we 
focus on studies that examine whether and how tax avoidance relates to individual disclosure 
decisions. One important caveat for the empirical analysis of the level of tax avoidance as a 
determinant of tax disclosure is the issue of endogeneity. In particular, the decision on both tax 
avoidance and disclosure behavior may be jointly determined by several firm-specific charac-
teristics, some of which might be unobservable. Moreover, the level of tax avoidance is likely 
chosen in light of existing disclosure requirements, making it challenging to separate the two 
channels and draw causal inferences on the direction of causality. Therefore, most existing 
studies investigate associations between the decision to disclose certain tax-related information 
and a firm’s level of tax avoidance.27 
                                                 
26  For a discussion of the informativeness of tax disclosure, see Section 5. We also refer the reader to the excellent 
review of Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) on the quality of frequently used tax avoidance measures, which is not 
within the scope of our survey. 
27  In their review on tax avoidance, Brühne and Jacob (2019) survey some studies that investigate the association 
between tax avoidance and firm transparency more broadly. According to their findings, most studies document 
a negative association between tax avoidance and firms’ level of transparency, consistent with tax-avoiding 
firms being more opaque. Note, however, that we review studies that explicitly focus on tax-related disclosures. 
 
29 
4.1.2.1 Tax avoidance and mandatory tax disclosure 
As discussed in Section 3, the disclosure of tax-related information could be costly for 
firms if this information can be linked to their overall tax position. In other words, the incentive 
to withhold information or to provide more opaque disclosures is stronger if firms expect the 
disclosure to be informative for stakeholders like tax authorities, who might use the information 
when assessing the firms’ tax liability. 
The compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements regarding the information on 
international activities seems to be particularly sensitive to the level of corporate tax planning 
as the information indicates tax avoidance opportunities (e.g., Ayers et al., 2015) and presences 
in tax havens (e.g., Akamah et al., 2018, and Hope et al., 2013). Gramlich and Whiteaker-Poe 
(2013) analyze Google’s and Oracle’s decision to drastically reduce the disclosure of material 
foreign subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 to their 10-K filings. The authors conclude that disclosing 
fewer subsidiaries is rational from a firm perspective, especially if these subsidiaries are located 
in tax havens. Building on these observations, Krapat et al. (2016) use a large sample of firms 
that substantially reduced their subsidiary disclosure and find that these firms report declining 
ETRs in subsequent periods relative to MNEs that did not change their disclosure behavior. The 
authors argue that reputational concerns and public scrutiny are the primary reasons for non-
disclosure in Exhibit 21. The IRS already possesses detailed information about foreign activities 
due to confidential tax reporting requirements for US firms. The findings by Dyreng et al. 
(2020) corroborate this assertion. The authors compare the subsidiaries disclosed in Exhibit 21 
to subsidiaries filed with the IRS and confirm that the propensity of non-disclosure in Exhibit 
21 is higher for subsidiaries located in tax havens. Given that the IRS already receives the in-
formation through the tax returns, the authors conclude that firms attempt to obscure their tax 
planning activities from the public to avoid criticism. In sum, these studies imply that firms 
strategically decide not to comply with financial reporting regulations to obfuscate the regional 
distribution of their economic activities, presumably to avoid additional scrutiny and criticism 
by external stakeholders such as the media, consumers, or the general public. 
Beyond geographic disclosure requirements, empirical evidence indicates a close link be-
tween firms’ tax aggressiveness and the quality of mandatory disclosures. In their study on first-
time FIN 48 disclosures, L. A. Robinson and Schmidt (2013) find that tax-aggressive firms 
provide lower quality disclosures both in terms of disclosure completeness (i.e., compliance) 
and clarity. Similarly, two recent studies analyze the textual attributes of tax-related qualitative 
disclosures. According to their results, tax-aggressive firms make more boilerplate disclosures 
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(Belnap, 2019a) and have more complex tax footnotes28 in their financial statements (Inger et 
al., 2018). Furthermore, indirect evidence of low-quality tax disclosures by tax-avoiding firms 
is presented by Kubick et al. (2016). The authors document that firms with lower ETRs have a 
higher propensity of receiving tax-related SEC comment letters. The SEC issues such comment 
letters if it identifies material deficiencies in a firm's filings or if financial items require further 
clarification.29 Thus, the receipt of a tax-related comment letter indicates the low quality of a 
firm’s mandatory tax disclosure in its financial statements. 
In aggregate, the evidence discussed so far is consistent with the expectation that tax-
avoiding firms are less transparent. In particular, firms use discretion in financial reporting reg-
ulations to conceal information about their tax position or even omit required disclosure. Hence, 
regulators should reduce the room for interpretation in the respective rules and ensure that ex-
isting reporting requirements are properly enforced. 
4.1.2.2 Tax avoidance and voluntary tax disclosure 
Firms engage in corporate tax planning to benefit from future tax savings. At the same 
time, sophisticated tax arrangements could also increase the organizational (Blouin & Krull, 
2018; Lewellen & Robinson, 2014) and the financial complexity of businesses (Balakrishnan 
et al., 2019). Related literature from financial accounting research shows that financial reporting 
complexity can impair a firm’s information environment and increase information processing 
costs for users, which could, in turn, affect the firm’s cost of capital (Lehavy et al., 2011; Miller, 
2010; You & Zhang, 2009). Thus, firms could have an incentive to provide additional disclo-
sures to resolve uncertainty around financial reporting items and mitigate the adverse conse-
quences of (tax) reporting complexity (e.g., Guay et al., 2016). Tax complexity refers to specific 
income tax components (e.g., permanent BTDs) and characteristics (e.g., ETR volatility), which 
are difficult to interpret for financial statement users and which make it difficult to predict in-
come tax cash flows for future periods accurately (e.g., Bratten et al., 2017). In fact, recent 
empirical studies find that firms discuss income tax-related topics more frequently in confer-
ence calls when tax reporting complexity is higher (N. Chen et al., 2019; Ehinger et al., 2020; 
Koutney, 2019). Similarly, Flagmeier and Müller (2017) show that firms issue more 
                                                 
28  While the authors argue that managers intentionally reduce the readability of the tax footnotes, they cannot 
fully rule out that the lower readability might be due complex tax planning structures, which are by nature hard 
to describe. 
29  For more information, see https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerscommentlettershtm.html (accessed on 
1 July 2020). 
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comprehensive information about tax-loss carry-forwards when the usability of the losses is 
less certain.  
Other studies analyze the effects of tax aggressiveness on voluntary tax disclosure behav-
ior more directly. Early evidence is provided by Schwab (2009), who shows that earnings an-
nouncements that include voluntary information on BTDs are more likely for firms with a 
higher level of tax avoidance, which is a potential source for large BTDs. Consistent with the 
prediction that tax-aggressive firms have a weaker information environment, Balakrishnan et 
al. (2019) find that analyst forecast errors and information asymmetries are higher for tax-
avoiding firms. In further analysis, the authors show that firms with a low ETR disclose more 
detailed MD&A sections and provide more tax-related discussions in conference calls, poten-
tially indicating that firms attempt to mitigate transparency concerns or complexity by issuing 
clarifying information. 
Overall, and in line with theoretical predictions, the empirical evidence suggests that man-
agers face conflicting incentives with respect to the optimal level of transparency. On the one 
hand, supplemental disclosure could facilitate the interpretation of tax-related financial items 
for capital market participants and mitigate potential agency costs associated with the concern 
that managers might derive private benefits from tax avoidance. On the other hand, the infor-
mation could also be accessed by tax authorities to target future audits. Ehinger et al. (2020) 
assess the relative importance of both channels and find that the risk of being audited by the 
IRS attenuates the positive effect of tax complexity on voluntary disclosure of changes in taxes 
or forward-looking tax information. Nevertheless, more research is necessary to understand 
better which factors (complexity, public scrutiny, or audit probability) drive the cost-benefit 
considerations and under which conditions firms are willing to provide additional information. 
4.1.2.3 Tax avoidance and CSR reporting 
As income taxes and corporate tax strategies are gradually recognized as an integral part 
of CSR disclosures (e.g., GRI, 2019, see Section 3.2), a developing stream of literature at the 
intersection of CSR and tax research investigates whether corporate tax behavior is associated 
with the inclusion of tax-related information in CSR reports. Based on a case study of a Finnish 
MNE, Ylönen and Laine (2015) provide illustrative insights on how an MNE’s commitment to 
sustainability and an open discussion with stakeholders in CSR disclosures conflicts with its 
actual approach to tax. In particular, the company provided very sparse information on taxation 
and tax planning in its renowned CSR reports despite claiming transparent communication. 
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Moreover, the authors show that the company heavily engaged in tax avoidance via intra-group 
transfer pricing using a Dutch holding company. 
However, the results of more recent studies with larger samples provide a different per-
spective in line with the legitimacy theory. That is, tax-avoiding firms are more likely to include 
tax-related information in their CSR disclosure to legitimize their tax strategies or to alleviate 
political and societal pressure for not paying their “fair share” of taxes (Hardeck & Kirn, 2016; 
Kao, 2019). Regarding the content, early evidence indicates that tax-avoiding firms provide 
more soft information such as a general commitment to a socially responsible approach to tax 
that is hard to verify (Hardeck & Kirn, 2016; Kao, 2019). Besides, tax-aggressive firms are less 
likely to mention compliance aspects in their CSR reports (Hardeck et al., 2019). In a cross-
country study on tax disclosure in CSR reports, Hardeck et al. (2019) show that country-level 
variation in cultural dimensions partly explains whether firms discuss taxes in CSR reports. 
Moreover, cultural dimensions are associated with differing views about tax payments and CSR 
expressed by the firms. For instance, firms in countries characterized by higher masculinity are 
more likely to view taxes and CSR as substitutes rather than complements. 
Based on these first insights, future research should further investigate what firms actually 
disclose in CSR reports and whether the information is incrementally useful to readers of the 
reports compared to the information provided in financial statement disclosures. Given that 
public CbCR and qualitative tax strategy reports become a mandatory element of CSR disclo-
sures for firms following the GRI reporting framework, the relationship between CSR disclo-
sure and tax behavior continues to be a promising area for future research. 
4.2 External pressure 
In recent years, corporate tax planning activities have moved into the focus of attention 
of the media (e.g., S. Chen et al., 2019) and NGOs. The latter attempt to exert public pressure 
on firms by uncovering tax planning arrangements and disclosure deficiencies associated with 
tax avoidance. The political and reputational costs argument predicts that unintended scrutiny 
and public pressure by external stakeholders constitute relevant criteria for a firm’s disclosure 
decisions.30 Empirical evidence confirms the relation between tax disclosure behavior and pub-
lic scrutiny. For instance, Dyreng et al. (2020) report that media coverage is unrelated to the 
                                                 
30  Apart from changes in disclosure behavior, external pressure might also induce changes in corporate tax avoid-




disclosure of non-tax haven subsidiaries but negatively associated with the disclosure of signif-
icant tax haven presences. The authors conclude that firms strategically omit tax haven subsid-
iaries that could be picked up by the media to avoid unintended scrutiny. In an earlier study, 
Dyreng et al. (2016) exploit a unique setting to investigate corporate disclosure responses to 
public pressure levied by an NGO on large UK firms that did not comply with a mandatory 
regulation to disclose all foreign subsidiaries. The authors find that initially non-compliant 
firms immediately increased their disclosure. Among the newly disclosed subsidiaries, the frac-
tion of tax haven locations was disproportionally higher, which suggests that firms previously 
intended to hide this information.  
The results concerning media attention and public scrutiny should be interpreted with 
some caution as media attention and public scrutiny are not randomly assigned. Since journal-
ists aim to generate attention among readers, they are more likely to choose controversial topics 
such as corporate tax avoidance (Jensen, 1979),31 which introduces a selection bias in the ex-
amined samples. A notable exemption is a study of Belnap (2019a), who conducts a field ex-
periment to test the effect of public scrutiny on firm disclosure behavior. His results indicate 
that treated firms start to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements. Moreover, previ-
ously compliant firms slightly improve the quality of their disclosure. One explanation to rec-
oncile the differing findings is that firms disclose less ex-ante to reduce costly public scrutiny. 
However, sufficiently large shocks in public scrutiny (e.g., caused by intense media coverage 
or public “shaming” campaigns) may alter the disclosure equilibrium for firms, especially for 
firms that violate mandatory regulations (Belnap, 2019a). This ex-post disclosure behavior 
would be consistent with socio-political theories (e.g., firms increasing disclosure to satisfy the 
demand by outside stakeholders, see also Section 3.3.1). 
Another piece of evidence on the effect of external pressure on disclosure is presented by 
Kubick et al. (2016). The authors document that firms increase the length of tax footnotes and 
the number of references to taxation in the MD&A section of their reports after receiving a tax-
related SEC comment letter. These results complement prior findings in accounting literature 
on the effect of regulatory scrutiny (S. V. Brown et al., 2018; J. R. Robinson et al., 2011).  
                                                 
31  This prediction is supported by S. Chen et al. (2019), who find that firm visibility and level of tax avoidance 
are relevant determinants of media coverage. 
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4.3 Interaction between different disclosure types 
Firms are subject to various tax reporting regulations and disclosure regimes, as we have 
documented in Section 2.2. Importantly, each set of disclosure creates specific reporting incen-
tives for firms depending on the addressee of the information (e.g., investors, the general public, 
tax authorities). However, the information required by different regulations could be interre-
lated to a certain extent. This is most obvious for the relationship between financial reporting 
standards and confidential tax reporting to tax authorities. Firms may alter their disclosure be-
havior to the extent to which these two sets of disclosure interact with each other (Hope et al., 
2013).  
A particularly well-studied example is the introduction of Schedule UTP, which requires 
US firms to confidentially provide the IRS with additional information about the UTBs rec-
orded in their public financial statements. The UTBs are reserves for the firm's uncertain tax 
positions, which might be subject to adjustments during tax audits. The reserves are disclosed 
on aggregate across jurisdictions, and firms are not required to specify the positions underlying 
the total amount. Schedule UTP obliges firms to report a narrative description of the compo-
nents of UTBs that relate to tax positions taken in the federal tax return in the US. The regulation 
increases overall tax transparency as it provides the IRS with previously unavailable infor-
mation allowing for more detailed analyses of uncertain tax positions. Notably, the Schedule 
UTP setting is unique because the extent of private disclosure depends on firms’ financial re-
porting decisions regarding the amount of UTBs. 
Empirical studies document robust evidence that firms respond to Schedule UTP's intro-
duction by reducing financial reporting reserves for UTBs without changing their underlying 
tax behavior (Abernathy et al., 2013; Honaker & Sharma, 2017; Towery, 2017). Exploiting 
confidential tax return data, Towery (2017) shows that firms strategically reduce the amount of 
reported UTBs. Still, they do not seem to claim fewer income tax benefits in corporate tax 
returns. In contrast to prior studies, Bozanic et al. (2017) analyze how firms modify their nar-
rative disclosures in financial statements following Schedule UTP. The authors show that af-
fected firms increase the length of tax footnotes. Moreover, firms seem to discuss topics that 
relate to UTBs after the imposition of the confidential reporting requirement. These findings 
indicate that firms increase voluntary public disclosure, but they also suggest a disconnect be-
tween qualitative and quantitative disclosure responses. One potential reason for the conflicting 
results might be that firms try to mitigate the costs associated with the disclosure to the IRS by 
reducing the amount of UTBs in their financial statements. For the remaining fraction of UTBs, 
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however, the cost-benefit tradeoff has likely changed, which could induce voluntary qualitative 
disclosure in the footnotes to explain the uncertain tax positions to investors. 
Apart from the studies on Schedule UTP, little attention has been paid to the interaction 
of different disclosure types. A notable exception is a study of Kays (2019), who investigates 
voluntary tax disclosure responses to the mandatory disclosure of tax return data by a third 
party, namely the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The author argues that large deviations 
between tax return income and financial statement income may increase uncertainty about 
firms’ future cash flows among investors. Consistent with her expectation, she documents that 
firms with larger deviations are more likely to issue supplemental information with reference 
to the ATO’s publication. These results imply that the third-party disclosure increased the ben-
efits of additional voluntary disclosure. 
In a recent study, R. J. Brown et al. (2019) examine whether the mandatory disclosure of 
public CbCR for EU banks alters the disclosure incentives under geographic segment reporting. 
As the public CbCR contains very granular country-level information about bank’s operations 
for every country, its introduction likely reduces the proprietary or political costs associated 
with segment reporting. However, R. J. Brown et al. (2019) fail to find a significant change in 
banks’ segment reporting after the CbCR adoption. Given that the CbCR for banks is publicly 
available for all interested stakeholders anyway,32 adjusting segment reports may involve un-
necessary direct preparation costs, which could explain this result. However, the recent intro-
duction of a private CbCR in OECD and EU countries may provide a more promising setting 
to assess public tax disclosure responses.  
4.4 Interim conclusion 
Research on the determinants of corporate tax disclosure decisions shows that firms con-
sider several factors when they trade off the costs and benefits associated with the disclosure of 
tax-related information. Moreover, the evidence presented above suggests that the disclosure 
decision is highly firm- and context-specific. For instance, tax-avoiding firms strategically de-
viate from mandatory disclosure requirements to obfuscate tax-related information. Still, they 
are more likely to issue supplemental (often qualitative) information to reduce complexity or 
legitimize their tax arrangements. This disclosure behavior is noteworthy and questions whether 
additional tax transparency regulations may be justifiable. Instead, the studies on subsidiary 
                                                 
32  Banks are required to publish the audited report as an annex to the (consolidated) financial statements (Article 
89 of the CRD IV; see also Section I.B of Table A.1 in the Appendix). 
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disclosures show that proper enforcement of existing reporting regulations is crucial. However, 
from an academic perspective, we still lack comprehensive empirical evidence on the relative 
importance of the different channels affecting disclosure decisions. In many studies, the single 
channels are only indirectly observable, or they are tested in isolation. Given the increasing 
number of disclosure requirements for firms, it might be promising to assess how the interaction 
between different disclosure rules affects public tax disclosure decisions. 
5 Informativeness of tax disclosures 
Having examined the determinants of firms’ voluntary and discretionary tax disclosure 
decisions, we next survey studies that empirically analyze the informativeness of the data dis-
closed. We define informativeness as the extent to which the respective disclosures increase the 
recipients’ level of knowledge about the firm, its financial performance, and, importantly, its 
tax behavior. The degree of informativeness hinges on both the conceptual design of the under-
lying tax transparency rules and frameworks (including the leeway offered by explicit or im-
plicit reporting choices) and on firms’ disclosure decisions (which we take as given in this 
section). According to the type of information, we distinguish between studies on quantitative 
disclosures (Section 5.1) and research on qualitative disclosures (Section 5.2). 
5.1 Quantitative tax disclosures 
5.1.1 Tax disclosures in financial statements 
While our study is clearly focused on information about a firm’s approach to tax and level 
of tax avoidance, tax disclosures in financial statements can as well contain economic infor-
mation about firm performance, which has been investigated by several studies evolving in the 
2000s. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and Graham et al. (2012) comprehensively review this 
stream of accounting research and summarize two main findings. First, since taxable income 
constitutes an alternative (often more cash-flow oriented) profit measure, tax disclosures com-
prise incremental information about a firm’s current and future earnings. Extant evidence sug-
gests that temporary BTDs are informative about earnings persistence and that total BTDs are 
positively associated with future earnings growth. Second, managers use the tax accounts in 
general – and in particular, the valuation allowance to deferred tax assets and permanently re-
invested earnings – to manage earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, but not to achieve 
other earnings targets. While the tax contingency reserve has also been employed for earnings 
management, there is conflicting evidence whether this still holds true after the introduction of 
FIN 48 (Cazier et al., 2015; Gupta et al., 2016). 
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Research on the informativeness regarding a firm’s tax behavior started with two early 
studies discussing what the financial statements of US companies tell about US taxable income 
and actual US income tax payments. Hanlon (2003) conceptually explains how items like the 
tax contingency reserve or tax credits and different consolidation rules for book and tax pur-
poses impede the calculation of US taxable income based on current tax expense. McGill and 
Outslay (2004) illustrate these difficulties in case studies. A first large-sample examination is 
provided by Lisowsky (2009). Combining confidential tax return data from the IRS with infor-
mation from Compustat, he builds a model that infers a firm’s US tax liability from all tax 
disclosures in its public financial statements. He documents a robust positive relationship be-
tween tax expense and actual tax payments indicated in the tax return. In particular, he finds 
that one dollar of current federal tax expense recorded in financial statements is associated with 
about 70 cents total tax reported to the IRS. Besides, Lisowsky (2009) identifies additional tax 
disclosure items which help (e.g., change in the tax contingency reserve, cash taxes paid) or do 
not help (e.g., deferred taxes) to estimate US total tax. In summary, as tax disclosures in finan-
cial statements are primarily designed to provide a fair presentation of a firm’s tax burden from 
an accounting perspective, they do not facilitate a precise calculation of taxable income or tax 
liabilities in the home country (Hanlon, 2003). Nevertheless, they allow for a good approxima-
tion. 
The growing interest in research on the tax planning behavior of MNEs has spurred the 
need for suitable measures of tax avoidance on firm-level. As the access to confidential tax 
authority data is rare, researchers have developed a series of measures based on the publicly 
available tax disclosures in consolidated financial statements. This includes different versions 
of the ETR (GAAP vs. cash ETR, annual vs. long-run), variations of BTD measures (temporary 
and total BTDs, abnormal BTDs, discretionary permanent BTDs), and the tax contingency re-
serve (especially after the introduction of FIN 48). Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) provide a de-
tailed overview and illustrate for each measure which forms of tax avoidance it captures.33 They 
also highlight the importance of selecting a proxy which fits the research question. 
A handful of studies try to test the validity of specific proxies by using additional infor-
mation on companies’ tax avoidance behavior from other sources as a benchmark. An early 
                                                 
33  As Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) note, it is important to consider the variety of tax planning activities. For 
example, conforming tax avoidance never results in a difference between financial and tax accounts, deferral 
strategies create temporary differences, and some other kinds of non-conforming tax avoidance give rise to 
permanent differences. Consequently, every measure includes only some forms of tax avoidance while exclud-
ing others.  
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analysis of Mills (1998) shows that temporary BTDs are associated with proposed IRS audit 
adjustments. Other authors rely on samples of US firms allegedly engaging in tax sheltering. 
The term “tax shelter” refers to a very aggressive form of transactions whose main benefit is 
reducing the tax burden. While complying with the letter of material tax law, the IRS – based 
on case law – may deny the legality if a transaction lacks economic substance. Such cases often 
end up in court, and Graham and Tucker (2006) use public tax court records and financial news 
to identify firms accused of engaging in tax shelters. Desai and Dharmapala (2009), Frank et 
al. (2009), and Wilson (2009) build upon this approach and document that their BTD measures 
are associated with the incidence of tax sheltering accusations. Lisowsky (2010) instead ex-
ploits confidential information on tax sheltering cases obtained by the IRS’ Office of Tax Shel-
ter Analysis (OTSA).34 He finds that total BTDs and the tax contingency reserve (prior to FIN 
48) are related to tax shelter engagement, while the long-run cash ETR and Frank et al.’s (2009) 
measure of discretionary permanent BTDs are not. Finally, Lisowsky et al. (2013) again use a 
confidential OTSA dataset and show that the UTBs to be disclosed after the introduction of FIN 
48 are a strong predictor of tax shelter participation and outperform all other conventional 
measures of tax avoidance. 
Apart from their conflicting results, studies correlating different tax avoidance proxies 
with tax sheltering incidence need to be interpreted with caution. First, the tax shelter datasets 
suffer from selection bias, as they only include firms that were discovered or actively disclosed 
to the tax authorities (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Second, as a transaction-based indicator, tax 
shelter participation is not necessarily informative about a firm’s overall level of tax avoidance. 
Firms with sufficient opportunities to engage in less risky tax planning strategies might abstain 
from aggressive tax shelters (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Thus, a significant association with 
tax sheltering does not qualify a measure as a universal proxy for tax avoidance. 
While UTBs have become a popular measure for (risky) tax avoidance due to their con-
ception as reflecting controversial tax positions, a study of L. A. Robinson et al. (2016) casts 
some doubt on their informativeness. Firms appear to be over-reserved, as only 24% of the 
UTBs unwind due to settlements with tax authorities within three years. Using confidential IRS 
                                                 
34  The sample used by Lisowsky (2010) comprises the years 2000-2004. In this period, the OTSA obtained its 
information on tax shelter participation through enforcement actions or voluntary disclosures by firms. In con-
trast, the OTSA dataset for the years 2006-2009 exploited by the subsequent study of Lisowsky et al. (2013) is 
based on firms’ mandatory disclosures of reportable transactions (Form 8886). See Section III.B of Table A.1 




data, L. A. Robinson et al. (2016) document that ETRs decrease in the periods of settlements, 
implying that the initial reserves exceed the actual amount of cash settlements. This tendency 
to overstate reserves may be inherent in the recognition and measurement criteria of FIN 48 
since they require firms to assume that all relevant positions will be detected by a tax audit.35 
Consequently, although UTBs may serve to identify certain forms of tax avoidance, their in-
formative value regarding future cash tax payments arising from risky positions seems to be 
restricted. 
In summary, it has to be noted that all the different proxies for tax avoidance based on tax 
items in consolidated financial statements reflect only certain forms of tax avoidance while 
excluding others. Attempts to empirically validate these proxies can provide only limited evi-
dence as tax planning decisions are unobservable. In addition, measures based on financial ac-
counting numbers may be distorted by aggressive financial reporting decisions and by firms 
using tax accounts for earnings management purposes (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010).  
5.1.2 Country-by-country reporting 
While financial reporting standards are mainly designed to provide investors with infor-
mation on firm performance, virtually all other types of tax disclosure rules under the scope of 
our review serve the primary goal of informing tax authorities or other stakeholders about cor-
porate tax behavior. In recent years, we have seen a remarkably rapid growth in studies, which 
exploit the data resulting from different CbCR requirements. By construction, CbCRs shall en-
able their readers to assess whether the profits allocated to and taxes paid in each country by an 
MNE are in line with the distribution of economic activity. In other words, CbCRs are supposed 
to indicate international profit shifting, a particular (and very important) form of tax avoidance. 
To assess the incremental informativeness of CbCRs in this regard, we first provide a very brief 
summary of how prior research has studied profit shifting.36  
Profit shifting denotes the artificial relocation of taxable profits from high-tax to low-tax 
countries, e.g., by transfer pricing, licensing of intangibles, or intra-group financing 
                                                 
35  It has to be noted, though, that several studies document a systematic decrease of the UTB amounts recorded 
in firms’ financial statements following the introduction of the related confidential disclosure requirements of 
Schedule UTP (see the review of this literature in Section 4.3). However, this finding does not necessarily 
imply that the newly disclosed amounts of UTBs are more informative compared to UTB amounts prior to 
Schedule UTP as the reduction seems to be driven by firms trying to minimize the positions they would need 
to explain in Schedule UTP. 
36  For a comprehensive review of the profit shifting literature, we refer the reader to Dharmapala (2014, 2020), 




(Heckemeyer & Overesch, 2017). As the amount of shifted profits is not directly observable, 
researchers rely on indirect approaches to detect and measure profit shifting (Dyreng & Hanlon, 
2019). A widely-used approach37 developed by Hines and Rice (1994) models the pre-tax in-
come reported by an affiliate of an MNE in a particular country as the sum of “true” profits 
(explained by economic input factors) and shifted profits (induced by tax incentives). The tax 
incentive is usually formalized as the difference between the host country's statutory tax rate 
and a group average.38 In the standard log-linear regression specification, the coefficient on the 
tax incentive variable can be interpreted as the tax semi-elasticity of reported profits. 
A multitude of different data sources have been employed so far to examine profit shift-
ing. While virtually all studies suggest that MNEs engage in profit shifting to some extent 
(Dyreng & Hanlon, 2019), estimates of the size of this phenomenon vary considerably across 
different datasets. Several researchers rely on macro-level information, such as data on foreign 
operations of US firms from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (Hines & Rice, 1994) or 
new datasets of international foreign affiliate statistics (Tørsløv et al., 2020). These studies typ-
ically find rather large amounts of profit shifting, with tax semi-elasticities around -3 (Clausing, 
2016; Hines & Rice, 1994) or about 40% of MNEs’ foreign profits being shifted to tax havens 
(Tørsløv et al., 2020). In contrast, other authors exploit micro-level datasets, especially infor-
mation from unconsolidated financial statements of subsidiaries provided by Bureau van Dijk 
(BvD) databases. Most micro-level studies document only modest results with tax semi-elas-
ticities around -1 (Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008).39 Meta-regression 
analyses by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) and Beer et al. (2020) also confirm that the ag-
gregate datasets tend to produce much stronger results. This finding has raised the question of 
how the discrepancy can be explained. 
Critics of micro-level datasets point out that BvD data mostly lack observations from tax 
havens that are probably the most relevant locations for profit shifting (Clausing, 2020; Dyreng 
& Hanlon, 2019). In this vein, the findings of Dowd et al. (2017) suggest that MNEs’ tax re-
sponsiveness is non-linear and that elasticities are highest with regard to low-tax countries. 
Furthermore, micro-level studies usually treat each company observation equally, while only a 
                                                 
37  Other approaches, for example, exploit earnings shocks (Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013) or compare reported 
labor productivities of MNEs with those of domestic firms (Tørsløv et al., 2020). 
38  The composite tax index developed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008) basically represents the difference between 
the host country tax rate and a weighted group average. Alternative tax incentive proxies include the host 
country statutory tax rate or measures of the ETR and ETR differences. 
39  However, a micro-level study on a sample of banks using Bankscope data documents a tax semi-elasticity of  
-2.4, suggesting that banks are more tax-sensitive than firms from other industries (Merz & Overesch, 2016). 
 
41 
few very large companies might be responsible for a vast majority of total profit shifting 
(Clausing, 2020). On the other hand, the aggregate structure of macro-level datasets does not 
allow to control for affiliate fixed effects, resulting in an over-estimation of profit shifting (as 
noted by Dharmapala, 2020). More importantly, a recent working paper of Blouin and Robinson 
(2020) claims that the aggregate BEA data, as used by prior research, suffer from a severe 
double counting and/or misallocation of profits. They propose a way to correct this error, which 
drastically reduces the estimates of profit shifting. Blouin and Robinson (2020) also discuss 
potential double counting and misallocation problems of several other data sources. 
Considering all the drawbacks of conventional datasets, it seems appealing to examine 
whether new information from CbCRs may serve as a preferable source to investigate profit 
shifting (Dyreng & Hanlon, 2019). The first setting where CbCR data have become available 
for research is the public CbCR requirement for EU financial institutions, which was introduced 
for financial years 2014 onwards.40 Several studies analyze hand-collected reports of different 
samples of European bank groups. Descriptive evidence suggests that tax havens play an im-
portant role for these firms, accounting for nearly one-fifth of their total worldwide profits (R. J. 
Brown et al., 2019; Dutt et al., 2019b; Janský, forthcoming). However, only certain tax havens 
(in particular, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Ireland, and Singapore) are used frequently, while the 
presences and profits disclosed in some other haven countries are negligible (R. J. Brown et al., 
2019; Dutt et al., 2019b; Janský, forthcoming). The CbCRs also reveal a considerable discon-
nect between reported profits and real activity. Relatedly, the profit per employee and the profit 
margin in tax havens is a multiple of the values in non-haven countries (R. J. Brown et al., 2019; 
Dutt et al., 2019b; Fatica & Gregori, 2020). Bouvatier et al. (2018) estimate a gravity model 
based on CbCR data to analyze the location decisions of EU bank groups. They find that tax 
havens attract about 200% additional turnover and nearly 160% additional employment beyond 
what can be explained by standard gravity factors, with German and UK-based bank groups 
exhibiting the most pronounced results. 
Two studies apply the standard approach developed by Hines and Rice (1994) to banks’ 
CbCR data (Dutt et al., 2019b; Fatica & Gregori, 2020). Both face the challenge that banks’ 
CbCRs do not contain an appropriate control variable for capital input (such as tangible or total 
assets). Still, they differ in terms of sample selection, the primary tax incentive variable, coun-
try-level controls, and fixed effect structure. Fatica and Gregori (2020) find an average tax semi-
elasticity of -2.5, which is close to the results of prior research on banks using BvD data (Merz 
                                                 
40  See Section 2.2.1 and Section I.B of Table A.1 in the Appendix for further details. 
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& Overesch, 2016). However, consistent with Dowd et al. (2017), they also observe that the 
responsiveness is much stronger with respect to tax haven locations. In contrast, Dutt et al. 
(2019b) document that the absence of a control variable for capital input severely biases the 
estimates against finding evidence of profit shifting. Based on a simplified correction for the 
bias's presumed size, they arrive at an average tax semi-elasticity of -4.6. 
In order to evaluate the incremental information revealed by the CbCR data, Dutt et al. 
(2019b) directly compare their dataset with the information contained in the BvD databases 
Orbis and Bank Focus for an identical sample of bank groups. They show that the commercial 
databases exhibit a good coverage of the group structure but lack financial statement infor-
mation for a large fraction of subsidiaries (especially of those in tax havens). The CbCR data 
uncover this information. However, the advantage in terms of coverage is counteracted by the 
limited set of variables on economic activity to be reported in banks’ CbCRs, casting doubt on 
whether this disclosure enables more precise estimations of the extent of profit shifting. 
Although the CbCR framework proposed by the OECD stipulates only private disclosure 
to tax authorities,41 the IRS has recently published the first aggregate data of US-based MNEs 
for 2016 and 2017.42 This CbCR framework comprises more variables due to its confidential 
nature, including tangible assets as a potential proxy for capital input. A few studies use the 
first wave of data published by the IRS and examine their advantages and problems. In terms 
of coverage, these studies document that the IRS CbCRs are clearly superior to Orbis (Garcia-
Bernardo et al., 2019) and even contain information on more than twice as many countries as 
the public BEA data series (Clausing, 2020; Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2019). Concerning the dou-
ble-counting issue, CbCRs do not suffer from the problems inherent in the BEA data as the 
method of profit allocation differs (Blouin & Robinson, 2020). Researchers discuss some other 
potential sources of double counting due to intra-group dividends and the position of “stateless 
income”43 in the US CbCRs. However, first quantitative analyses show that, after correcting for 
stateless income, aggregate profits from the IRS CbCR dataset only slightly exceed the 
                                                 
41  See Section 2.2.2 and Section III.A of Table A.1 in the Appendix for more details. 
42  Available at https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-country-by-country-report (accessed on 15 June 2020). 
The data for 2016 are mainly based on voluntary reports, the data for 2017 represent the first full year of 
mandatory reports. 
43  Owing to the US tax system and the US CbCR implementation, the income of conduit entities such as partner-
ships needs to be disclosed as “stateless income”. When both a partnership and its partner have to file a CbCR, 
the income labelled as stateless is recorded twice in the aggregate CbCR dataset (Blouin & Robinson, 2020). 
To avoid this problem, Clausing (2020) eliminates the position of stateless income from the dataset. 
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benchmarks of corrected BEA profits and aggregate financial statements profits from Com-
pustat (Blouin & Robinson, 2020; Clausing, 2020; Horst & Curatolo, 2020). 
In light of these advantages, Clausing (2020) uses the IRS CbCR data for 2017 as an 
alternative source to quantify profit shifting of multinational firms headquartered in the US. 
Depending on the method applied, she estimates that the US has lost corporate tax revenues of 
USD 91-134 bn (i.e., about 30-45% of its total corporate income tax revenues) in 2017, which 
is in the range of the large amounts of profit shifting documented by prior studies using aggre-
gate datasets. However, these results need to be interpreted with caution. Other researchers 
assess such numbers as implausibly high (Dyreng & Hanlon, 2019) and question the assump-
tions underlying the calculations (Blouin & Robinson, 2020). Besides, the IRS CbCR dataset is 
very new and, so far, offers only one full year of mandatory reports. 
In summary, first evidence suggests that different kinds of CbCR datasets – which will 
increasingly become available in the future44 – can provide additional information on MNEs’ 
profit shifting behavior due to several advantageous features. If available on firm-level, CbCR 
disclosures contain disaggregated information, allowing researchers to control for group- and 
affiliate-specific factors. Simultaneously, CbCRs offer a more complete country coverage, in-
cluding all tax havens, which is superior to unconsolidated financial statements from the BvD 
databases and more comprehensive than the public BEA data series. Finally, CbCRs are less 
prone (albeit not immune) to double counting or misallocation of profits than BEA data or 
international foreign affiliate statistics. 
Nevertheless, several caveats should be noted when using CbCR information to examine 
profit shifting. First, companies do not have to report the data on the subsidiary level but on the 
country level, which already implies a certain degree of aggregation. Second, the multilateral 
CbCR regulations contain several explicit choices, and, in addition, their wording leaves a cer-
tain scope for interpretation. For example, the OECD (2015) framework allows for a wide range 
of sources to compile the CbCRs, including financial statements, regulatory filings, and even 
managerial accounting. Similarly, the EU requirement for banks lacks a clear definition of the 
items to be reported and the applicable consolidation scope. The resulting leeway likely causes 
differences in national implementation and companies’ reporting practices, impeding the 
                                                 
44  The OECD (2020) has just recently published aggregate international CbCR information, the IRS will probably 
publish further years of data, researchers might occasionally be granted access to tax authorities’ confidential 
CbCR datasets, and the EU is still discussing about a general public CbCR requirement for large MNEs. 
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comparability of the data. Since extant studies have not addressed this issue, more research on 
potential heterogeneity within CbCR datasets is warranted. 
Third, when relying on CbCR data, researchers are confined to a limited selection of var-
iables. While this drawback is especially pronounced for the CbCRs of European banks (lacking 
a capital input proxy), even the OECD’s confidential CbCR does neither include labor costs nor 
any direct indicators reflecting intra-group financing or licensing of intangibles. Forth, even if 
firms had to report all these items, it should be noted that information on the distribution of 
several economic input factors per se does not imply a universal formula or benchmark for a 
“fair” allocation of profits (Lagarden et al., 2020). Finally, since CbCRs are generally based on 
accounting information, the profits disclosed per country do not necessarily correspond to the 
international allocation of taxable income. A recent study of Bilicka (2019) shows that foreign 
MNEs increasingly report zero taxable income but, simultaneously, positive accounting profits 
in the UK (as a high-tax country). Like other accounting-based measures, CbCRs cannot cap-
ture such non-conforming tax planning activities. In light of these caveats, CbCR datasets likely 
constitute an additional piece in the puzzle, rather than revealing the whole picture of MNEs’ 
profit shifting behavior. 
5.2 Qualitative tax disclosures 
In light of the limitations of quantitative disclosures and due to the advance of textual 
analysis techniques, research has recently started examining qualitative tax disclosures as an 
additional source of information on tax behavior. For example, Campbell et al. (2019) analyze 
tax-related risk factor disclosures of public US firms. As of 2005, the SEC requires firms to 
discuss significant risk factors in their 10-K filings (Item 1A). Campbell et al. (2019) measure 
the extent of firms’ tax-related risk factor disclosures and find a negative association with future 
cash tax payments. They conclude that the tax risks discussed by managers reflect positions of 
reasonable risk-taking (i.e., which are value-increasing as they result in positive future net cash 
flows). 
The trend towards more tax transparency has also entailed new qualitative disclosures, 
such as the tax strategy reports to be published by certain firms with a presence in the UK.45 
This requirement appears to be particularly interesting from a research perspective. As opposed 
to financial statements and CbCR disclosures, it demands that firms state explicit information 
on their attitude towards tax planning. Bilicka et al. (2020) examine the content of about 260 
                                                 
45  See Section 2.2.1 and Section I.C of Table A.1 in the Appendix for more information. 
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reports published by MNEs headquartered in the UK. They conduct natural language processing 
analyses based on plagiarism software to identify common phrases across the different docu-
ments. The results indicate a modest degree of overall resemblance, with an average value of 
the highest similarity level across reports of about 8%. Moreover, about 6% of the analyzed 
publications exhibit a similarity level exceeding 30%, which they label as “boilerplate” disclo-
sures. In a study prepared for Tax Justice Network, Belnap (2019b) applies corresponding tech-
niques to around 600 reports of US-based MNEs subject to UK regulation. In contrast to Bilicka 
et al. (2020), he finds an average similarity level of 30%. He also highlights a striking example 
of two very large US companies whose reports are 86% alike. Since the documented similarity 
is not driven by firms operating in the same industries, he infers that firms either copy from 
each other or external advisors jointly provide that standard phrases. While the overall results 
of Belnap (2019b) and Bilicka et al. (2020) differ, both studies indicate that the tax strategy 
reports of at least some firms may be rather uninformative about their tax planning behavior. 
Due to the qualitative nature of this disclosure type, firms have considerable leeway to influence 
its informativeness. The potential determinants of such disclosure decisions have been exam-
ined in Section 4. 
5.3 Interim conclusion 
Research on how informative (public) disclosures are about a firm’s tax behavior is fo-
cused mainly on quantitative disclosures. A well-established strand of the literature develops 
and tests a group of tax avoidance measures calculated from financial statement items. More 
recently, authors have started to exploit the first available CbCR datasets and assess their infor-
mation content regarding profit shifting. While all these studies provide an important basis for 
research on the factors associated with tax avoidance, they face the problem that tax planning 
decisions and profit shifting actions per se are unobservable. Thus, there is no reliable bench-
mark to validate the suitability of these measures and datasets. As a complementary source of 
information, researchers increasingly examine qualitative tax disclosures (such as risk factor 
disclosures and tax strategy reports). Still, the first results suggest that some firms might reduce 
the informativeness by using boilerplate language. Interestingly, although several authors in-
vestigate firms' and stakeholders' reactions to public tax return disclosure regimes, we lack 
studies that analyze the disclosed information itself. Considering the results of Bilicka (2019) 
and the restricted possibilities to access confidential tax authority data, it could be fruitful to 
combine and compare public tax return datasets with financial statement information. 
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6 Effects of tax disclosure 
6.1 Effects on firms and managers 
In this section, we survey studies on firm reactions to tax disclosure. The increase in a 
firm’s level of tax transparency by introducing mandatory disclosure requirements or by third-
party reporting alters the firm's information environment towards its stakeholders. If a firm 
expects the disclosure to be incrementally informative for adversarial recipients or to result in 
negative attention on its tax planning activities, the disclosure may induce changes in corporate 
outcomes. Theoretically, several corporate responses are conceivable (see Section 3.3.2). First, 
firms might attempt to prevent becoming subject to the disclosure requirement (Lenter et al., 
2003). Second, firms might adjust their tax planning behavior if sustaining the current tax strat-
egy becomes too costly upon disclosure. This firm response directly relates to the effectiveness 
of transparency regulations, which are designed to curb tax avoidance. However, to the extent 
that higher levels of tax transparency increase effective tax burdens, this may also change the 
marginal costs of investment opportunities, thereby distorting investment decisions.46 More 
precisely, firms could respond by relocating their investments, which would be an unintended 
consequence from the perspective of policymakers. 
For the next parts, we distinguish between studies that examine corporate reactions to tax 
disclosure regulations (Section 6.1.1) and studies on the effects of actual tax disclosure on firms 
and managers (Section 6.1.2). Following the classification outlined in Section 2.2, we first sur-
vey corporate responses to public tax disclosure regimes before we turn to the reactions to con-
fidential tax reporting rules. 
6.1.1 Firm reactions to tax disclosure regulations 
6.1.1.1 Public tax disclosure regimes 
Public tax disclosure regulations primarily aim to improve firms' accountability and com-
pliance towards investors and other stakeholders. Nevertheless, tax authorities may also use the 
published information. Due to these various recipients, the potential effects of increased trans-
parency on firms could be driven by different channels. For instance, firms might reduce their 
tax avoidance level in response to (expected) reputational risks or due to improved tax enforce-
ment or both. 
                                                 
46  Prior literature provides strong evidence that corporate investment decisions are tax-sensitive (e.g., Feld & 
Heckemeyer, 2011; Giroud & Rauh, 2019) and that a reduction in tax avoidance opportunities might negatively 
affect economic real activity in high-tax countries (e.g., Overesch, 2009; Suárez Serrato, 2019). See Section 
3.3.2 for further explanations.  
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With the implementation of FIN 48 in 2007, the FASB intended to standardize the treat-
ment of tax uncertainty in financial reporting, which was subject to substantial diversity before. 
US firms were now required to disclose their aggregated tax reserve amounts (UTBs). Given 
the comprehensive disclosure requirements in the notes, practitioners expressed concerns that 
this information would provide the IRS with a “roadmap” to identify and audit firms’ most 
controversial tax positions, resulting in higher tax payments (see Frischmann et al., 2008).  
In general, extant research on FIN 48 indicates that the standard still allows for certain 
discretion, as evidenced, for example, by the substantial reduction of UTBs in connection with 
the introduction of Schedule UTP (Section 4.3).47 Nevertheless, the disclosure of UTBs seems 
to involve risks concerning pending tax audits. For instance, Blouin et al. (2010) examine 
whether firms attempt to settle disputes due to the impending adoption of FIN 48. According 
to their findings, firms with higher IRS deficiencies were more likely to resolve disputes to 
avoid additional audit scrutiny. Relatedly, other studies consistently report that tax avoidance 
decreased in post-FIN 48 periods (Henry et al., 2016; Tomohara et al., 2012), suggesting that 
the tax reserves in financial statements are incrementally useful for assessing corporate tax po-
sitions.48 Gupta et al. (2014) extend this finding by analyzing changes in state-level tax avoid-
ance surrounding the adoption of FIN 48. Consistent with studies on the federal level, the au-
thors document an increase in state ETRs in response to the financial reporting rule. 
In sum, extant literature provides ample evidence that FIN 48 affected overall tax avoid-
ance. Still, one limitation common to these studies is the lack of an appropriate control group 
since the regulation applies to all firms reporting under US GAAP. While the studies conduct 
several cross-sectional tests to mitigate concerns of confounding events, they cannot entirely 
rule out that other unobservable factors are driving the results. 
As described in Section 2.2.1, two industry-specific CbCR frameworks have been intro-
duced in the EU, allowing researchers to study the effects of public disclosure on firm outcomes 
in multinational settings. Extant literature mainly focuses on the public CbCR for European 
banks under the CRD IV, which became effective as of the financial year 2014. The content of 
these reports allows for insights into banks’ international activities and profitability, although 
                                                 
47  Moreover, findings on earnings management through tax reserves following the adoption of FIN 48 are incon-
clusive (see Section 5.1.1). 
48  This is also consistent with the results of Bozanic et al. (2017), who show that the IRS increasingly downloaded 




fewer items have to be reported than under the OECD’s confidential CbCR. Joshi et al. (forth-
coming) formally test the impact of the CbCR introduction with archival data and provide some 
evidence consistent with decreased income shifting among bank affiliates in the post-adoption 
period.49 However, the authors find no evidence for overall tax avoidance changes, suggesting 
that banks resort to alternative strategies to reduce their tax burden. This conclusion is partially 
questioned by Overesch and Wolff (2019). They show that the extent of the overall reduction 
in tax avoidance varies based on banks’ exposure to public scrutiny (measured by their tax 
haven presences). 
In a related study, Eberhartinger et al. (2020) assess whether global systemically im-
portant banks50 headquartered in the EU decrease their tax haven presence in response to CbCR. 
Their results imply that banks strategically shut down subsidiaries that lack real economic ac-
tivity. This finding is supported by Bouvatier et al. (2018), who show that the level of commer-
cial activities in tax havens reported by the banks remains unchanged. In sum, extant evidence 
suggests that the public CbCR requirement for European banks led to tax planning adjustments. 
Still, it remains unclear which channels (stronger tax enforcement or reputational concerns) are 
the primary forces for the documented effects.  
So far, only one study examines the effects of mandatory CbCR requirements imposed 
on extractive industries, which primarily focus on increasing transparency on the different kinds 
of payments between firms and governments. Exploiting the staggered introduction of such 
regimes in Europe and Canada, Rauter (2020) shows that disclosing companies increase their 
payments to host governments by roughly 12%. In cross-sectional tests, he finds the effects to 
be stronger among firms that face higher reputational risks, suggesting that the disclosure re-
quirements imposed reputational costs on affected firms. In additional tests, the study provides 
strong evidence that the increased transparency led to a shift in investment activities from dis-
closing firms to non-disclosing firms, causing lower overall productivity. These findings relate 
to prior studies in CSR disclosure literature documenting that uneven disclosure requirements 
can distort investment decisions and capital allocation (Christensen et al., 2019). Clearly, the 
results may not generalize to other transparency rules, given the peculiarities of the extractive 
                                                 
49  In contrast, a supplemental test of Dutt et al. (2019b) based on Bank Focus data suggests that the tax semi-
elasticity of affected EU banks in the post-CbCR periods is similar to the one documented by Merz and 
Overesch (2016) for periods before the CbCR introduction. 
50  To assess EU banks’ systematic riskiness, the European Banking Authority (EBA) compiles a yearly list of 




sector (with controversies on exploitative characteristics and environmental impact). Neverthe-
less, they call the desirability of unevenly adopted transparency measures into question. 
A small but instructive strand of literature examines the effects of public tax return dis-
closure by tax authorities on firm outcomes. The stated objective of public tax return policies 
is to encourage firms and individuals to comply with tax laws. So far, only a few countries (i.a., 
Norway, Japan, Australia) adopted such transparency measures.51 Proponents argue that such 
disclosure regimes enhance tax enforcement and monitoring of firms by making actual tax pay-
ments accessible for the general public (Blank, 2014). From a firm perspective, the public dis-
closure of complex and sensitive information involves the risk of misinterpretation of the dis-
closed items and subsequent pressure (Lenter et al., 2003). Thus, such measures may provide 
incentives to avoid disclosure ex-ante. For instance, both the Japanese and Australian regula-
tions contain(ed) a provision that the disclosure would only apply to taxpayers above a certain 
taxable income threshold (see Section II of Table A.1 in the Appendix). 
In fact, empirical findings support the expectation that firms understate their taxable in-
come to avoid disclosure (Hasegawa et al., 2013; Hoopes et al., 2018). Descriptive evidence by 
Hoopes et al. (2018) indicates that the excess mass below the threshold is higher for foreign-
owned businesses and private firms, consistent with higher disclosure costs for these firms. 
Concerning actual tax payments, the authors report only limited evidence of firms increasing 
their tax payments under the disclosure regime. Similarly, S. Chen (2017) finds no evidence of 
changes in corporate tax avoidance by Australian firms in reaction to the public disclosure, 
consistent with corresponding findings by Hasegawa et al. (2013) in the Japanese setting.52 In 
sum, firms seem to perceive the disclosure as costly and avoid it, but it remains unclear whether 
the measure effectively hinders aggressive tax planning. 
Slemrod et al. (2020) are the first to provide valuable insights into how public appraisal 
regimes for large taxpayers affect corporate outcomes. The authors analyze taxpayers’ re-
sponses to a social recognition and appraisal program in Pakistan (see Section II of Table A.1). 
The program publicly rewards the top 100 taxpaying corporations to promote tax compliance. 
According to early results, firms around the threshold manage their tax liability to become or 
remain eligible for the honor program. Hence, it seems that these firms attempt to monetize the 
                                                 
51  Japan abolished the public disclosure of tax return information in 2004. 
52  Analyzing the public tax return disclosure for individuals in Norway, Bø et al. (2015) report a strong response 
in reported taxable income to increased transparency among business owners. In particular, the information 
was made accessible through the internet, which increased the salience of the disclosure. The authors conclude 




social recognition associated with the honor program. As the program's benefits are transferred 
to the responsible managers of these firms, the behavior may also involve the self-serving in-
terests of the responsible managers. More research is needed to understand better whether such 
disclosure programs cause unintended consequences for shareholders. 
6.1.1.2 Confidential tax disclosure rules 
The primary purpose of confidential tax disclosure rules is to improve the amount or 
quality of information available to tax authorities, which are the only recipient of this disclo-
sure. Thus, corporate responses are either attributable to improved tax enforcement or firms 
expecting the disclosure to update tax authorities’ knowledge about corporate tax positions.  
Regarding country-specific confidential tax reporting regimes, existing research mainly 
studies US regulations. One of the first settings that have been examined empirically is the 
adoption of Schedule M-3 in 2004. Under this regulation, firms with assets above USD 10 mil-
lion have to provide a detailed reconciliation of their worldwide financial statement income to 
US taxable income. The regulation is intended to provide the IRS with additional information 
to assess the discrepancies between financial reporting and tax reporting (i.e., BTDs). To the 
extent that BTDs result from corporate tax planning strategies, increased detection risk may 
alter the net benefits of certain forms of tax avoidance. Consistent with this assertion, some 
studies find a decline in discretionary permanent BTDs (Donohoe & McGill, 2011) and total 
amounts of reported BTDs (Green & Plesko, 2016) around the implementation of Schedule M-
3. These findings are partially challenged by Henry et al. (2016), who even document an in-
crease in the level of tax avoidance after the introduction of the regime.53 Moreover, this in-
crease is stronger for domestic firms, suggesting that the regime is more informative about for-
eign operations (consistent with Hope et al., 2013). 
Another frequently examined private disclosure regime is Schedule UTP, which supple-
ments corporate tax returns. As discussed in Section 4.3, there is ample evidence that firms 
report lower tax reserves (UTBs) in their financial statement following Schedule UTP. Never-
theless, some studies conclude that firms continue to claim uncertain tax positions on corporate 
tax returns (Honaker & Sharma, 2017; Towery, 2017), as they fail to document effects on cor-
porate tax avoidance. Other studies even indicate an increase across several tax avoidance 
                                                 
53  The authors use a cash-based measure of tax avoidance developed by Henry and Sansing (2018). Unlike many 
conventional measures, their proxy is also defined for loss-years, which enables the authors to consider the 
entire population of profitable and loss-making firms across their sample period. Unfortunately, the study does 
not report robustness tests with conventional tax avoidance measures as dependent variable. 
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measures in subsequent periods (Green & Plesko, 2016; Henry et al., 2016). Overall, combined 
empirical evidence suggests that Schedule UTP was mostly ineffective in hindering corporate 
tax avoidance. 
On an international level, the staggered introduction of a private CbCR by countries par-
ticipating in the OECD BEPS project represents a significant regulatory shock to tax transpar-
ency from 2016 onwards. Large MNEs exceeding a certain revenue threshold are required to 
report a detailed geographic breakdown of their international activity and key financial items 
to the competent tax authority in their country of residence. The reports are subsequently shared 
with tax authorities in other jurisdictions. Proponents argue that the reports include previously 
unavailable information that may help tax authorities target audits more efficiently and detect 
aggressive tax planning schemes (OECD, 2015). For instance, the data can be used to assess 
the profitability across countries as well as taxes paid in each jurisdiction. While the aggregated 
nature of the data does not allow for direct inferences about corporate tax planning strategies, 
the disclosure might be sufficiently costly to affect corporate behavior.  
So far, three concurrent studies examine the effect of the regulation on corporate out-
comes. Early evidence supports the conjecture that the increased detection risk alters the net 
benefits of tax avoidance (Hugger, 2020; Joshi, 2020). The studies find that regulated firms 
exhibit a 1-2 percentage point increase in consolidated ETRs relative to firms not subject to 
CbCR. On the subsidiary level, Joshi (2020) provides some evidence of reduced profit shifting 
among affiliates beginning in 2018. This delayed response might be due to firms learning about 
how tax authorities utilize the information. Interestingly, the effects of the regulation seem to 
be more pronounced than those documented for the public CbCR for European banks. 
De Simone and Olbert (2020) examine the immediate effect of the regulation on group 
structures and economic activity of European MNEs using a regression discontinuity design. 
The authors document that firms just above the reporting threshold reduce organizational com-
plexity by closing affiliates at low hierarchical levels and affiliates located in tax havens. This 
evidence is consistent with a related study of Braun and Weichenrieder (2015), who show that 
German MNEs dissolve tax haven subsidiaries following the signing of bilateral TIEAs.54 The 
respective tax haven affiliates presumably did not have sufficient economic substance to justify 
profit attribution during a tax audit. Additional tests by De Simone and Olbert (2020) suggest 
                                                 
54  While the focus of TIEAs is rather on fighting tax evasion of wealthy individuals (see Section 2.2.2), the 




that MNEs reallocate economic activity to European countries with preferential tax regimes by 
increasing investments in tangible assets and employment in these locations. Thus, firms seem 
to adjust investment decisions in response to increased transparency. Overall, these studies pro-
vide robust evidence that increased transparency on corporate activities in low-tax jurisdictions 
affects businesses' location choices. 
Apart from direct effects on corporate tax planning strategies, Hugger (2020) reports 
some evidence that MNEs manipulate their revenues downwards to avoid being subject to the 
CbCR obligation.55 Cross-sectional tests show that the excess mass below the threshold is 
higher for private firms with fewer reporting requirements and more tax-aggressive firms. 
CbCR arguably invokes higher potential costs for these firms (both in terms of preparing the 
reports and of tax payments), which increases the incentive to manipulate the revenues below 
the threshold. 
6.1.2 Firm reactions to actual disclosure of tax-related information 
Under most transparency regulations, companies enjoy some discretion regarding the data 
or information being disclosed. However, companies also encounter situations in which they 
have no control over the published information or the tonality, for example, in cases of infor-
mation leakage or public campaigns. Such disclosures are typically characterized by a public 
shaming component for perceived corporate misbehavior (e.g., aggressive tax planning). As we 
have discussed in Section 4.2, public attention in the form of press articles or campaigns by 
NGOs on corporate tax behavior seems to be an important factor for firms’ subsequent tax 
disclosure decisions. 
Beyond disclosure choices, prior literature shows that media attention on corporate be-
havior can induce firm responses (e.g., Dyck et al., 2008). According to recent survey evidence, 
managers are increasingly concerned about reputational risks associated with corporate tax 
planning activities (Graham et al., 2014). Apart from reputational concerns, publicly revealed 
tax arrangements may also be informative for tax authorities. Thus, public revelations may pro-
voke corporate responses, such as changes in tax avoidance. Of course, under rational decision 
                                                 
55  Joshi (2020) and De Simone and Olbert (2020) also test for bunching behavior, which would cast doubts on 
the validity of their identification strategy, but do not find evidence for self-selection. Importantly, the result 
of Hugger (2020) is only significant for the last period in his sample (i.e., in 2018) while De Simone and Olbert 
(2020) observe data only until 2017. Apart from different sample periods, differences in sample composition 




making, firms will only react if the actual costs resulting from increased transparency exceed 
the expected net savings from tax avoidance. This premise might explain why extant studies 
fail to find an association between public scrutiny and tax behavior upon media attention 
(S. Chen et al., 2019; Gallemore et al., 2014).56 Gallemore et al. (2014) further investigate 
whether firms or their managers bear reputational costs upon the revelation of tax shelter activ-
ities. Across a series of tests, the authors find no evidence that the revelation led to changes in 
management turnover, sales, or marketing expenses relative to other firms. While external pres-
sure due to perceived corporate misconduct can induce changes in corporate tax behavior 
(Dyreng et al., 2016), it remains unclear under which circumstances reputational costs materi-
alize. In sum, the general effect of media coverage on firms’ tax behavior seems somewhat 
limited. 
In a recent study, O’Donovan et al. (2019) investigate the effects of the Panama Papers 
that revealed secrete corporate offshore activities of multinational firms relating to bribery, tax 
evasion, and tax avoidance. Their analysis shows that affected firms were unable to sustain their 
level of tax avoidance following the leak. Since the information was mostly unknown to tax 
authorities, this effect likely stems from additional scrutiny rather than reputational costs. In-
terestingly, the authors also find a significant reduction in commercial activities reported in 
deemed corrupt countries, similar to the real effects documented by Rauter (2020). 
While not directly related to the studies above, Kubick et al. (2016) find that firms in-
crease reported (cash) ETRs after receiving a public tax-related comment letter from the SEC. 
This finding suggests that publicly visible regulatory pressure from the SEC decreases the ex-
pected benefits of tax avoidance and results in higher tax payments. Moreover, the authors show 
that peer firms in the same industry adjust their ETRs (regardless of having received a tax-
related comment letter themselves), consistent with spillover effects within industries. 
6.1.3 Interim conclusion 
In light of the policy developments worldwide, we observe an increasing number of stud-
ies examining the effects of transparency in multinational settings. We derive several conclu-
sions from our survey above. First, existing studies provide some evidence that firms adjust 
their tax planning behavior in response to increased transparency. However, this effect is lim-
ited to certain regulations (e.g., FIN 48 or CbCR). Notably, the results indicate that firms are 
                                                 




often able to keep their overall level of tax avoidance constant, suggesting that they substitute 
scrutinized tax strategies. Second, an increasing number of studies respond to prior calls by 
Leuz and Wysocki (2016) for more research on real effects of disclosure regulations. These 
studies document that if tax disclosure rules affect corporate tax burdens, firms seem to change 
their investment decisions, which could have adverse consequences for countries adopting the 
regulation. Moreover, the results demonstrate that disclosure rules need to be carefully designed 
as firms might try to avoid falling under the regulation. Third, there is robust evidence that both 
types of CbCR – public and private – involve substantial costs for regulated firms, given the 
strong corporate responses. However, future research should assess the long-term effect of these 
regulations, especially regarding private CbCR. Fourth, public disclosure of tax return infor-
mation (including actual tax payments) seems to be perceived as costly by affected firms. Fifth, 
we lack compelling large-sample evidence on whether and how reputational risks affect corpo-
rate tax policies within firms. Finally, we know little about how the introduction of qualitative 
tax disclosure requirements affects corporate behavior, despite the growing importance of such 
reporting regimes. One exception is the study by Bilicka et al. (2020), who find heterogeneous 
effects of mandatory tax strategy reports on corporate tax aggressiveness. While the level of tax 
avoidance remains unaffected on average, the authors document that previously tax-aggressive 
firms decrease their cash ETRs even further relative to non-tax-aggressive firms. Thus, the 
qualitative disclosure mandate seems to have had no effect on those firms that were specifically 
targeted. 
6.2 Effects on equity investors 
Considering the multitude of potential benefits and costs discussed in Section 3.3, it is to 
be expected that equity investors respond to tax-related disclosure. For our review, we distin-
guish between studies that examine the capital market effects of (presumed) increases in tax 
transparency (Section 6.2.1) and studies that focus on reactions to the actual issuance of tax-
related disclosures (Section 6.2.2).  
6.2.1 Investor reactions to increases in tax transparency 
Increases in tax transparency, either through the introduction of mandatory reporting re-
quirements or due to firms’ voluntary commitment to enhanced disclosures, may affect several 
capital market outcomes. If a specific type of public disclosure reduces information asymmetry, 
it will mitigate adverse selection problems, such as investors trying to price-protect or exiting 
the market. Consequently, stock market liquidity increases. Financial accounting research pro-
vides profound theoretical support and ample empirical evidence on this positive effect on stock 
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liquidity (Beyer et al., 2010; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). Moreover, some studies on financial 
reporting disclosures suggest that a reduction in information asymmetry can manifest in a lower 
cost of capital (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). 
As tax-related disclosures contain financial information about a firm (see Section 5.1.1), 
their publication could, in principle, also result in such capital market benefits. However, we 
currently lack empirical evidence on the effect of tax transparency on stock liquidity or the cost 
of capital. In this vein, a recent working paper of Hutchens et al. (2020) examines the imple-
mentation of SFAS 109 in the 1990s. SFAS 109 reformed the accounting for income taxes 
under US GAAP and was, in particular, designed to increase the informativeness of financial 
reporting on deferred taxes. Exploiting the staggered adoption of the new standard, Hutchens 
et al. (2020) find that individual investors (relative to more sophisticated investors) subse-
quently increased their stockholdings in firms most affected by SFAS 109. This result indicates 
that the new standard reduced the informational disadvantages of less sophisticated investors. 
Unlike stock liquidity and the cost of capital, a growing number of studies investigate the 
effect of increases in tax transparency on stock prices. It is important to note that stock price 
responses to the introduction of public tax-related disclosure requirements do not only reflect 
how investors evaluate the incremental informativeness of the disclosure. Instead, investors 
incorporate all the potential implications such regimes and the related reactions of firms and 
their stakeholders might have for the cost of capital and expected future cash flows. As de-
scribed in Section 3.3.2, these implications include potential benefits from decreased infor-
mation asymmetry and reduced possibilities of managers to hide expropriation activities and 
potential costs in the form of compliance costs, increased tax expense, proprietary costs, polit-
ical costs, reputational risks, and adverse real effects. Consequently, the change in stock prices 
will only show the expected net effect of all these different channels. 
Frischmann et al. (2008) investigate the introduction of FIN 48, which substantially in-
creased the public disclosure requirements for UTBs in financial statements. They do not find 
significant abnormal stock returns for affected firms across a series of legislative events. How-
ever, investors reacted negatively when the Senate later started scrutinizing FIN 48 disclosures, 
suggesting that investors revised their initial beliefs regarding potential political costs. Johan-
nesen and Larsen (2016) document a remarkable stock price decline of 5-10% around the in-
troduction of a public CbCR regulation for EU extractive industries. In contrast, Dutt et al. 
(2019a) do not observe a significant capital market reaction to the political decision to adopt a 
public CbCR requirement for EU financial institutions. Two studies exploit the implementation 
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of a public tax return disclosure regime in Australia. Hoopes et al. (2018) focus on a central 
date when the application threshold and the relevant items were announced for the first time 
and find that affected firms exhibit negative abnormal returns.57 S. Chen (2017) extends their 
analysis by three additional legislative events. Interestingly, she documents that the adverse 
capital market reaction to the first two events – including the date examined by Hoopes et al. 
(2018) – is offset by a positive response to the latter two events. Thus, she conjectures that 
investors re-evaluated their beliefs in the course of the legislative procedure and ultimately ex-
pected net benefits. Finally, albeit not related to a mandatory disclosure regime, O’Donovan et 
al. (2019) investigate the increase in tax transparency resulting from the so-called Panama Pa-
pers. This data leak provided public insights into the use of (previously secret) shell companies 
incorporated in offshore tax havens. Given the sheer number of leaked documents, investors 
were probably unable to process the detailed information about each firm on the day of the 
disclosure (i.e., the event day). Thus, the documented stock price decline for firms exposed to 
the leak of about 0.9% probably rather reflects investors' general expectations about the effects 
of the shock to transparency. 
In summary, extant evidence on average stock price responses to upcoming increases in 
public tax-related disclosures is decidedly mixed. However, this can probably be explained by 
differences in the settings and the type of information published, resulting in different net bal-
ances of the related benefits and costs. For example, while the Panama Papers revelations about 
shell companies may be particularly useful for tax audits, public tax return disclosures cannot 
increase the information available to tax authorities (as they are the issuer). Conversely, the 
salience of publications made by tax authorities may be associated with higher reputational 
costs. Even the two public CbCR regimes in the EU exhibit heterogeneous capital market re-
sponses. While the disclosure requirement for banks is designed to assess whether they pay a 
“fair share” of taxes in each country, the obligation for the extractive industries primarily aims 
at fighting corruption in this sector. As the real effects documented by Rauter (2020) suggest, 
the large stock price drop for the extractive industries may be driven by investors’ expectation 
that reduced opportunities of corruption will render resource extraction costlier for the affected 
firms. This is also in line with O’Donovan et al. (2019), showing that firms exposed to corrupt 
countries experience more negative investor reactions to the Panama Papers. Nearly all studies 
provide consistent evidence across the different settings that more tax-aggressive firms 
                                                 
57  While the interpretation of Hoopes et al. (2018) focuses on the incremental stock price reaction for firms pre-
sumed to be disclosed as paying zero taxes, their results also indicate a negative reaction for all firms expected 
to be subject to the disclosure regime. 
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experience more negative stock price responses (S. Chen, 2017; Dutt et al., 2019a; Frischmann 
et al., 2008; Hoopes et al., 2018; O’Donovan et al., 2019). Investors seem to anticipate that 
firms will adjust their tax planning activities in light of the new disclosures (see Section 6.1). 
Finally, sample splits indicate that the capital market generally reacts more favorably for firms 
with weaker governance structures, suggesting that investors expect the increase in transpar-
ency to reduce expropriation by managers (Dutt et al., 2019a; O’Donovan et al., 2019). 
The second group of studies investigates stock price reactions to the introduction of pri-
vate tax disclosure requirements. As the audience is restricted to tax authorities, confidential 
disclosures cannot decrease information asymmetry between firms and outside investors and 
do not imply proprietary and reputational costs. However, the remaining potential costs and 
benefits of public disclosures described above should apply accordingly.58 
Concerning the US, Donohoe and McGill (2011) find small negative abnormal returns 
around legislative events leading up to the passage of Schedule M-3. Similarly, Abernathy et 
al. (2013) document stock price declines around the announcements of the initial proposals for 
Schedule UTP, and stock price increases due to the issuance of the final rule (which relaxed 
some of the most controversial issues included in the first drafts). Both studies show that the 
reactions are stronger for more tax-aggressive firms. In sum, the results indicate that investors 
predict net costs of increased transparency towards the IRS, probably in the form of compliance 
costs, potential back taxes for prior years, and reduced future tax planning opportunities. How-
ever, studies on the reaction of firms to these regulations do not suggest that firms reduced their 
overall tax avoidance in subsequent periods (as described in Section 6.1.1.2). In a multinational 
setting, Bennedsen and Zeume (2018) examine how investors evaluate the signing of bilateral 
TIEAs between high-tax headquarter countries and tax haven host countries. Interestingly, they 
find that the firm value of affected MNEs increased by about 2.5% after the signing. The in-
crease was especially pronounced for firms with more complex tax haven structures and weaker 
governance. The authors conclude that investors expect the TIEAs to be beneficial on average 
as the improved monitoring by tax authorities reduces managers' opportunities to extract private 
benefits at the detriment of outside investors. 
Considering the opposing results from the different private disclosure settings, investors 
seem to assume that expropriation activities are mainly based on complex international group 
                                                 
58  Nevertheless, some effects might be a bit weaker compared to public disclosures. For example, improved mon-
itoring by tax authorities due to confidential disclosures can reduce expropriation by managers, but the impact 
might be stronger if the public (and, in particular, investors) had access to the information as well. 
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structures, and the secrecy and opaqueness of tax havens. This result is also consistent with 
weakly-governed firms exhibiting more favorable stock price reactions to the Panama Papers 
and public CbCR introduction (Dutt et al., 2019a; O’Donovan et al., 2019), as these disclosures 
also provide information on group structures and tax haven presences. In contrast, Schedule M-
3 and Schedule UTP rather focus on the domestic implications of tax planning. However, an 
alternative explanation could be that investors’ assessment of tax transparency measures sys-
tematically differs across countries, causing the different findings in the US vs. international 
settings. 
6.2.2 Investor reactions to actual disclosures of tax-related information 
Apart from the adoption of new tax transparency rules, research also examines how the 
capital market reacts to the issuance of public disclosures. It is important to note that stock price 
changes following actual tax-related disclosures reflect how investors evaluate the news con-
tained in the publication (if any) and whether investors incorporate the news into share prices, 
rather than capturing the response to increased transparency per se (Christensen et al., 2019). 
We further distinguish between news about tax planning and news about firm performance. 
6.2.2.1 Reactions to information about tax planning  
In theory, to the extent that tax minimization increases after-tax profits, shareholders 
should appreciate such activities. However, suppose potential risks from aggressive tax plan-
ning are revealed to stakeholders prevail or investors are afraid that certain tax planning struc-
tures facilitate managerial diversion. In that case, investors may view tax avoidance as value-
decreasing. A group of studies examines the general association between several tax avoidance 
indicators from firms’ financial statements and firm value measures. While most studies do not 
find a significant association on average (Brooks et al., 2016; Desai & Dharmapala, 2009), there 
is evidence that the relationship varies subject to a firm’s strength of governance (Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2009; Wilson, 2009) and the type of tax planning (Inger, 2014). Furthermore, 
Inger et al. (2018) show that investors’ tax avoidance assessment also depends on the informa-
tiveness of a firm’s public disclosures. Although investors typically favor a high level of trans-
parency, there are cases where they reward low readability of the tax footnotes, presumably to 
inhibit that tax authorities use the information to identify and challenge aggressive tax planning. 
Relatedly, two recent studies conduct laboratory experiments to observe more directly 
how investors perceive corporate tax planning. Both A. B. Davis et al. (2017) and Jemi-
olo (2019) provide their “simulated” investors with background information on a hypothetical 
company and a neutral report stating the company’s ETR in comparison to the industry average. 
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Jemiolo (2019) finds no significant effect of the relative ETR on stock prices, while A. B. Davis 
et al. (2017) document a positive relationship between tax planning and stock prices, but only 
if the company has a high CSR rating. The results of these experiments should be interpreted 
with caution, as external validity critically depends on how representative the test persons are 
of actual investors and on whether estimates of stock prices stated in a simplified laboratory 
setting are indicative of actual investment decisions. Nevertheless, we infer that studies based 
on different research methods do not provide conclusive evidence of an unequivocal overall 
relationship between tax avoidance and firm value. They rather suggest that investors’ assess-
ment of tax planning depends on different factors such as governance, CSR activity, and dis-
closure quality. 
Assuming an efficient capital market, investors immediately incorporate all available in-
formation about a firm’s level of tax planning into stock prices. Consequently, investors will 
only react to actual disclosure if it conveys new information (i.e., if it causes investors to revise 
their previous beliefs about a firm’s tax avoidance). A few studies examine how stock prices 
respond to the issuance of tax-related disclosures in general-purpose financial reporting. Ex-
ploiting the news provided by the publication of the first-time UTB disclosures (after the adop-
tion of FIN 48), Frischmann et al. (2008) find a positive association between abnormal returns 
and the part of the UTBs which would affect the ETR if tax authorities disregarded the under-
lying positions. L. A. Robinson and Schmidt (2013) observe such a positive reaction only for 
firms issuing low-quality UTB information, which is consistent with the finding of Inger et al. 
(2018) that investors sometimes reward opaque public disclosures of tax-avoiding firms due to 
reduced informativeness for tax authorities. However, considering how the subsequent intro-
duction of the related private reporting requirement of Schedule UTP has affected firms’ incen-
tives regarding their public UTB disclosures,59 it is highly probable that investors’ perception 
has changed likewise. Focusing on the tendency of the FIN 48 rules to overstate UTB amounts 
(see Section 5.1.1), L. A. Robinson et al. (2016) document that investors are not able to identify 
firms which are particularly over-reserved and do not seem to incorporate this information in 
their stock price valuation.60 Finally, Campbell et al. (2019) provide evidence that the extent of 
tax-related risk factor disclosures in a firm’s 10-K filing is positively associated with contem-
poraneous stock returns. Taken together with the results on their informativeness about future 
                                                 
59  As described in Section 4.3, evidence suggests that firms systematically reduced the UTB amounts recorded in 
their financial statements and simultaneously increased the qualitative UTB disclosures in the tax footnotes 
following the introduction of Schedule UTP. 
60  It has to be noted that the sample period of L. A. Robinson et al. (2016) is not long enough to observe whether 
this mispricing has changed after the introduction of Schedule UTP. 
 
60 
cash flows (see Section 5.2), it appears that investors correctly interpret and reward these qual-
itative disclosures as news about reasonable risk-taking. 
Turning to public disclosures by third parties, S. Chen (2017) and Hoopes et al. (2018) 
additionally examine the capital market response to the first actual publication under the Aus-
tralian public tax return disclosure regime. S. Chen (2017) observes a small negative stock price 
reaction on average for all firms contained in the ATO report, but no significant effect for the 
most salient cases (i.e., firms disclosed as paying zero taxes). However, focusing only on the 
information disclosed does not account for the believes investors have already formed prior to 
the publication. Hoopes et al. (2018) attempt to adequately model the news conveyed by the 
report and document that unexpected zero taxpayers (i.e., firms whose respective financial 
statements would have suggested positive tax payments) experience small stock price de-
clines.61 Kays (2019) defines the news component more neutrally as the difference between the 
amounts of taxable income and tax liability disclosed in the report and the amounts inferred 
from corresponding financial statements. She finds that abnormal returns around the publication 
are related to the absolute size of the difference. Still, the effect is mitigated if a firm issues 
additional voluntary disclosure explaining the difference. In summary, evidence suggests that 
the capital market reacts to news contained in the ATO’s public tax return report and that in-
vestors view the surprise of being disclosed as zero taxpayer negatively. 
Media articles constitute another source of third-party disclosures about tax avoidance. 
Firms usually cannot influence their occurrence and content, and they are often characterized 
by a negative wording, implying a shock in public scrutiny (see Section 6.1.2). Consequently, 
capital market reactions to media articles capture the response to news about tax avoidance and 
investors’ expectations about potential consequences from this shock in public scrutiny. 
Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) identify US firms alleged in media articles of engaging in tax 
shelters62 and find average stock price declines of about -1.2% in a three-day event window 
around the publication. Gallemore et al. (2014) replicate this approach with a slightly increased 
sample and confirm the temporary effect, but they also show that the negative reaction com-
pletely reverses within 30 days. Brooks et al. (2016) construct a more recent sample of UK 
firms subject to media coverage on their tax reduction activities (including both tax avoidance 
                                                 
61  In an additional test, S. Chen (2017) also focuses on the news conveyed by the report. She finds a negative 
stock market reaction for firms whose actual tax payments disclosed by the ATO exceeded the amounts ex-
pected based on available financial statement information, which suggests that investors are rather concerned 
about tax costs than about reputational costs for these firms. 
62  For a description of tax shelters, see Section 5.1.1. 
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and tax evasion). Their average results also indicate modest short-term stock price drops, which 
are at least partially reversed within a month. However, cross-sectional tests reveal more pro-
nounced and more permanent negative investor reactions for smaller firms, consumer-facing 
firms, and articles about corporate inversions (i.e., a particular disreputable form of tax avoid-
ance). These cross-sectional differences suggest that the stock price responses are driven by 
investors’ expectations of reputational costs and consumer backlashes due to negative media 
attention rather than by new information about a firm’s tax avoidance activities. Finally, 
Blaufus et al. (2019) examine a sample of media articles on large German firms. They find a 
short-term63 stock price decline of about 1.4% around news about (illegal) tax evasion, but no 
significant response to news about (legal) tax avoidance, indicating that investors distinguish 
according to legality. Moreover, investors appear to react positively to news about tax avoid-
ance if they expect a firm’s overall tax risk to be low (Blaufus et al., 2019). 
Instead of general press articles, Huesecken et al. (2018) exploit the publication of leaked 
information about hundreds of advance tax rulings between Luxembourg fiscal authorities and 
several large MNEs (known as Lux Leaks). This setting is distinctive as the tax planning struc-
tures revealed had been approved by the relevant tax authority. Interestingly, the authors find 
an average stock price increase for the affected firms around the publication of the documents. 
Consistent with the results of Campbell et al. (2019) and Blaufus et al. (2019), investors seem 
to reward news about tax avoidance activities associated with low (legal) risks. However, 
MNEs explicitly mentioned in media reports about Lux Leaks experience less favorable reac-
tions, suggesting that the benefits can be neutralized by negative consequences of increased 
public scrutiny (in line with the cross-sectional findings of Brooks et al., 2016). 
6.2.2.2 Reactions to information about firm performance 
As illustrated in Section 5.1.1, accounting research has documented that tax disclosures 
in financial statements contain information about current and future earnings. Some of these 
studies suggest that investors use certain performance information comprised in BTDs for their 
stock valuation. However, evidence of associations between BTDs and future stock returns and 
                                                 
63  Unfortunately, Blaufus et al. (2019) only examine short-term stock price reactions (i.e., within a three-day 
window around the publication of the respective news) and do not provide evidence on whether the observed 




the so-called tax expense anomaly64 indicate that the pricing by the capital market is incomplete 
(see the review of Graham et al., 2012). 
More recent studies examine whether additional tax disclosures (other than in financial 
statements) can help investors better process this information. Schwab (2009) provides some 
support that the mispricing of BTDs is weaker when firms voluntarily report on BTDs in their 
earnings announcements. He concludes that stating the information in a salient and straightfor-
ward manner improves investors’ understanding. Baik et al. (2016) analyze the contribution of 
analysts as information intermediaries. They distinguish between cases where analysts only 
forecast a firm’s after-tax earnings and cases where analysts additionally issue pre-tax income 
forecasts (which implies a forecast of the tax expense and the ETR). Results show that the tax 
expense anomaly is mostly eliminated by the presence of analysts’ implicit tax expense fore-
casts, which suggests that these third-party disclosures draw investors’ attention to tax expense 
and assist them in comprehending the implications for future earnings. Similarly, Mauler (2019) 
documents that stock price reactions to earnings announcements depend not only on whether a 
firm meets analysts’ after-tax earnings forecast but also on whether it meets analysts’ pre-tax 
income forecast. Consequently, investors seem to assess analysts’ tax-related forecasts as value 
relevant. 
Considering that taxable income constitutes an alternative profit measure, it seems plau-
sible that tax return data may help the capital market assess its current and future performance. 
Two studies investigate settings where selected investors get access to confidential tax returns. 
Demeré (2018) exploits the features of the US syndicated loan market, where lenders frequently 
request tax returns when evaluating bank loan applications. He assumes that when a syndicated 
loan is traded on secondary markets and the loan syndicate includes institutional investors, the 
tax return information is disseminated to the equity market and can thus be incorporated into 
share prices. His findings confirm that the tax expense anomaly (and other common forms of 
tax-related mispricing) decreases after the issuance of syndicated loans involving institutional 
investors. Interestingly, the effect is stronger after the introduction of Schedule M-3, suggesting 
that its detailed book-tax reconciliation is informative with regard to tax planning and firm 
performance. Finally, Minnis and Sutherland (2017) focus on debt investors and document that 
banks as lenders regularly request tax return information when monitoring small borrowers, 
                                                 
64  Thomas and Zhang (2011) document that tax expense surprise (defined as the difference between tax expense 
recorded in the current quarter and tax expense recorded in prior year’s corresponding quarter) is positively 
related to future stock returns. 
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sometimes as complements to and sometimes even as substitutes of (typically unaudited) finan-
cial statements. 
Altogether, recent evidence indicates that investors’ mispricing of performance infor-
mation in financial statements tax disclosures can be mitigated by additional disclosures (such 
as earnings announcements and analysts’ tax expense forecasts). In particular, investors find 
tax return data incrementally informative over financial statements. 
6.2.3 Interim conclusion 
So far, research has primarily focused on examining stock price reactions to (1) the intro-
duction of tax transparency regimes and (2) the issuance of tax-related disclosures. While the 
former reflects investors’ expectations about all costs and benefits (including potential firm and 
stakeholder reactions) associated with a new disclosure requirement, the latter incorporates both 
investors’ evaluation of the news about tax planning and potential implications of a shock in 
public scrutiny (especially in case of third-party disclosures). Consequently, stock price 
changes only reveal the net aggregate effect, which explains the partially conflicting and often 
weak average results. Throughout the different settings, consistent cross-sectional evidence 
shows that investors expect the most tax-aggressive firms and firms susceptible to reputational 
risks to bear the highest costs of increased tax transparency. Investors reward tax avoidance 
associated with low (legal) risks and, in some cases, even prefer low-quality disclosures by 
firms to decrease the informativeness for tax authorities. Interestingly, results suggest that even 
confidential disclosures to tax authorities can benefit shareholders by reducing opportunities 
for managerial diversion. These beneficial effects are most pronounced when the disclosures 
contain data on international group structures and tax haven presences. 
Apart from tax planning, tax-related disclosures convey information about firm perfor-
mance, and recent studies show that increased transparency helps investors realize and price 
this information. Considering this potential role in mitigating information asymmetry, we en-
courage research on whether public tax disclosure regimes (e.g., public CbCR or public tax 
return disclosure) affect stock liquidity or the cost of capital. Furthermore, we currently lack 
evidence on how the capital market evaluates the introduction and issuance of new qualitative 
tax disclosures (e.g., tax strategy reports). 
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6.3 Effects on other stakeholders 
6.3.1 Analysts 
Accounting research has documented that financial analysts play a valuable role in en-
hancing the capital market's efficiency since their earnings forecasts and recommendations af-
fect stock prices (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Thus, it is important to examine how analysts under-
stand and process tax-related information and how an increase in tax transparency affects their 
role as intermediaries. In theory, the relationship between the volume of public corporate dis-
closure and financial analysts is ambiguous. On the one hand, an expansion of corporate dis-
closure reduces information acquisition costs, which potentially attracts analysts and improves 
the quality of their reports. On the other hand, an increase in publicly available information may 
diminish analysts' opportunities and incentives to gather private information, resulting in a re-
duction in analyst activity and forecast quality (Christensen et al., 2019; Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Consistent with a complementary relationship, empirical evidence on financial reporting mainly 
suggests that a greater extent and higher quality of firms’ financial disclosures are associated 
with increased analyst following, improved analyst forecast accuracy, and lower forecast dis-
persion (Leuz & Wysocki, 2016).65, 66 Similarly, first studies on CSR disclosure indicate that 
firms issuing voluntary CSR reports exhibit higher analyst forecast accuracy and that financial 
intermediaries are among the primary users of mandatory CSR disclosures (Christensen et al., 
2019). 
Turning to tax-related information, research on accounting for income taxes has docu-
mented that analysts misinterpret certain tax disclosures in financial statements (K. Chen et al., 
2003) and that their forecasts do not completely incorporate performance information contained 
in BTDs (Weber, 2009).67 This failure may be a potential driver for investors’ mispricing of 
BTD information (see Section 6.2.2.2). Schwab (2009) complements prior results and finds that 
the correlation between analyst earnings forecast errors and BTD amounts is weaker when firms 
voluntarily report on BTDs in their earnings announcements. He infers that the salience and 
conciseness of this voluntary disclosure enhance analysts’ understanding. 
                                                 
65  See in particular, tables 3.1 and 3.2 of the online appendix to Leuz and Wysocki (2016). 
66  In contrast, some studies suggest that the introduction of RegFD in the US reduced both the information pro-
duction by analysts and the quality of their reports (Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). However, it is important to note 
that RegFD did not merely increase public disclosure but explicitly prohibited managers from confidentially 
providing relevant information to selected capital market participants (including analysts). As a result, RegFD 
considerably limited the possibilities of analysts to acquire superior information. In addition, several concurrent 
institutional changes make it difficult to distinguish whether the observed effects are due to the RegFD or to 
confounding factors (Beyer et al., 2010). 
67  See also the review of this literature in Graham et al. (2012). 
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Two recent studies exploit the particularities of interim reporting to investigate the infor-
mation processing of analysts. Under US GAAP, firms are required to use the integral method 
to compute tax expense in their 10-Q filings (ASC 740-270). According to this method, quar-
terly tax expense is calculated based on year-to-date pre-tax income and an ETR estimate for 
the full year. Thus, the interim reports for the first three quarters of a financial year convey a de 
facto mandatory management forecast of the annual ETR. However, the effects of discrete items 
(e.g., tax rate and tax law changes, settlements with tax authorities) have to be fully recorded in 
the quarter in which they occur. Consequently, the incidence of discrete items distorts the man-
datory ETR forecast and reduces its usefulness for analysts. 
Bratten et al. (2017) find that 74% of analyst ETR forecasts68 deviate meaningfully from 
management’s mandatory ETR forecasts contained in the 10-Q filings and that analysts are 
about three times more likely to disagree in the presence of discrete items. Moreover, the devi-
ating analyst forecasts are more accurate than management’s mandatory forecasts, particularly 
if discrete items occur and if the general complexity of forecasting the ETR is higher. The 
authors interpret their results as evidence that analysts understand the complex tax environment 
and identify and correct the deficiencies of the integral method. N. Chen et al. (2019) addition-
ally consider that many firms also provide voluntary forecasts of the ETR in the conference 
calls accompanying the release of the interim reports for the first three quarters of a financial 
year. Managers may use the flexibility of these voluntary ETR forecasts to overcome potential 
distortions inherent in the mandatory forecasts. N. Chen et al. (2019) document that analysts 
incorporate the news of both types of management forecast – compulsory and voluntary – when 
subsequently revising their own ETR forecast. However, analysts seem to find management’s 
voluntary forecasts more informative, especially in the presence of discrete items and when 
analysts do not simply mimic the mandatory forecast. Overall, these results suggest that the 
superiority of analysts’ deviating ETR forecasts found by Bratten et al. (2017) may be partially 
driven by analysts utilizing the public information in management’s concurrent voluntary fore-
casts (rather than private information). 
In contrast to quarterly ETR forecasts, Koutney (2019) focuses on annual forecasts issued 
at the beginning of a financial year. Managers often communicate a prediction of the following 
year’s ETR in conference calls on fourth-quarter earnings announcements. Koutney (2019) 
finds that analysts’ annual ETR forecasts are less accurate when they deviate from 
                                                 
68  As explained in Section 6.2.2.2, analysts often forecast both after-tax earnings and pre-tax income, which im-
plies a forecast of the ETR. 
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management’s voluntary forecasts. He also observes that disagreeing analysts tend to have less 
experience and less access to private information. Consequently, analyst disagreement with 
voluntary forecasts seems to be driven by overconfidence rather than by superior knowledge. 
In summary, extant evidence suggests that firms' voluntary tax-related disclosures (in the 
form of information on BTDs or management ETR forecasts) improve analysts’ forecast accu-
racy. This finding is consistent with the favorable effects documented for financial and CSR 
disclosure. While analysts rightly deviate from distorted mandatory ETR forecasts in quarterly 
reports, they do not appear to be able to outperform management’s voluntary ETR forecasts. 
Thus, analysts do not seem to have superior private information on the implications of income 
taxes on average. Against this backdrop, it is surprising that we lack any evidence on whether 
analysts use the information of new public tax-related disclosures (e.g., public CbCR, public 
tax return disclosure, tax strategy reports) and on whether the mandated increase in tax trans-
parency affects analyst coverage, forecast accuracy, and forecast dispersion. Moreover, consid-
ering the emergence of studies on the relationship between a firm’s tax aggressiveness and 
analyst activity (Allen et al., 2016; Balakrishnan et al., 2019; Francis et al., 2019; He et al., 
2020), it would be interesting to examine how changes in tax transparency influence this rela-
tion.69 
6.3.2 Consumers and the general public 
Consumers and, more broadly, the general public are relevant stakeholder groups because 
their perception of firms ultimately determines many firms’ economic success (through pur-
chase decisions). This applies in particular to businesses that offer products and services for 
private customers. The decision to enter into a transaction with a specific firm likely depends 
on whether the perceived corporate attributes match individual preferences and values. Prior 
evidence from CSR literature suggests that the congruence of personal views with corporate 
CSR activities positively affects consumer perceptions, resulting in a higher willingness to pay 
and increased brand loyalty (Christensen et al., 2019). From a societal perspective, tax pay-
ments contribute to public budgets, which are used to finance public goods and services. If 
consumers consider paying taxes a necessary obligation toward society, revelations about ag-
gressive tax avoidance might negatively impact consumers’ assessment of firms, or even actual 
                                                 
69  As a first example in this context, Balakrishnan et al. (2019) investigate whether additional voluntary tax-
related disclosures can mitigate the negative association between tax aggressiveness and analyst forecast accu-




purchase behavior (Middleton & Muttonen, 2020).70 Given the evolving policy discussions and 
leakages featured in the media, the overall awareness on the role of taxation for public finance 
among consumers might have risen over the last years (Middleton & Muttonen, 2020). Against 
this background, examining the effects of corporate tax transparency on consumer behavior is 
particularly relevant. 
Since the initial call by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for more research on the perception 
of tax avoidance by consumers one decade ago, several studies have attempted to address this 
question using laboratory experiments or surveys. Early experimental studies find that consum-
ers react negatively to news about aggressive corporate tax strategies, which is reflected in 
lower reputation of the firms and reduced willingness to pay for a given product (Antonetti & 
Anesa, 2017; Asay et al., 2018; Hardeck & Hertl, 2014). At the same time, consumers are un-
willing to accept a price premium for responsible tax behavior. Thus, the revelation of aggres-
sive tax behavior seems to impose reputational damage on firms. Moreover, the relationship 
between tax avoidance and consumer reaction appears to be moderated by personal values and 
moral views on tax compliance, which is consistent with related findings of studies on consumer 
reactions to CSR activities (Christensen et al., 2019). Consumers’ awareness of negative exter-
nalities of corporate tax avoidance likely constitutes an important factor for their reactions. 
However, the salience of news about corporate tax avoidance seems rather low. In a survey by 
Asay et al. (2018) conducted among US citizens, only 20% of respondents recall ever having 
read a media article about aggressive corporate tax behavior.  
One major limitation of laboratory experiments and surveys is that they may suffer from 
social desirability bias, i.e., respondents choose the answer they perceive as socially acceptable. 
Specifically, the use of suggestive or judgmental language (e.g., “aggressive” vs. “responsible” 
tax practices) may induce certain responses. More recent studies attempt to overcome the prob-
lem by framing information about corporate tax practices in a more neutral way (Hoopes et al., 
2018; Jemiolo, 2019)71 or using incentive-aligned mechanisms to elicit consumers’ actual will-
ingness to pay (Hardeck et al., forthcoming). While Jemiolo (2019) fails to find an association 
between tax management and consumer behavior, Hoopes et al. (2018) document adverse con-
sumer reactions in terms of purchase intentions and perceived ethicality to the partial tax return 
disclosure in Australia, but only for of privately-owned domestic firms. The authors conclude 
                                                 
70  We note that consumers’ evaluation of corporate tax practices is likely not restricted to legal considerations of 
the case. 
71  In the setting of Hoopes et al. (2018), the Australian tax authority published the information on the tax return 
data in a neutrally worded report on its website. 
 
68 
that consumer sentiment for global and large brands is more resilient than consumer sentiment 
for domestic brands. In a recent study, Hardeck et al. (forthcoming) report a strong impact of 
corporate tax avoidance on consumers’ attitudes toward the firm but only marginal effects on 
their willingness to pay. Importantly, these effects are fully mediated by CSR perceptions of 
the firm, which extends prior results documenting a direct impact of tax behavior on CSR per-
ception or perceived ethicality (Antonetti & Anesa, 2017; Hoopes et al., 2018; Jemiolo, 2019). 
In sum, these findings confirm the expectation that consumers link observed tax behavior to 
CSR, suggesting that tax behavior and CSR are viewed as complements rather than substitutes 
(see Section 3.2). However, even though consumers care about corporate tax practices, they 
barely adjust their purchase behavior or willingness to pay (Asay et al., 2018; Hardeck et al., 
forthcoming). This finding might be one explanation of why other studies do not observe any 
measurable economic consequences on the corporate level following the revelation of corporate 
tax shelter activities (Gallemore et al., 2014). 
We have seen several cases of consumer backlash caused by revealed corporate tax prac-
tices over the last years. A prominent example is Starbucks, which experienced intense public 
pressure and calls for a boycott due to its marginal tax payments in the UK. In contrast to se-
lected anecdotal evidence, the surveyed studies provide mixed evidence on consumer reactions. 
While there is compelling evidence for effects on the perception of firms, the impact of corpo-
rate tax strategies on consumers’ purchase decisions seems modest at best. Broadly speaking, 
firms’ tax behavior could adversely affect consumers’ attitudes towards the firm, but on aver-
age, firms are unlikely to incur actual costs due to adjusted purchase behavior. Still, this missing 
link does not mean that increased tax transparency has no effect on consumers. Future research 
should try to shed more light on the discrepancy between stated attitudes and real actions un-
covered in prior literature. Moreover, upcoming studies should examine more cross-sectional 
differences, such as different moral norms and attitudes among consumers. For instance, repu-
tational costs arguably vary across geographic regions (as suggested by Hardeck et al., 2019, 
and Wilde & Wilson, 2018). Thus, future studies should follow Hardeck et al. (forthcoming), 
who conduct their experiment with US and German participants to exploit the cultural differ-
ences in personal views on taxation. 
6.3.3 Tax authorities 
As illustrated throughout Section 3, tax authorities play a particular role among the recip-
ients of tax-related disclosures since they potentially use the reported information when as-
sessing a firm’s tax liability. If certain (public or private) disclosures help them detect and 
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challenge legally questionable forms of tax planning, tax revenues increase. However, the in-
troduction of tax transparency regimes is often accompanied by debates on whether the new 
reporting requirements are truly informative to tax authorities.72 To enrich these discussions, 
research on how and when tax authorities use different types of disclosures is necessary. Un-
fortunately, tax authorities' information processing is mostly unobservable for researchers, even 
if access to administrative data is granted.73 
An innovative study of Bozanic et al. (2017) overcomes this problem. They exploit the 
fact that SEC server log files can track users accessing EDGAR, the central database of public 
financial disclosures made by SEC-registered US firms, and identify when IRS employees 
download a firm’s 10-K filings. The authors document that larger companies and more tax-
aggressive companies tend to attract more attention from the IRS. Examining the increase in 
public tax disclosures in financial statements mandated by the introduction of FIN 48, Bozanic 
et al. (2017) find that IRS’ downloads of 10-K filings multiplied in the subsequent periods 
(relative to other EDGAR downloads made by the IRS). This result suggests that the IRS con-
sidered the UTB disclosures in financial statements as informative about tax planning, con-
sistent with some evidence that firms reduced their tax aggressiveness and increased tax pay-
ments after the adoption of FIN 48 (see Section 6.1.1.1). Finally, Bozanic et al. (2017) also 
observe a subsequent decline in 10-K downloads as soon as the private disclosures under Sched-
ule UTP became available to the IRS. The relative informativeness of the aggregate BTD 
amounts in public financial statements seems to have decreased now that the IRS confidentially 
receives a narrative description of the underlying positions.74 Altogether, the findings indicate 
that the interaction of public and private disclosure requirements jointly affects tax authority 
behavior. 
Following the insights of Bozanic et al. (2017), the more recent introduction of tax trans-
parency regimes poses interesting research questions. For example, do tax authorities incorpo-
rate the information in MNEs’ public segment reporting when evaluating profit shifting risks? 
If so, has its relevance changed since tax authorities receive confidential CbCRs? And do tax 
authorities access public CbCR data of EU financial institutions or public tax strategy reports 
of UK firms? Considering the multitude of public and private disclosures available to tax 
                                                 
72  For more details, see Section 3.3.2. 
73  Administrative datasets may reflect audit frequencies and audit adjustments, but usually do not contain infor-
mation on which disclosures tax authorities consider in their decision making. 
74  This result is also in line with firms voluntarily increasing their qualitative UTB disclosures after the informa-
tive value for the IRS had decreased due to Schedule UTP (see Section 4.3).  
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administration, policymakers should be particularly interested in evidence on whether tax au-
thorities are able to recognize and assess all relevant information or whether they face problems 
of information overload. Finally, going beyond recording tax authority downloads of docu-
ments, it would be interesting to investigate how different types of disclosures affect tax audit 
decisions and audit efficiency. According to the OECD’s (2020) first publication of aggregate 
CbCR data, national tax administrations stated that they employ CbCR information to help 
identify which MNEs to audit and to plan audits, but not as evidence of BEPS. Future studies 
could try to verify this statement, e.g., by surveying firms’ tax executives on CbCR-related 
inquiries of tax authorities and resulting in international tax disputes. Confidential client data 
of large tax consultancies may constitute another potential source of information in this regard. 
Despite existing data restrictions, the particular role of tax authorities as the addressee of tax-
related disclosure offers an interesting avenue for future research. 
7 Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
This study provides a comprehensive review of the evolving research on corporate tax 
transparency. In this final section, we summarize and synthesize the main findings from our 
survey of the empirical literature (Sections 4-6), relate the results to the theoretical underpin-
nings (Section 3) and our classification of disclosures rules (Section 2), and offer several sug-
gestions for future work in this area. Focusing on the different research questions, we arranged 
our review of empirical evidence, according to determinants, informativeness, and effects of 
tax-related disclosures (similar to Christensen et al., 2019). Figure 3 illustrates the number of 
studies examining each group of research questions. More than half of the studies investigate 
different kinds of effects (mainly on firms and investors), while determinants account for about 
one third. 
Our review of the empirical literature on the determinants of tax disclosure decisions 
shows that the interpretation of firm characteristics and attributes is highly context-specific, 
with different channels often being tested in isolation. Research would undoubtedly benefit 
from a more comprehensive theoretical framework, which could help to reconcile conflicting 
empirical findings. To this end, our conceptual discussion of tax transparency in Section 3.3 
may serve as a starting point. In line with its intuitive importance, the reporting firm’s level of 
tax aggressiveness constitutes the most well-researched determinant. Evidence suggests an am-
biguous relationship, reflecting a tradeoff that firms face: On the one hand, tax-aggressive firms 
are more inclined to reduce the quality of or even do not fully comply with hard-fact mandatory 
disclosures (e.g., UTBs, subsidiary list) to keep this sensitive information private. On the other 
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hand, tax-aggressive firms tend to issue more disclosures which involve a higher degree of 
leeway (i.e., voluntary and/or more qualitative publications). They may do so either to legiti-
mize their tax arrangements (consistent with legitimacy theory) or to reduce information asym-
metry resulting from the related complexity. Remarkably, we lack studies examining the role 
of managers in discretionary tax disclosure decisions. This is surprising, considering the ample 
evidence from financial disclosure research (Healy & Palepu, 2001) and the growing literature 
on the relationship between managerial characteristics and incentives and firms’ tax planning 
(Dyreng & Hanlon, 2019; Wilde & Wilson, 2018). Thus, focusing on how managers – and tax 
executives – simultaneously decide about tax planning and tax disclosure can be a promising 
avenue for future research. Finally, we encourage more cross-country studies on disclosure de-
terminants to shed light on the influence of political, institutional, and cultural differences. 
Regarding the informativeness of tax-related disclosures, early literature has developed 
and applied several tax avoidance measures based on financial statement information. However, 
these measures are hard to validate, and they all capture only certain forms of tax avoidance 
(Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). A very recent group of studies exploit first published CbCR data 
as a new source to estimate profit shifting. They document considerable advantages in terms of 
country coverage but also important limitations due to missing variables and limited compara-
bility across reports. Voluntary CbCRs, according to the new GRI Standard 207, may offer 
additional opportunities for future studies. While we look forward to more research employing 
larger and longer-term CbCR datasets, it seems unlikely that this type of disclosure will end the 
longstanding academic discussion about the size of international profit shifting. Considering 
the difficulties in inferring taxable income and actual tax payments from financial statements, 
future contributions could be made by examining the incremental information content of pub-
licly disclosed tax return data and linking it to financial statement information. More generally, 
we suggest that future studies combine and compare different types of disclosures to get a more 
complete picture and develop more nuanced tax aggressiveness measures. 
As indicated in Figure 3, the effects of tax transparency on firms have received consider-
able attention among scholars. Empirical findings mainly suggest that firms perceive the intro-
duction of tax disclosure regimes as costly. Several firms try to prevent falling under disclosure 
obligations (e.g., by bunching below applicable size thresholds). For firms subject to the re-
spective requirement, there is some evidence that they close tax haven subsidiaries and adjust 
their tax planning behavior. However, the results for the overall effect on tax avoidance are 
mixed, potentially due to the substitution of more transparent forms of tax planning by less 
obvious or controversial strategies. Besides, several studies document real responses (e.g., 
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changes in investments and employment) following mandated increases in tax transparency. 
The extent of the effects varies across the different settings, yet reactions are generally stronger 
for disclosures on international activities. Besides, it should be noted that several studies on 
recent tax-related disclosure requirements necessarily rely on relatively short post-introduction 
periods, leaving room for future research on the longer-term effects. 
While the consequences of tax transparency for investors have attracted the largest num-
ber of studies, virtually all of them examine stock price reactions. Changes in stock prices fol-
lowing the introduction of a reporting requirement or the issuance of disclosure reflect the ag-
gregate net effect of all costs, benefits, and reactions expected by investors. This makes it dif-
ficult to interpret the results and reconcile them with other findings (e.g., firm reactions). Nev-
ertheless, cross-sectional evidence indicates that investors expect the most tax-aggressive firms 
to face the highest costs of disclosure, reward legal tax planning, and reasonable risk-taking, 
and, in some cases, accept low-quality disclosures to conceal tax avoidance from tax authorities. 
Some results also suggest that investors expect to benefit from improved monitoring. Yet, ow-
ing to the concentration on stock price responses, we largely lack empirical literature on 
whether and how investors actually utilize the disclosed information. In light of the robust find-
ings that financial disclosures can mitigate information asymmetry, it also seems worthwhile to 
analyze whether increases in tax transparency affect stock liquidity and the cost of capital. 
About a handful of studies examine the effects on analysts. These studies are essentially 
confined to certain voluntary tax-related disclosures in earnings announcements and conference 
calls and find that the issuance of this information improves forecast accuracy. Therefore, it is 
up to future research to investigate whether the introduction of tax-specific public disclosure 
regimes (e.g., CbCR, public tax returns) has influenced analyst activity and whether the respec-
tive disclosures help analysts enhance their forecasts. 
Research on the responses of consumers and the general public to tax-related disclosures 
is primarily based on surveys and laboratory experiments. Extant findings suggest that revela-
tions about a firm’s tax aggressiveness negatively affect consumers’ perception of the con-
cerned firm. In contrast, empirical literature so far has not been able to provide conclusive evi-
dence that such revelations lead to changes in consumers’ purchase decisions. Future studies 
could thus try to shed more light on this discrepancy and on the mechanisms of how (stated) 
attitudes may or may not influence consumer behavior. Tax transparency research may draw 
on existing findings and research designs from other disciplines, such as behavioral marketing 
and business psychology, to further explore consumer reactions. The first step in this direction 
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is the study by Asay et al. (2018). They find that the perception of a firm’s tax aggressiveness 
ranks very low among the factors which determine purchase decisions. In any case, it should 
be noted that the extent and importance of potential consumer reactions largely depend on a 
firm’s business model and its reliance on private customers. 
Despite their particular role as recipients, to date, only one study examines whether tax 
authorities use information from tax-related (public) disclosures. Although restricted data avail-
ability undoubtedly impedes research on this topic, academic literature would benefit from fu-
ture studies on whether and how tax authorities process information from various public and 
private sources for planning tax audits and tax risk assessments. Surveys among tax executives 
or access to confidential client data of tax consultancies might help overcome data restrictions. 
In general, our review shows that we know very little about how the recent increase in 
tax transparency affects the information processing of three important recipients – tax authori-
ties, investors, and analysts. The following questions still need to be answered: Do the recipients 
access and use the information from the different tax-related disclosure requirements? How do 
they prioritize or compare if different disclosures with overlapping content are available? Do 
certain recipients (in particular: tax authorities) face problems of information overload? How 
do the disclosures affect the recipients’ decision making and actions (e.g., audit decisions, stock 
purchases, and sales, forecasts)? While there is more evidence with respect to consumers, la-
boratory experiments probably cannot simulate the simultaneous availability of a multitude of 
different information. Thus, it remains open to what determines the visibility and salience of 
tax-related information from the consumers’ perspective. Overall, the identified lack of evi-
dence on the effects on recipients implies that it is still difficult to assess whether the proposed 
benefits of increased tax transparency for recipients actually materialize. 
Concerning costs, evidence of tax-aggressive firms reducing the quality of (or even fail-
ing to comply with) mandatory disclosures and indications of firms trying to prevent falling 
under the reporting requirements suggest that firms perceive many disclosures as costly. How-
ever, it is not apparent which kind of costs are most prevalent. Compliance costs, double taxa-
tion or controversy costs, political and proprietary costs are often difficult to observe or quantify 
and have not been addressed directly by extant research. Reputational risks of tax planning 
apparently constitute a major concern of firms (Graham et al., 2014). Although consumers’ 
perception of a firm seems to be sensitive to news about tax aggressiveness, empirical studies 
so far do not provide convincing evidence of reputational costs actually manifesting in consum-
ers’ purchase decisions or decreasing sales. While a reduction in tax avoidance is the ultimate 
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goal of many recently-introduced tax disclosure regimes, empirical findings on this effect are 
quite mixed. At the same time, studies document economic consequences (e.g., changes in in-
vestments) in response to increases in tax transparency. In summary, the mixed results regard-
ing tax avoidance and the indications of unintended side effects such as bunching behavior and 
relocation of real investments call into questions whether tax transparency regimes efficiently 
fulfill their purpose. 
Considering the vast diversity among tax-related disclosures, we also aim to provide re-
searchers and policymakers with a summary of the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
selected disclosure types. Figure 4 depicts the number of studies included in our survey accord-
ing to the different kinds of disclosure. The structure follows our classification illustrated in 
Figure 2 and explained in Section 2.2. Unsurprisingly, more than 80% of studies focus on public 
disclosures, probably due to data availability. Tax disclosures in general-purpose financial re-
porting account for about 45% of the empirical literature. 
Several early studies investigate deferred tax and BTD disclosures in financial statements, 
and the results are relatively mixed. Research does neither find consistent evidence on how tax 
aggressiveness affects BTD reporting decisions nor an unequivocal relationship between BTD-
based measures of tax avoidance and firm value. Moreover, analysts seem unable to understand 
the information contained in BTDs completely. A potential explanation for these inconclusive 
findings is that BTDs simultaneously reflect both tax avoidance and financial earnings man-
agement. 
UTB information in the tax footnote constitutes the most well-studied public disclosure 
issued by firms. The results consistently suggest that UTBs are informative about tax avoidance 
since tax-aggressive firms issue lower-quality UTB disclosures. Moreover, tax avoidance de-
creases after the introduction of FIN 48, and tax authorities seem to download public UTB 
information (at least before the implementation of Schedule UTP). 
The empirical findings for segment reporting and subsidiary lists are concentrated on de-
terminants and indicate that tax-aggressive firms issue less transparent and less comprehensive 
disclosures. Apparently, information on the geographic distribution of MNEs’ activities is 
meaningful with regard to tax avoidance. 
Among the more specific tax-related disclosures, most studies focus on the different 
CbCRs. While the public CbCR regulation for extractive industries appears to be effective in 
fighting corruption and increases the extraction payments of affected firms, these consequences 
are not directly related to tax transparency. Regarding the public CbCR requirement for banks 
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in the EU, evidence on reactions is only modest. Studies document that banks reduce profit 
shifting and close tax haven subsidiaries, but the results on overall tax avoidance are inconclu-
sive. Stock prices do not exhibit a significant investor response to the adoption of the rule. 
Surprisingly, the effects are more pronounced for the implementation of the OECD’s confiden-
tial CbCR, with consistent findings of a reduction in profit shifting and overall tax avoidance 
as well as real effects, namely the relocation of investments and employment. Due to the more 
comprehensive list of reportable items, the OECD’s CbCR might be more informative for tax 
authorities than banks’ disclosures. Alternatively, industry-specific particularities among finan-
cial institutions may explain the results. 
Turning to qualitative publications by firms, first analyses of tax strategy reports suggest 
that the reports of some firms could be rather uninformative owing to the use of boilerplate 
language. While a few studies investigate the determinants of voluntary tax disclosures in CSR 
reports, there is virtually no evidence on whether these disclosures are informative and whether 
recipients find them valuable. In this context, the recent issuance of a separate standard on taxes 
within the most widely adopted framework for sustainability reporting (GRI 207) may spur 
upcoming research. Similarly, the informativeness and utilization of other tax-related qualita-
tive disclosures (e.g., in MD&A and risk factor reports) offers opportunities for future research 
exploiting textual analysis techniques. 
Studies exploiting settings of public tax return disclosure regimes provide mixed results 
on the effects. Firms obviously anticipate impending costs and try to prevent being subject to 
the rules. However, they do not seem to change their tax avoidance behavior. Investor reactions 
are rather weak and inconclusive, and negative impacts on consumer perception are limited to 
certain groups of firms. It has to be noted, though, that the respective studies are necessarily 
confined to single-country settings. Considering the institutional differences, it is difficult to 
compare the results from different countries. 
Third-party disclosures in press articles or by NGOs and leaks constitute a distinctive type 
of public tax-related disclosure, as firms usually cannot influence their occurrence and content. 
They often exhibit a negative wording (“shaming”) and entail a shock in public scrutiny. Due 
to these features, such settings are appealing to examine the effects of increased attention to a 
firm’s tax behavior. However, as summarized above, empirical evidence does not suggest that 
potential reputational damages influence the demand for a firm’s products or services. Accord-
ingly, extant studies mostly fail to find notable overall responses of firms and investors to dis-
closures in press articles or by NGOs and leaks. 
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A few studies investigate the introduction of private disclosures requirements to tax au-
thorities in the US settings of Schedule M-3 and Schedule UTP. Their results do not provide 
support for the effectiveness of these rules, as they indicate only small adverse investor reac-
tions and no reduction in the overall level of tax avoidance. Nevertheless, both settings – espe-
cially Schedule UTP – are interesting as the information to be privately reported to tax author-
ities is closely linked to items publicly disclosed in financial statements. Several studies docu-
ment that different disclosure requirements interact, e.g., the introduction of Schedule UTP 
changes firms’ disclosure behavior with regard to UTBs in financial statements. 
In this vein, we look forward to research on interaction effects in other regulatory settings, 
e.g., whether the introduction of a confidential CbCR requirement affects MNEs’ public seg-
ment reporting or subsidiary disclosure. Similarly, future studies could further examine whether 
the adoption of mandatory reporting rules influences voluntary disclosure behavior and, if so, 
whether mandatory and voluntary disclosures act as complements or substitutes. We note that 
tax accounting researchers should have comparative advantages in this area due to their 
knowledge of the institutional backgrounds. 
Finally, when comparing the empirical findings by disclosure type with the classification 
outlined in Section 2.2, it is striking that we lack research on the effects of regimes requiring 
the private disclosure of certain tax planning arrangements to tax authorities. This is surprising 
in light of the considerable number of countries which have implemented such a rule within the 
last two decades.75 Future research may investigate how firms and investors react to these re-
gimes (and, conditional on data availability, how tax authorities use the information). It could 
also be interesting to shed light on how the typical promoters of tax planning arrangements – 
tax advisors and financial intermediaries – are affected. The recent introduction of DAC 6 in 
the EU member states offers a promising cross-country setting to examine these questions. 
Despite the rapidly growing number of studies, our review has demonstrated that we are 
still only at the beginning of empirical research on tax transparency. Many open questions re-
main. To conclude, we briefly list the directions that we have identified as particularly interest-
ing for future research: (1) The development of a comprehensive theoretical framework incor-
porating the different incentives which influence tax disclosure decisions; (2) the role of man-
agers and tax executives in corporate decisions on tax transparency and the interrelation with 
simultaneous tax planning decisions; (3) interaction effects between public and private 
                                                 
75  See Section III.B of Table A.1 in the Appendix for an overview. 
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disclosure requirements or between mandatory and voluntary disclosures; (4) the informative-
ness and reception of qualitative tax-related disclosures (e.g., in CSR reports according to the 
GRI framework or tax strategy reports); (5) combinations and comparisons of the different in-
formation about tax behavior contained in various types of (quantitative and qualitative) dis-
closures and development of more nuanced measures of tax avoidance; (6) the effects of the 
introduction of regimes requiring the private disclosure of tax planning arrangements; and (7) 
the processing of the available tax-related information by investors, analysts, consumers, and 
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Figure 1: Number of empirical studies on tax transparency by year and publication sta-
tus 
 
Notes: This graph depicts the number of empirical studies on tax transparency by year and publication status. We 
include all studies on tax transparency which we refer to in our review of the empirical literature (Sections 4-6) 
and/or which are summarized in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Studies investigating multiple research questions 
and/or disclosure type are counted only once. The “working paper” category also includes two dissertations. The 
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Figure 3: Number of empirical studies on tax transparency by research question 
 
Notes: This graph depicts the number of empirical studies on tax transparency by research question. We include 
all studies on tax transparency which we refer to in our review of the empirical literature (Sections 4-6) and/or 
which are summarized in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Studies investigating multiple research questions are counted 
multiple times. 
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Figure 4: Number of empirical studies on tax transparency by disclosure type 
 
Notes: This graph depicts the number of empirical studies on tax transparency by disclosure type. We include all studies on tax transparency which we 
refer to in our review of the empirical literature (Sections 4-6) and/or which are summarized in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Studies investigating multiple 
disclosure types are counted multiple times. 
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Table A.1: Overview of selected tax disclosure rules and frameworks 
I. Public disclosures issued by firms 
A. Financial reporting 




Content of disclosure (only selected items) Place of  
disclosure 
Breakdown of tax 
expense and of 
pre-tax income 
 
US GAAP: 17 CFR 
§ 210.4-08(h) 
• Components of income (loss) before income tax expense as either 
o Domestic 
o Foreign 
• Components of income tax expense; amounts applicable to the following items shall be stated separately for each major 
component: 
o US federal income taxes 
o Foreign income taxes 
o Other income taxes 
 
Amounts applicable to foreign income (loss) and amounts applicable to foreign or other income taxes which are less than five 




come or notes to 
(consolidated) fi-
nancial statements 
IFRS Not required under IFRS (but several companies voluntarily disclose a breakdown of tax expense into domestic and foreign). 
 
--- 
Tax reconciliation US GAAP: ASC 
740-10-50-12 and -
13; 17 CFR 
§ 210.4-08 
• Reconciliation of the reported amount of income tax expense attributable to continuing operations for the year to the 
amount of income tax expense that would result from applying domestic federal statutory tax rates to pre-tax income from 
continuing operations (using either percentages or dollar amounts) 
• Estimated amount and nature of each significant reconciling item. Reconciling items that are individually less than five 
percent of the expected tax expense may be aggregated. 
 
If no individual reconciling item amounts to more than five percent of the expected tax expense and the total difference to be 





IFRS: IAS 12.81(c), 
84-86 
• Explanation of the relationship between tax expense (income) and accounting profit in either or both of the following 
forms: 
o A numerical reconciliation between tax expense (income) and the product of accounting profit multiplied by the ap-
plicable tax rate(s), disclosing also the basis on which the applicable tax rate(s) is (are) computed 
o A numerical reconciliation between the average effective tax rate and the applicable tax rate, disclosing also the basis 











Content of disclosure (only selected items) Place of  
disclosure 
Deferred taxes US GAAP: ASC 
740-10-50-2, -3, -6, 
-9; ASC 740-30-50-
2; 17 CFR § 210.4-
08 
• Significant components of income tax expense, especially: 
o Current tax expense (or benefit) 
o Deferred tax expense (or benefit) 
• Components of the net deferred tax liability or asset recognized in an entity’s statement of financial position: 
o Total of all deferred tax liabilities 
o Total of all deferred tax assets 
o Total valuation allowance recognized for deferred tax assets 
o Net change during the year in the total valuation allowance 
• Amounts and expiration dates of operating loss and tax credit carryforwards for tax purposes 
• Approximate tax effect of each type of temporary difference and carryforward that gives rise to a significant portion of de-
ferred tax liabilities and deferred tax assets 
• When a deferred tax liability is not recognized because of the exceptions to comprehensive recognition of deferred taxes: 
o A description of the types of temporary differences for which a deferred tax liability has not been recognized and the 
types of events that would cause those temporary differences to become taxable 
o The cumulative amount of each type of temporary difference 
o The amount of the unrecognized deferred tax liability for temporary differences related to investments in foreign 
subsidiaries and foreign corporate joint ventures that are essentially permanent in duration if determination of that 







• Major Components of tax expense (or income). These components may include (i.a.): 
o Current tax expense (or income) 
o The amount of deferred tax expense (or income) relating to the origination and reversal of temporary differences 
o The amount of deferred tax expense (or income) relating to changes in tax rates or the imposition of new taxes 
o Deferred tax expense arising from the write-down, or reversal of a previous write-down, of a deferred tax asset 
• In respect of each type of temporary difference, unused tax losses, and unused tax credits: 
o The amount of the deferred tax assets and liabilities recognized in the statement of financial position for each period 
presented 
o The amount of the deferred tax income or expense recognized in profit or loss 
• The amount of a deferred tax asset and the nature of the evidence supporting its recognition, when: 
o The utilization of the deferred tax asset is dependent on future taxable profits in excess of the profits arising from the 
reversal of existing taxable temporary differences; and 
o The entity has suffered a loss in either the current or preceding period in the tax jurisdiction to which the deferred tax 
asset relates 
• The amount (and expiry date, if any) of deductible temporary differences, unused tax losses, and unused tax credits for 
which no deferred tax asset is recognized in the statement of financial position 
• The aggregate amount of temporary differences associated with investments in subsidiaries, branches, and associates and 
interests in joint arrangements for which deferred tax liabilities have not been recognized (i.e., if the parent is able to con-















US GAAP: ASC 
740-10-50-15A 
(codification of  
FIN 48) 
• Tabular reconciliation of the total amounts of unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) at the beginning and end of the period, 
including at a minimum: 
o Gross amounts of the increases / decreases in UTBs as a result of tax positions taken during a prior period 
o Gross amounts of the increases / decreases in UTBs as a result of tax positions taken during the current period 
o Amounts of decreases in the unrecognized tax benefits relating to settlements with taxing authorities 
o Reductions to UTBs as a result of a lapse of the applicable statute of limitations 
• The total amount of UTBs that, if recognized, would affect the effective tax rate 
• For positions for which it is reasonably possible that the total amounts of UTBs will significantly increase or decrease 
within 12 months of the reporting date: 
o The nature of the uncertainty 
o The nature of the event that could occur in the next 12 months that would cause the change 






IFRS: IAS 12.88; 
IFRIC 23.A4-A5 
• When there is uncertainty over income tax treatments, an entity shall determine whether to disclose: 
o Judgments made in determining taxable profit (tax loss), tax bases, unused tax losses, unused tax credits, and tax 
rates; and 
o Information about the assumptions and estimates made in determining taxable profit (tax loss), tax bases, unused tax 
losses, unused tax credits, and tax rates 
• If an entity concludes it is probable that a tax authority will accept an uncertain tax treatment, the entity shall determine 







US GAAP: ASC 
280-10-50-41 
 
IFRS: IFRS 8.33 
Companies have to disclose several financial figures separately for each operating segment. The disaggregation into operating 
segments is based on the way management organizes segments internally to make operating decisions and assess performance 
(“management approach”). Financial information can therefore be segmented in several ways (e.g., by products and services, by 
geography, by legal entity, or by type of customer). 
 
If a company does not define its segments by geography, at least the following geographic information has to be disclosed (if 
practicable): 
• Revenues from external customers from the country of domicile and foreign countries in total 
• Material revenue from one country individually 
• Basis for attributing revenues from external customers to individual entities 
• Long-lived assets (US GAAP) / non-current assets (IFRS) 
• Material assets in an individual foreign country individually 
 
Besides, a geographic breakdown of tax expense and of pre-tax income is required for SEC-registered US firms by 17 CFR 
















US GAAP: 17 CFR 
§ 229.601(b)(21) 
 
• List of the subsidiaries of the registrant, containing: 
o State or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization 
o Names under which such subsidiaries do business 
 
Subsidiaries may be omitted if the unnamed subsidiaries, considered in the aggregate as a single subsidiary, would not constitute 
a significant subsidiary as of the end of the year covered by this report. 
 
Exhibit 21 to the 
10-K filing 
IFRS: IFRS 
12.10(a)(i); Art. 28 




The IFRS only require disclosing information that enables users of its consolidated financial statements to understand the com-
position of the group. 
 
However, the EU Accounting Directive obliges EU firms to disclose (i.a.): 
• In relation to undertakings included in the consolidation (or excluded from a consolidation on the grounds of  
immateriality): 
o The names and registered offices of those undertakings 
o The proportion of the capital held in those undertakings 










B. Mandatory public CbCR 
Country / 
Region 
Law / source of the 
rule 
Content / items of disclosure Medium / place of disclosure Who is affected? Entry into force 




2014, c. 39, s. 376 
Reporting businesses have to report certain types of 
payments to all levels of government in Canada or 
abroad if these payments exceed CAD 100,000. 
 
Payments within the scope of the ESTMA are: 
• Taxes, other than consumption or personal in-
come taxes 
• Royalties 
• Fees and regulatory charges as well as consid-
erations for licenses, permits or, concessions 
• Production entitlements 
• Bonuses, including signature, discovery, and 
production bonuses 
• Dividends 
• Infrastructure improvement payments 
 
Payments shall be disclosed at project level, when 
possible. “Project” refers to operational activities 
that are governed by contract(s) and form the basis 
of payment liabilities with a government. Taxes can 


















Reports have to made available 
by entities on a publicly acces-
sible website. The Government 
of Canada publishes a list of 









Entities (i.e., firms) engaged in the 
commercial development of oil, gas, 
or minerals. The reporting obligation 
includes firms that control entities 
engaged in these activities. 
 
An entity is required to report if it 
meets one of the following two crite-
ria: 
• The entity is listed on a stock 
exchange in Canada 
• Non-listed entities are within 
the scope if they meet two of 
the following size-related crite-
ria in one of the two most recent 
financial years: 
o At least CAD 20 million 
in total assets 
o At least CAD 40 million 
in revenues 
o At least 250 employees 
on average 
  
The ESTMA was en-
acted in December 
2014 and came into 
force on 1 June 2015. 
Applicable for fiscal 
years starting on or af-





Law / source of the 
rule 













Disclosures to be made on a per-country basis: 
• Total amount of payments made to each gov-
ernment 
• Amount per type of payment made to each 
government, separately for 
o Production entitlements 
o Taxes levied on the income, production, 
or profits of companies 
o Royalties 
o Dividends 
o Signature, discovery, and production bo-
nuses 
o License fees, rental fees, entry fees, and 
other considerations for licenses and/or 
concessions 
o Payments for infrastructure improve-
ments 
• Where those payments have been attributed to 
a specific project, the total amount per type of 
payment made for each such project and the 
total amount of payments for each such project 
 
The disclosures pertain to payments made to any 
governments resulting from extractive operations 
(i.e., exploration, prospection, discovery, develop-
ment, and extraction of minerals, oil, natural gas de-
posits, or other materials) and/or operations relating 
to the logging of primary forests. Payments below 












Reports have to be filed with 
and published in the national 
commercial register. Most af-
fected firms also publish the re-
port on their website. 
 
• Large EU/EEA undertakings 
and all EU/EEA public-interest 
entities active in the extractive 
industry or the logging of pri-
mary forests 
• Undertakings active in the ex-
tractive or logging of primary 
forest industries which are 
listed at an EU/EEA stock ex-
change 
 
Parent undertakings which are re-
quired to prepare consolidated finan-
cial statements have to disclose a 
consolidated report on payments 
(comprising the parent entity and all 
subsidiaries under its control). 
 
Large undertakings according to the 
EU Accounting Directive are defined 
as undertakings which on their bal-
ance sheet dates exceed at least two 
of the three following criteria: 
• Balance sheet total of  
EUR 20 million 
• Net turnover of EUR 40 million 
• Average number of employees 
during the financial year of 250 
 
Fiscal years starting on 
or after 1 January 2016 
(earlier application in a 






Law / source of the 
rule 
Content / items of disclosure Medium / place of disclosure Who is affected? Entry into force 
United 
States 
Sec. 1504 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and 
Consumer Protec-
tion Act; Sec. 13(q) 
of the Securities Ex-
change Act (15 
U.S.C. § 78m(q)) 
Disclosures to be made both per government/coun-
try and per project: 
• Total amounts of payments made to any gov-
ernment, broken down by category: 
o Taxes 
o Royalties 
o Fees (including license fees) 
o Production entitlements 
o Bonuses 
o Other material benefits 
• Currency used to make the payments 
• Financial period in which the payments were 
made 
• Business segment that made the payments 
 
The disclosures comprise any payment by the listed 
company (or a subsidiary or entity under its control) 
to any government for the purpose of the commer-
cial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals. 
The SEC is allowed to set a de minimis rule so that 
payments under a certain threshold are exempt from 
disclosure. 
 
Disclosures have to be filed 
with the SEC, publicly availa-
ble through EDGAR. 
SEC-registered companies engaging 
in the commercial development of 
oil, natural gas, or minerals 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act 
was enacted on 21 July 
2010. Sec. 1504 di-
rected the SEC to issue 
final rules that require 
the disclosure. The 
SEC adopted such 
rules in 2012, but they 
were vacated by court 
decision in 2013. In 
2016, the SEC adopted 
a modified version, 
which was revoked by 
the Congress via a 
joint resolution of dis-
approval in 2017. As 
of December 2019, the 
SEC has proposed a 
third version of the 
rule (which is currently 











Disclosures to be made on a per-country basis: 
• Turnover 
• Number of employees on a full-time equiva-
lent basis 
• Profit or loss before tax 
• Tax on profit or loss 
• Public subsidies received 
• List of all the subsidiaries and permanent es-
tablishments maintained in the respective 
country, containing 
o Name(s) 
o Nature of activities 





The report has to be audited 
and published as an annex to 
the (consolidated) financial 
statements. 
 
EU financial institutions 
 
Fiscal years starting on 
or after 1 January 2014 
(limited disclosures al-
ready for the preceding 
year). Later implemen-








Law / source of the 
rule 
Content / items of disclosure Medium / place of disclosure Who is affected? Entry into force 
EU mem-
ber states 
Proposal for a Gen-
eral Public CbCR. 
The information is 
based on the com-
promise proposal of 
the Presidency of 
the Council of the 
EU as of 13 No-
vember 2019 
(14038/19) and on 
the resolution of the 
European Parlia-
ment of 27 March 
2019 (P8_TA-
PROV(2019)0309). 
The compromise proposal of the Presidency re-
quires the following disclosures: 
• The name of the ultimate parent undertaking or 
the standalone undertaking 
• Financial year concerned 
• Currency used 
• The following items on a per-country basis for 
each EU member state and each tax jurisdic-
tion contained in the EU list of non-coopera-
tive jurisdictions and on an aggregate basis for 
all other jurisdictions: 
o Brief description of the nature of the ac-
tivities 
o Number of employees  
o Revenues 
o Profit or loss before income tax 
o Income tax accrued during the relevant 
financial year 
o Income tax paid on cash basis 
o Accumulated earnings at the end of the 
relevant financial year 
 
The European Parliament demands a per-country 
disclosure for all jurisdictions worldwide and pro-
poses several additional items: 
• List of all subsidiaries, a brief description of 
the nature of their activities and their respec-
tive geographical location 
• Fixed assets other than cash or cash equiva-
lents 
• Distinction between the revenues made with 
related parties and with unrelated parties 
• Stated capital 
• Details of public subsidies received and any 
donations made to politicians, political organi-
zations, or political foundations 
• Whether undertakings, subsidiaries or 
branches benefit from preferential tax treat-
ment, from a patent box, or equivalent regimes 
 
Reports have to be filed with 
and published in the national 
commercial register. In addi-
tion, the report shall be pub-
lished on the website of the re-
porting entity. 
 
Instead of the filing with the 
national commercial register, 
the European Parliament pro-
poses the publication according 
to a common template in a cen-





• Ultimate parent undertakings or 
standalone undertakings domi-
ciled in the EU which on their 
balance sheet date exceeded for 
each of the last two consecutive 
financial years a total (consoli-
dated) revenue of EUR 750 mil-
lion 
• Medium-sized and large EU 
subsidiaries and branches con-
trolled by an ultimate parent un-
dertaking domiciled outside the 
EU which on its balance sheet 
date exceeded for each of the 
last two consecutive financial 
years a total consolidated reve-
nue of EUR 750 million (even 
in this case, the disclosures 
shall comprise the whole group) 
 
The scope of affected undertakings 
proposed by the European Parlia-
ment is slightly more comprehensive 
(e.g., no restriction to medium-sized 
and large EU subsidiaries; exceeding 
of the revenue threshold in the im-




Open / implementation 
still under debate. 
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C. Mandatory tax strategy disclosure 
Country / 
Region 
Law / source of the 
rule 
Content / items of disclosure Medium / place of disclosure Who is affected? Entry into force 
United 
Kingdom 
Schedule 19 of the  
Finance Act 2016 
(s. 24), Sec. 161 
The tax strategy report must contain: 
• The approach to risk management and gov-
ernance arrangements in relation to UK taxa-
tion 
• The attitude towards tax planning (so far as 
affecting UK taxation) 
• The level of risk in relation to UK taxation 
that the business is prepared to accept 
• The approach of the business towards its 
dealings with HMRC 
• Details of the paragraph of the legislation 
the report complies with 
 
The group tax strategy may include: 
• Any other information relating to taxation 
(whether UK taxation or otherwise) 
 
The tax strategy report must be 
published on an annual basis on the 
internet and be available free of 
charge. The report may be pub-
lished as a separate document or as 
a self-contained part of a wider doc-
ument. 
• UK groups, sub-groups, compa-
nies, or partnerships that ex-
ceeded at least one of the follow-
ing thresholds in the previous fi-
nancial year: 
o A turnover of  
GBP 200 million 
o A balance sheet total of 
GBP 2 billion 
• UK companies or groups that are 
part of an MNE group that meets 
the OECD’s CbCR framework 
threshold of global turnover over 
EUR 750 million 
 
A company or sub-group only has to 
publish its own tax strategy if it’s not 
covered by a published strategy at a 
higher level. 
 
Effective for financial 
years starting after 





D. Voluntary disclosure frameworks 
Country / 
Region 
Name and source 
of the framework 
Content / items of disclosure Medium / place of disclosure Target group Entry into force 
Australia Voluntary tax trans-
parency code (TTC) 
(part of the 2016-17 
Federal Budget) 
The Tax Transparency Code (TTC) is a set of 
principles and minimum standards to guide me-
dium and large businesses on public disclosure 
of tax information. Information disclosed under 
the TTC is divided between Part A and Part B 
content.  
 
Part A contains:  
• A reconciliation of accounting profit to tax 
expense and to income tax paid or income 
tax payable  
• Identification of material temporary and 
non-temporary differences 
• Accounting effective company tax rates for 
Australian and global operations 
 
Part B contains: 
• Approach to tax strategy and governance 
• Tax contribution summary for corporate 
taxes paid  
• Information about international related 
party dealings  
 
Businesses can elect to satisfy the 
minimum standards of the TTC by 
publishing the corresponding in-
formation 
• In their general-purpose fi-
nancial statements, 
• In a Taxes Paid Report, or  
• In another document 
 
Businesses can notify the Austral-
ian Taxation Office (ATO) once 
they have made their TTC report 
publicly available on their website 
and provide the ATO with the cur-
rent URL link to the published re-
port. 
 
The ATO facilitates the centralized 
hosting of the published TTC re-
ports provided by the businesses 
that adopt the TTC. These reports 
are hosted at https://data.gov.au/ 
dataset/ds-dga-f71709a8-2eeb-
4592-ad1f-443f7f520186/details. 
The ATO does not review or pro-
vide any assurance on the accuracy 
of the information contained in 
these reports. 
 
Companies (including entities 
treated as companies for Austral-
ian tax purposes) that are medium 
or large businesses are encour-
aged to adopt the TTC. This in-
cludes Australian-headquartered 
businesses and foreign multina-
tionals that have operations in 
Australia. 
 
It is recommended that medium 
businesses adopt Part A of the 
TTC and large businesses adopt 
both Part A and Part B of the 
TTC. 
 
Medium and large businesses are 
defined by the following thresh-
olds: 
• Medium businesses are busi-
nesses with aggregated Aus-
tralian turnover of at least 
AUD 100 million but less 
than AUD 500 million 
• Large businesses are busi-
nesses with aggregated Aus-
tralian turnover of  











The Board of Taxa-
tion recommended 
the TTC be adopted 
for financial years 
ending after the re-
lease of the Board’s 








Name and source 
of the framework 
Content / items of disclosure Medium / place of disclosure Target group Entry into force 
International GRI 207: TAX 
(2019) 
Management approach disclosures: 
• Approach to tax (207-1) 
o Tax strategy of the company 
o Governance body that formally re-
views and approves the tax strategy 
o Approach to regulatory compliance 
o Link between the approach to tax and 
the business and sustainable develop-
ment strategies 
• Tax governance, control, and risk manage-
ment (207-2) 
o Description of the tax governance 
and control framework 
o Description of the mechanisms for re-
porting concerns about unethical or 
unlawful behavior and the integrity in 
relation to tax 
o Description of the assurance process 
for disclosures on tax and reference 
to the assurance report 
• Stakeholder engagement and management 
of concerns w.r.t. to tax disclosure (207-3) 
o Approach to engagement with tax au-
thorities 
o Approach to public policy advocacy 
on tax 
o Processes for collecting and consider-
ing the views and concerns of stake-
holders 
 
CbCR disclosures (207-4): 
• Mandatory disclosures for each tax jurisdic-
tions where the entities included in the con-
solidated financial statements are resident 
for tax purposes: 
o Names of the resident entities 
o Primary activities of the organization 
o Number of employees (and the basis 
of calculation of this number) 
o Revenues from third-party sales 
The GRI Standards are designed to 
be used by organizations to report 
about their impacts on the econ-
omy, the environment, and society. 
A report in accordance with the 
GRI Standards can be produced as 
a stand-alone sustainability report 
or can reference information dis-




In general, the GRI Standards are 
applicable for every organization 
preparing a sustainability report. 
There are two basic approaches 
for applying the Standards: 
• The GRI Standards can be 
used as a set to prepare a 
sustainability report that is in 
accordance with the Stand-
ards 
• Selected GRI Standards, or 
parts of their content, can 
also be used to report spe-
cific information without 
preparing a report in accord-
ance with the Standards 
The Standard is ef-
fective for reports or 
other materials pub-
lished on or after 








Name and source 
of the framework 
Content / items of disclosure Medium / place of disclosure Target group Entry into force 
o Revenues from intra-group transac-
tions with other jurisdictions 
o Profit/loss before tax 
o Tangible assets other than cash and 
cash equivalents 
o Corporate income tax paid on a cash 
basis 
o Corporate income tax accrued on 
profit/loss (without deferred taxes) 
o Reasons for the difference between 
corporate income tax accrued on 
profit/loss and the tax due if the statu-
tory tax rate is applied to profit/loss 
before tax 
• Reconciliation of the sums of reported 
third-party revenues, profit/loss, tangible 
assets, and corporate income tax paid with 







II. Public disclosures by tax authorities – tax return disclosure 
Country Law / source of 
the rule 
Content / items of disclosure Medium / place of disclosure Who is affected? Entry into force 
Australia Sec. 3C-3E of the 
Taxation Adminis-
tration Act 1953 
• Company name and business identifica-
tion number (ABN) 
• Total income 
• Taxable income 
• Income tax payable 
Disclosure on the website of the 






• Australian public and foreign-
owned corporate tax entities 
with total income of  
AUD 100 million or more 
• Australian-owned resident pri-
vate companies with total in-
come of AUD 200 million or 
more 
• Entities that have an amount of 
petroleum resource rent tax 
(PRRT) payable 
 
Effective as of tax 
year 2013/2014. 
Denmark Sec. 17 of the 
Skatteforvaltnings-
loven (SFL) 
• Identity of the taxpayer  
• Taxable income 
• Utilized losses carried forward  
• Amount of payable taxes 
 
Online database by the tax admin-
istration (SKAT). 
• Entities that are liable to cor-
porate tax in Denmark 
Effective as of tax 
year 2011. 
Finland Sec. 5 of the Act on 
the Public Disclo-
sure and Confiden-
tiality of Tax Infor-
mation 
No 1346/1999 
• Name of the corporation 
• Municipality of domicile 
• Corporate code 
• Taxable income and property 
• Total amount of taxes imposed 
• Total amount of withholding tax 
• Amount to be levied or refunded in the 
course of tax collection 
 
Information can be obtained at cus-
tomer terminals in the local tax of-
fices. The publication of the data 
comes along with considerable me-
dia coverage. 
• Entities that are liable to cor-
porate tax in Finland 
Effective as of 1 Janu-
ary 2000. 
Japan (abolished) • Corporate name  
• Taxable income 
• Tax office to which the tax was remitted 
• Name of company’s president  
• Beginning and ending day of the ac-
counting year 
Information was posted publicly at 
the tax office within three months 
after a company had submitted its 
tax return, and was public for at 
least one month. This information 
was often collected and centrally 





• Corporations whose taxable in-
come exceeded the threshold 
of JPY 40 million (about 
69,000-84,000 companies) 
Introduced in 1950, 
abolished in 2005 
(i.e., the last disclo-
sure occurred in 2006 
for the tax year 2005). 
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Country Law / source of 
the rule 
Content / items of disclosure Medium / place of disclosure Who is affected? Entry into force 
Norway Sec. 8-8 of the 
Ligningsloven 
• Name of the corporation 
• Organization number 
• Postcode and postal town 
• Municipality 
• Net income 
• Net wealth 
• Tax 
 
Tax lists are published on the web-
site of the Norwegian tax authority 
(skatteetaten.no). Users have to cre-
ate an account to get access to the 
lists. 
• Corporations who received a 
tax assessment notice 
Public tax return dis-
closures in Norway 
date back to the mid-
dle of the 19th century.  
Pakistan Sec. 181B and Sec. 




Disclosures in the taxpayer’s directory: 
• Name of the company 
• Identification number 
• Amount of income tax paid 
 
In addition, under the Taxpayer Privileges and 
Honor Card Program (TPHC), the Federal 
Board of Revenue announces annually the top 
100 taxpayers of four categories, including 
corporations and partnerships. Besides, these 
top taxpayers receive material benefits and 
privileges. 
 






• All corporations domiciled in 
Pakistan 
• All partnerships (“associations 
of persons”) domiciled in Pa-
kistan 
Effective as of tax 
year 2012/2013. 
Poland Art. 27b of the Cor-
porate Income Tax 
Act 
• Company name  
• Taxpayer identification number (NIP) 
• Revenues 
• Tax deductible costs  
• Income or incurred loss 
• Tax base 
• Tax due 
• (Effective tax rate) 
Publication on the Ministry’s web-
site (in the Public Information Bul-
letin) 
• All “tax capital groups” (re-
gardless of the amount of reve-
nues), which are formally rec-
ognized groups of wholly or 
majority-owned companies 
consolidating their taxes under 
a single Polish entity 
• Corporate taxpayers other than 
tax capital groups, whose in-
come in the tax year exceeds 
the amount of EUR 50 million  
 
Effective as of 1 Janu-
ary 2018, disclosures 
for tax years 2012 and 
onwards. 
Turkey Art. 5 III of the 
Vergi Usul Kanunu 
(VUK) 
• Name of the corporation 
• Activity type 
• Amount of tax paid 
• Location 
• Affiliated tax office 






• The top 100 highest-paying 
taxpayers (regarding corporate 
income tax) 
• Taxpayers who do not want 
their names to be revealed are 




III. Private disclosures to tax authorities 
A. Private CbCR 
Country / 
Region 
Law / source of the 
rule 
Content / items of disclosure Medium of disclosure and ex-
change of information 






tion Plan – Action 
Point 13; Council 
Directive (EU) 
2016/881 
Disclosures to be made on a per-country basis: 
• Revenues, broken down into related party 
and unrelated party 
• Profit (loss) before income tax 
• Income tax paid (on cash basis) 
• Income tax accrued – current year 
• Stated capital 
• Accumulated earnings 
• Number of employees 
• Tangible assets other than cash and cash 
equivalents 
• List of all the constituent entities of the 
MNE group included in each aggregation 
per tax jurisdiction, containing 
o Name(s) 
o Main activity(ies) 
 
In combination with the “local file” and the “mas-
ter file”, the CbCR is part of the OECD’s three-
tiered approach to transfer pricing documentation. 
 
Affected companies disclose the re-
ports to the national tax authorities. 
The reports are exchanged between 
the tax authorities of the affected 
countries based on the Multilateral 
Competent Authority Agreement 
(CbC MCAA) or, alternatively, 
based on bilateral agreements (i.a., 
with the US). The OECD has devel-
oped a standardized XML format 
for the filing and exchange of the 
reports. 
• The ultimate parent entity of an 
MNE group that is resident for 
tax purposes in a participating 
country if the consolidated group 
revenue in the preceding finan-
cial year was equal to or ex-
ceeded EUR 750 million (or an 
equivalent in local currency) 
• A resident constituent entity 
which is not the ultimate parent 
entity of an MNE group which 
exceeds the above-mentioned 
revenue threshold if the ultimate 
parent entity does not have to 
file a report in its jurisdiction of 
residence or if this jurisdiction 
does not take part in the ex-
change of the reports 
 
A first wave of coun-
tries (including the EU 
member states) adopted 
the rules for fiscal years 
starting on or after 
1 January 2016. Several 






B. Disclosure of tax planning arrangements 
Country Law / source of 
the rule 
What has to be disclosed? Definition of the report-
able transactions 
Medium of disclosure and exchange 
of information 
Who has to disclose? Entry into force / 
in effect for 
Canada Disclosure of re-
portable transac-
tions (Sec. 237.3 
of the Canadian 
Income Tax Act) 
A reportable transaction is an “avoidance transac-
tion”, as defined for purposes of Canada’s general 
anti-avoidance rule, that is entered into by a taxpayer 
and meets at least two of the following three criteria: 
• The promoter or advisor for the transaction is 
entitled to a fee that is based on 
o The amount of the tax benefit 
o Getting the tax benefit 
o The number of people participating, or 
who have been provided access to advice 
from the promoter or advisor about the tax 
consequences 
• The promoter or advisor for the transaction ob-
tains “confidential protection,” (i.e., any ar-
rangement that prohibits him from disclosing the 
details or structure of the transaction to any per-
son) 
• The taxpayer, the person who entered into the 
transaction on the taxpayer’s behalf, or the pro-
moter or advisor have or had “contractual pro-
tection” (i.e., any form of protection against fail-

















An information return (Form RC312) 
has to be filed with the Canadian 
Revenue Agency (CRA) on or before 
30 June of the calendar year follow-
ing the calendar year in which the 
transaction first became a reportable 
transaction.  
 
• Every taxpayer for whom a 
tax benefit results (or would 
result) from the reportable 
transaction 
• Every person who has en-
tered into a reportable trans-
action for the benefit of an-
other person 
• Every advisor or promoter in 
respect of the reportable 
transaction who is or was en-
titled to a fee in respect of 
this transaction 
• Every person who is not 
dealing at arm’s length with 
an advisor or promoter in re-
spect of the reportable trans-
action and who is or was en-
titled to a fee in respect of 
this transaction 
Reportable transac-
tions entered into 




Country Law / source of 
the rule 
What has to be disclosed? Definition of the report-
able transactions 
Medium of disclosure and exchange 
of information 
Who has to disclose? Entry into force / 
in effect for 
EU mem-
ber states 
DAC 6 (Council 
Directive (EU) 
2018/822 of 25 
May 2018) 
Disclosure of reportable cross-border arrangements, 
i.e., arrangements which 
• Concern either more than one member state or a 
member state and a third country (“cross-bor-
der”) and 
• Contain at least one of certain “hallmarks” 
 
A hallmark is a characteristic or feature of a cross-
border arrangement that presents an indication of a 
potential risk of tax avoidance. Annex IV of the Di-
rective contains a detailed list of hallmarks, including 
(i.a.): 
• The use of substantially standardized structures 
• Deductible cross-border payments to associated 
companies where the recipient benefits from cer-
tain tax advantages 
• Transfer pricing arrangements involving the use 
of unilateral safe harbor rules 
• Arrangements designed to circumvent automatic 
exchange of information and beneficial owner-
ship 
 
Certain hallmarks are subject to a “main benefit test”, 
which is satisfied if the main benefit (or one of the 
main benefits) a person may reasonably expect to de-















The disclosure has to be made to the 
competent tax authority of the mem-
ber state within 30 days of certain 
trigger events. If more than one mem-
ber state is concerned, the Directive 
contains an unambiguous provision to 
which member state the information 
has to be reported. 
 
The information will be automatically 
exchanged each quarter by the com-
petent authorities of each member 
state. 
 
• Primarily the intermediaries, 
i.e., any person that designs, 
markets, organizes, or makes 
available for implementation 
or manages the implementa-
tion of a reportable cross-
border arrangement, or that 
provides aid, assistance, or 
advice with regard to the ar-
rangement 
• In the following cases the 
taxpayer has to disclose: 
o The intermediary has 
no EU nexus 
o The intermediary can-
not make the disclo-
sure due to legal pro-
fessional privilege 
• The taxpayer has developed 
the arrangement in-house 
The Directive ap-
plies as of 1 July 
2020. However, re-
portable arrange-
ments the first step 
of which was im-
plemented between 
25 June 2018 and 
1 July 2020 have to 
be disclosed by 
31 August 2020. 
 
111 
Country Law / source of 
the rule 
What has to be disclosed? Definition of the report-
able transactions 
Medium of disclosure and exchange 
of information 
Who has to disclose? Entry into force / 
in effect for 
Ireland Mandatory disclo-
sure regime (Sec. 
817D-817R of the 
Taxes Consolida-
tion Act 1997) 
A disclosable transaction is any transaction, or pro-
posal for a transaction, that meets all of the following 
criteria: 
• It may enable a person to obtain a tax advantage 
• The tax advantage is, or might be expected to be, 
one of the main benefits of the transaction  
• It matches any one of the specified descriptions 
(i.e., classes of transaction) set out in the legisla-
tion 
 
Disclosures have to be made to the 
central Mandatory Disclosure Unit 
within 5 working days (30 working 
days for “in-house” schemes), using 
specific forms (Forms MD1-MD7). 
• Primarily the promoters of 
the schemes (e.g., account-
ants, solicitors, banks and fi-
nancial institutions, along 
with small firms of specialist 
promoters) 
• However, in the following 
cases the client/user has to 
disclose: 
o Where the promoter is 
outside Ireland 
o Where there is no pro-
moter and the scheme 
is specific to a certain 
group or for their own 
use (“in-house” 
scheme) 
o Where the promoter 
cannot make a disclo-
sure due to legal pro-
fessional privilege 
 
Introduced as of 
January 2011, ma-
jor amendments to 
the rule in 2015. 
Portugal Decree-Law No 
29/2008 of 
25 February 2008 
Obligation to report operations and transactions 
whose sole or principal objective is to obtain tax ben-
efits (tax planning structures). The tax planning 
schemes or dealings which fall under this regime are 
those which involve 
• An entity subject to a more favorable tax regime 
• An entity totally or partially exempt from taxa-
tion 
• Financial or insurance operations that may lead 
to a recharacterization of income or to a change 
of beneficiary 
• The use of tax losses 
• Promoters whose liability is excluded or limited, 
irrespective of whether the situation falls under 




Disclosure to the Portuguese tax au-
thorities via official forms within 20 
days following the end of the month 
in which the scheme or action has 
been conceived, proposed, or adopted 
for the first time (promoter) or until 
the end of the month following its 
adoption (user), respectively. The tax 
authorities organize a database which 
will include tax planning schemes. 
This database is made available to tax 
inspectors in case of tax audits. 
• Primarily the promoters of 
reportable operations and 
transactions (if resident in 
Portugal) 
• Users of reportable opera-
tions and transactions (if the 
promoter is a non-resident 
entity or the scheme has not 
been proposed by a pro-
moter) 
Effective as of 
15 May 2008. 
However, the re-
gime is supposed to 
be abolished in the 
course of the na-
tional implementa-
tion of the EU 
DAC 6 (see above). 
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Country Law / source of 
the rule 
What has to be disclosed? Definition of the report-
able transactions 
Medium of disclosure and exchange 
of information 
Who has to disclose? Entry into force / 






(§ 34-39 of the 
Tax Administra-
tion Act of 2011) 
Disclosure of reportable arrangements. These are ar-
rangements which are either contained in a specific 
list published by the Commissioner or where a tax 
benefit is or will be derived or is assumed to be de-
rived by any participant and which additionally 
• Provide for interest, fees, etc. that are partly or 
wholly dependent on the assumptions relating to 
the tax treatment of that arrangement; 
• Have characteristics which are substantially sim-
ilar to the indicators of a lack of commercial 
substance in terms of the general anti-avoidance 
rule; 
• Give rise to an amount that is or will be dis-
closed by any participant as 
o A deduction for purposes of the Income 
Tax Act but not as an expense for pur-
poses of financial reporting standards or 
o Revenue for purposes of financial report-
ing standards but not as gross income for 
purposes of the Income Tax Act 
• Do not result in a reasonable expectation of a 
pre-tax profit for any participant; or 
• Result in a reasonable expectation of a pre-tax 
profit for any participant that is less than the 
value of that tax benefit to that participant if 
both are discounted to a present value  
 




The arrangement must be disclosed to 
the South African Revenue Service 
(SARS) within 45 business days after 
an amount is first received by or has 
accrued to a participant or is first paid 
or actually incurred by a participant 
in terms of the arrangement. After re-
ceipt of the information, the SARS is-
sues a reportable arrangement refer-
ence number to each participant for 
administrative purposes. 
 
• Primarily the promoter of the 
reportable arrangement 
• All other participants of the 
reportable transaction, if 
o There is no promoter 
in relation to the ar-
rangement, or  
o The promoter is not a 
resident 
• However, a participant need 
not disclose the information 
if the participant obtains a 
written statement that the 
promoter or any other partic-
ipant has already made the 
disclosure 
The initial version 
of the rule was en-
acted as of 2005. 
Major reforms have 








(Part 7 of the Fi-
nance Act 2004) 
Disclosure of “notifiable arrangements” and pro-
posals of such arrangements. A scheme qualifies as a 
notifiable arrangement if  
• It will, or might be expected to, enable any per-
son to obtain a tax advantage, 
• That tax advantage is, or might be expected to 
be, the main benefit or one of the main benefits 
of the arrangement, and 
Notifiable arrangements and pro-
posals must be disclosed to the 
HMRC using Forms AAG1, AAG2 
or AAG3. Disclosure has to be made 
within 5 days of certain trigger events 
(or within 30 days of the scheme be-
ing implemented if there is no pro-
moter).  
• Primarily the promoters of 
notifiable arrangements  
• In the following cases the us-
ers of notifiable arrange-
ments have to disclose: 
o The promoter is based 
outside the UK 
o The promoter is a law-
yer and legal 
Applies from 1 Au-
gust 2004 to pro-
posals notifiable on 




into on or after 
23 April 2003. 
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Country Law / source of 
the rule 
What has to be disclosed? Definition of the report-
able transactions 
Medium of disclosure and exchange 
of information 
Who has to disclose? Entry into force / 
in effect for 
• The scheme falls within one of a number of de-
scriptions contained in the regulations (so-called 
“hallmarks”)  
 
The current regulations comprise schemes relating to: 
• Financial products 
• Standardized tax products 
• Loss schemes  
• Certain plant or machinery leasing arrangements  
• Certain pension arrangements 
 
professional privilege 
prevents him or her 
from providing all or 
part of the prescribed 
information  
o There is no promoter, 
such as when a person 
designs and imple-





(26 CFR § 
1.6011-4; 26 CFR 
§ 301.6112-1; 26 
U.S. Code § 6111) 
Disclosure of the participation in a “reportable trans-
action”, which includes 
• Listed transactions (i.e., contained in a list of tax 
avoidance transaction determined by the IRS) 
• Confidential transactions (i.e., offered to a tax-
payer under conditions of confidentiality and for 
a fee) 
• Transactions with contractual protection (i.e., 
the taxpayer has the right to a refund of fees if 
intended tax consequences are not sustained) 
• Loss transactions (i.e., any transaction resulting 
in the taxpayer claiming a certain loss) 
• Transactions of interest (as identified by the 
IRS) 
 
Taxpayers must attach Form 8886 to 
the respective tax return for each tax 
year in which the business partici-
pated in a reportable transaction. A 
copy of the disclosure statement must 
be sent to the Office of Tax Shelter 
Analysis (OTSA) at the same time 
that any disclosure statement is first 
filed by the taxpayer. 
 
Material advisors must file Form 
8918 with the OTSA by the last day 
of the month that follows the end of 
the calendar quarter in which the ad-
visor became a material advisor with 
respect to the reportable transaction 
or in which circumstances occur to 
require an amended disclosure state-
ment. Besides, material advisors must 
prepare and maintain a list for each 
(type of) reportable transaction and 
furnish such list to the IRS upon re-
quest. 
 
• Taxpayers participating in 
reportable transactions 
• Material advisors with re-
spect to any reportable trans-
action (i.e., persons who pro-
vide any material aid, assis-
tance, or advice with respect 
to organizing, managing, 
promoting, selling, imple-
menting, insuring, or carry-
ing out any reportable trans-
action, and who derive a cer-
tain amount of gross income 
for such aid, assistance, or 
advice) 
The initial version 
of the rule was ap-
plicable to transac-
tions entered into 
after 28 February 
2003. The catego-
ries of reportable 
transactions have 
been amended as of 




C. Supplementary reconciliation provided to tax authorities 
Country / 
Region 
Law / source of the 
rule 




Net Income (Loss) 
Reconciliation (final 
version issued by the 
Treasury and the IRS 
as of 7 July 2004) 
Part I: 
• Certain questions about the firm’s financial 
statements 
• Reconciliation of financial statement net income 
(loss) for the firm (or consolidated financial 
statement group, if applicable) to net income 
(loss) of includable corporations for US income 
tax purposes 
 
Part II and III: 
• Reconciliation of the net income (loss) of in-
cludable corporations to US taxable income 
• Categorization of every book-tax difference item 
(regardless of size) according to permanent 
and/or temporary (timing) components 
  
Schedule M-3 has to be 
filed with the IRS as a part 
of the annual US corporate 
income tax return (Form 
1120), US income tax re-
turn for an S corporation 
(Form 1120-S), or US re-




• US corporations or groups of 
corporations who are required to 
file a US corporate income tax 
return (Form 1120) or a US in-
come tax return for an S corpo-
ration (Form 1120-S) and whose 
total assets at the end of the tax 
year are equal to or exceed  
USD 10 million 
• US partnerships who are re-
quired to file a US return of 
partnership income (Form 1065) 
if any of the following applies: 
o Total assets at the end of 
the tax year equal to or 
exceeding USD 10 mil-
lion 
o Total receipts for the tax 
year equal to or exceeding 
USD 35 million 
o An entity that owns at 
least 50% of the partner-
ship is required to file 















Schedule M-3 is effec-
tive for tax years end-
ing on or after 31 De-
cember 2004 (for cor-
porations) / tax years 
ending on or after 
31 December 2006 (for 









tions (26 CFR  
§ 1.6012-2(a)(4); IRS 
Announcement 2010-
75, I.R.B. 2010-41) 
Disclosure of income tax positions for which the two 
following conditions are satisfied: 
• The corporation has taken a tax position on its 
US federal income tax return for the current tax 
year or for a prior tax year 
• Either the corporation or a related party has rec-
orded a reserve with respect to that tax position 
for US federal income tax in audited financial 
statements, or the corporation or related party 
did not record a reserve for that tax position be-
cause the corporation expects to litigate the posi-
tion 
 
The following information has to be reported for each 
relevant tax position for the current tax year and for 
prior tax years: 
• Primary Internal Revenue Code (IRC) sections 
and subsections relating to the tax position 
• Indication whether the tax position creates tem-
porary or permanent book-tax differences (or 
both) 
• Identification number of a pass-through entity 
involved in the tax position 
• Indication whether the tax position qualifies as a 
major position (i.e., if its relative size is at least 
10% of all positions) 
• Ranking of the tax position according to its size 
(relative to the other positions) 
• Concise description of the position 
 
The disclosure is made us-
ing IRS Schedule UTP 
(Uncertain Tax Position 
Statement), which is filed 
as an attachment to the cor-
porate income tax return, 
i.e., Form 1120 or 
Form 1120-F. 
US corporations required to file a US 
corporate income tax return (Form 
1120) and foreign corporations re-
quired to file a US income tax return 
of a foreign corporation (Form 1120-
F) if all of the following criteria are 
fulfilled: 
• The corporation has assets that 
equal or exceed USD 10 million 
• The corporation or a related 
party issued audited financial 
statements reporting all or a 
portion of the corporation’s op-
erations for all or a portion of 
the corporation’s tax year 
• The corporation has one or 
more tax positions that must be 
reported on Schedule UTP 
 
The relevant asset threshold was 
phased in over a five-year period 
(USD 100 million for tax years 2010-
2011, USD 50 million for 2012-2013 
and USD 10 million for 2014 and all 
subsequent years). 
Effective for tax years 
beginning on or after 
1 January 2010. 
Notes: This table provides a detailed overview of selected tax-related disclosure rules and frameworks applicable (or under discussion) in several countries around the world. The information 
presented is compiled from the respective legal sources and standards indicated in the table, from additional administrative instructions of the respective tax authorities and standard setters, 
from the national reports on tax transparency for 29 countries contained in Başaran Yavaşlar and Hey (2019), from the institutional descriptions of empirical studies examining the respective 




Table A.2: Structured overview of empirical literature on tax transparency 
Panel A: Studies on determinants – generic firm attributes and characteristics (Section 4.1.1) 
References Disclosure type Determinants 
Akamah et al. (2018) Segment reporting - Size 
- Industry 
Ayers et al. (2015) Deferred tax & BTD disclosures - Size 
- Institutional ownership 
- Analyst coverage 
- Industry 
Balakrishnan et al. (2019) Voluntary disclosures in earnings an-
nouncements & conference calls 
- Analyst coverage 
Belnap (2019a) Tax strategy disclosures - Size 
Bilicka et al. (2020) Tax strategy disclosures - Industry 
N. Chen et al. (2019) Voluntary disclosures in earnings an-
nouncements & conference calls 
- Size 
- Institutional ownership 
- Analyst coverage 
Dyreng et al. (2020) Subsidiary list - Size 
- Analyst coverage 
Ehinger et al. (2020) Voluntary disclosures in earnings an-
nouncements & conference calls 
- Size 
- Analyst coverage 
Evers et al. (2014) Deferred tax & BTD disclosures - Size 
Gleason & Mills (2002) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Industry 
Hardeck et al. (forthcoming) CSR reports - Size 
Krapat et al. (2016) Subsidiary list - Size 
Mauler (2019) Tax disclosures in financial state-
ments in general 
- Analyst coverage 
L. A. Robinson & Schmidt 
(2013) 
UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Size 
 
 
Panel B: Studies on determinants – tax aggressiveness (Section 4.1.2) 
References Disclosure type Determinants 
Akamah et al. (2018) Segment reporting - Tax aggressiveness 
Ayers et al. (2015) Deferred tax & BTD disclosures - Tax aggressiveness 
Balakrishnan et al. (2019) Tax-related MD&A disclosure - Tax aggressiveness 
Voluntary disclosures in earnings an-
nouncements & conference calls 
- Tax aggressiveness 
Belnap (2019a) Tax strategy disclosures - Tax aggressiveness 
N. Chen et al. (2019) Voluntary disclosures in earnings an-
nouncements & conference calls 
- Tax (reporting) complexity /  
uncertainty 
Dyreng et al. (2020) Subsidiary list - Tax aggressiveness 
Ehinger et al. (2020) Voluntary disclosures in earnings an-
nouncements & conference calls 
- Tax (reporting) complexity /  
uncertainty 
Flagmeier & Mueller (2017) Tax disclosures in financial state-
ments in general 
- Tax (reporting) complexity /  
uncertainty 
Flagmeier et al. (2017) Tax disclosures in financial state-
ments in general 




References Disclosure type Determinants 
Gramlich & Whiteaker-Poe 
(2013) 
Subsidiary list - Tax aggressiveness 
Hardeck & Kirn (2016) CSR reports - Tax aggressiveness 
Hardeck et al. (2019) CSR reports - Tax aggressiveness 
- Cultural imprint 
Hope et al. (2013) Segment reporting - Tax aggressiveness 
Inger et al. (2018) Tax disclosures in financial state-
ments in general 
- Tax aggressiveness 
Kao (2019) CSR reports - Tax aggressiveness 
Koutney (2019) Voluntary disclosures in earnings an-
nouncements & conference calls 
- Tax (reporting) complexity /  
uncertainty 
Krapat et al. (2016) Subsidiary list - Tax aggressiveness 
Kubick et al. (2016) Tax disclosures in financial state-
ments in general 
- Tax aggressiveness 
L. A. Robinson & Schmidt 
(2013) 
UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Tax aggressiveness 
Schwab (2009) Voluntary disclosures in earnings an-
nouncements & conference calls 
- Tax aggressiveness 
Ylönen & Laine (2015) CSR reports - Tax aggressiveness 




Panel C: Studies on determinants – external pressure (Section 4.2) 
References Disclosure type Determinants 
Belnap (2019a) Tax strategy disclosures - NGO pressure / public attention 
Dyreng et al. (2016) Subsidiary list - NGO pressure / public attention 
Dyreng et al. (2020) Subsidiary list - Media coverage 
Kubick et al. (2016) Tax disclosures in financial state-
ments in general 
- Regulatory scrutiny 
Tax-related MD&A disclosure - Regulatory scrutiny 
 
 
Panel D: Studies on determinants – interaction between different disclosure types (Section 4.3) 
References Disclosure type Interacting disclosure rule 
Abernathy et al. (2013) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Schedule UTP 
Bozanic et al. (2017) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Schedule UTP 
Tax disclosures in financial state-
ments in general 
- Schedule UTP 
R. J. Brown et al. (2019) Segment reporting - CbCR - banks 
Honaker & Sharma (2017) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Schedule UTP 
Hope et al. (2013) Segment reporting - Schedule M-3 
Kays (2019) Voluntary additional public disclo-
sures to tax return data 
- Public tax return disclosure by 
tax authorities 







Panel E: Studies on the informativeness (Section 5):  
References Disclosure type Informativeness in terms of 
Belnap (2019b) Tax strategy disclosures - Boilerplate language / similarity 
Bilicka et al. (2020) Tax strategy disclosures - Boilerplate language / similarity 
Blouin & Robinson (2020) CbCR - OECD - Comparison with other datasets 
Bouvatier et al. (2018) CbCR - banks - Tax aggressiveness 
R. J. Brown et al. (2019) CbCR - banks - Tax aggressiveness 
Campbell et al. (2019) Tax risk disclosures - Future tax payments 
Clausing (2020) CbCR - OECD - Comparison with other datasets 
Clausing (2020) CbCR - OECD - Tax aggressiveness 
Desai & Dharmapala (2009) Deferred tax & BTD disclosures - Tax aggressiveness 
Dutt et al. (2019b) CbCR - banks - Tax aggressiveness 
Dutt et al. (2019b) CbCR - banks - Comparison with other datasets 
Fatica & Gregori (2020) CbCR - banks - Tax aggressiveness 
Frank et al. (2009) Deferred tax & BTD disclosures - Tax aggressiveness 
Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2019) CbCR - OECD - Comparison with other datasets 
Horst & Curatolo (2020) CbCR - OECD - Comparison with other datasets 
Janský (forthcoming) CbCR - banks - Tax aggressiveness 
Lisowsky (2009) Tax disclosures in financial state-
ments in general 
- Actual current tax liability /  
tax payments 
Lisowsky (2010) Tax disclosures in financial state-
ments in general 
- Tax aggressiveness 
Lisowsky et al. (2013) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Tax aggressiveness 
McGill & Outslay (2004) Tax disclosures in financial state-
ments in general 
- Actual current tax liability /  
tax payments 
McGill & Outslay (2004) Tax disclosures in financial state-
ments in general 
- Tax aggressiveness 
Mills (1998) Deferred tax & BTD disclosures - Tax aggressiveness 
L. A. Robinson et al. (2016) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Future tax payments 




Panel F: Studies on firm reactions to tax disclosure regulations (Section 6.1.1) 
References Disclosure type Reaction in terms of / effect on 
Bilicka et al. (2020) Tax strategy disclosures - Tax aggressiveness 
Blouin et al. (2010) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Avoidance of disclosure  
(i.a., bunching) 
Bouvatier et al. (2018) CbCR - banks - Tax haven presences 
- Investment & real activity 
Braun & Weichenrieder 
(2015) 
TIEAs - Tax haven presences 
- Investment & real activity 
S. Chen (2017) Public tax return disclosure by tax au-
thorities 
- Tax aggressiveness 
De Simone & Olbert (2020) CbCR - OECD - Tax haven presences 
- Avoidance of disclosure  
(i.a., bunching) 
- Investment & real activity 
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References Disclosure type Reaction in terms of / effect on 
Donohoe & McGill (2011) Schedule M-3 - Tax aggressiveness 
Dutt et al. (2019b) CbCR - banks - Tax aggressiveness 
Eberhartinger et al. (2020) CbCR - banks - Tax haven presences 
Green & Plesko (2016) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Tax aggressiveness 
Schedule M-3 - Tax aggressiveness 
Schedule UTP - Tax aggressiveness 
Gupta et al. (2014) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Tax aggressiveness 
Hasegawa et al. (2013) Public tax return disclosure by tax au-
thorities 
- Avoidance of disclosure  
(i.a., bunching) 
Hasegawa et al. (2013) Public tax return disclosure by tax au-
thorities 
- Tax aggressiveness 
Henry et al. (2016) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Tax aggressiveness 
Schedule M-3 - Tax aggressiveness 
Schedule UTP - Tax aggressiveness 
Honaker & Sharma (2017) Schedule UTP - Tax aggressiveness 
Hoopes et al. (2018) Public tax return disclosure by tax au-
thorities 
- Tax aggressiveness 
- Avoidance of disclosure  
(i.a., bunching) 
Hope et al. (2013) Segment reporting - Tax aggressiveness 
Hugger (2020) CbCR - OECD - Tax aggressiveness 
- Avoidance of disclosure  
(i.a., bunching) 
Joshi (2020) CbCR - OECD - Tax aggressiveness 
- Avoidance of disclosure  
(i.a., bunching) 
Joshi et al. (forthcoming) CbCR - banks - Tax aggressiveness 
Overesch & Wolff (2019) CbCR - banks - Tax aggressiveness 
Rauter (2020) CbCR - extractive industries - Investment & real activity 
Slemrod et al. (2020) Public tax return disclosure by tax au-
thorities 
- Avoidance of disclosure  
(i.a., bunching) 
Tomohara et al. (2012) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Tax aggressiveness 




   
Panel G: Studies on firm reactions to actual disclosure of tax-related information (Section 6.1.2) 
References Disclosure type Reaction in terms of / effect on 
S. Chen et al. (2019) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Tax aggressiveness 
Dyreng et al. (2016) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Tax aggressiveness 
- Tax haven presences 
Gallemore et al. (2014) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Tax aggressiveness 
- Executive turnover 
- Auditor turnover 
- Sales & advertising expenses 
Kubick et al. (2016) Tax-related SEC comment letters - Tax aggressiveness 
- Tax aggressiveness of peer firms 
O’Donovan et al. (2019) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Tax aggressiveness 
- Sales & advertising expenses 
 
 
Panel H: Studies on investor reactions to increases in tax transparency (Section 6.2.1) 
References Disclosure type Reaction in terms of / effect on 
Abernathy et al. (2013) Schedule UTP - Stock price reaction to increase in 
transparency 
Bennedsen & Zeume (2018) TIEAs - Stock price reaction to increase in 
transparency 
S. Chen (2017) Public tax return disclosure by tax au-
thorities 
- Stock price reaction to increase in 
transparency 
Donohoe & McGill (2011) Schedule M-3 - Stock price reaction to increase in 
transparency 
Dutt et al. (2019a) CbCR - banks - Stock price reaction to increase in 
transparency 
Frischmann et al. (2008) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Stock price reaction to increase in 
transparency 
Hoopes et al. (2018) Public tax return disclosure by tax au-
thorities 
- Stock price reaction to increase in 
transparency 
Hutchens et al. (2020) Deferred tax & BTD disclosures - Stockholdings of individual in-
vestors 
Johannesen & Larsen (2016) CbCR - extractive industries - Stock price reaction to increase in 
transparency 
O’Donovan et al. (2019) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 





Panel I: Studies on investor reactions to actual disclosure of tax-related information (Section 6.2.2) 
References Disclosure type Association / reaction / effect on 
Baik et al. (2016) Analysts’ (implicit) tax expense 
forecast 
- (Mis)pricing of tax-related per-
formance information 
Blaufus et al. (2019) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Stock price reaction to disclosure 




References Disclosure type Association / reaction / effect on 
Brooks et al. (2016) Tax disclosures in financial 
statements in general 
- Association between tax avoid-
ance & firm value 
Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Stock price reaction to disclosure 
/ increased scrutiny 
Campbell et al. (2019) Tax risk disclosures - (Mis)pricing of disclosed tax in-
formation 
S. Chen (2017) Public tax return disclosure by tax 
authorities 
- Stock price reaction to disclosed 
tax information 
A. B. Davis et al. (2017) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Association between tax avoid-
ance & firm value 
Demeré (2018) Tax return disclosure to selected 
recipients 
- (Mis)pricing of tax-related per-
formance information 
Desai & Dharmapala (2009) Deferred tax & BTD disclosures - Association between tax avoid-
ance & firm value 
Dyreng et al. (2016) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Stock price reaction to disclosure 
/ increased scrutiny 
Frischmann et al. (2008) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Stock price reaction to disclosed 
tax information 
Gallemore et al. (2014) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Stock price reaction to disclosure 
/ increased scrutiny 
Hanlon & Slemrod (2009) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Stock price reaction to disclosure 
/ increased scrutiny 
Hoopes et al. (2018) Public tax return disclosure by tax 
authorities 
- Stock price reaction to disclosed 
tax information 
Huesecken et al. (2018) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Stock price reaction to disclosure 
/ increased scrutiny 
Inger (2014) Tax disclosures in financial 
statements in general 
- Association between tax avoid-
ance & firm value 
Inger et al. (2018) Tax disclosures in financial 
statements in general 
- Association between tax avoid-
ance & firm value 
Jemiolo (2019) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Association between tax avoid-
ance & firm value 
Kays (2019) Public tax return disclosure by tax 
authorities 
- Stock price reaction to disclosed 
tax information 
Mauler (2019) Analysts’ (implicit) tax expense 
forecast 
- (Mis)pricing of tax-related per-
formance information 
Minnis & Sutherland (2017) Tax return disclosure to selected 
recipients 
- (Debt) investors’ request for the 
information 
L. A. Robinson & Schmidt 
(2013) 
UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Stock price reaction to disclosed 
tax information 
L. A. Robinson et al. (2016) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - (Mis)pricing of disclosed tax in-
formation 
Schwab (2009) Voluntary disclosures in earnings 
announcements & conference calls 
- (Mis)pricing of tax-related per-
formance information 
Wilson (2009) Deferred tax & BTD disclosures - Association between tax avoid-






Panel J: Studies on the effects on analysts (Section 6.3.1) 
References Disclosure type Reaction in terms of / effect on 
Bratten et al. (2017) Mandatory ETR forecasts in interim 
reports 
- Incorporation into forecasts 
- Effect on forecast accuracy 
K. Chen et al. (2003) Deferred tax & BTD disclosures - Incorporation into forecasts 
N. Chen et al. (2019) Mandatory ETR forecasts in interim 
reports 
- Incorporation into forecasts 
- Effect on forecast accuracy 
Voluntary disclosures in earnings an-
nouncements & conference calls 
- Incorporation into forecasts 
- Effect on forecast accuracy 
Koutney (2019) Voluntary disclosures in earnings an-
nouncements & conference calls 
- Incorporation into forecasts 
- Effect on forecast accuracy 
Schwab (2009) Voluntary disclosures in earnings an-
nouncements & conference calls 
- Incorporation into forecasts 
- Effect on forecast accuracy 
Weber (2009) Deferred tax & BTD disclosures - Incorporation into forecasts 
- Effect on forecast accuracy 
 
 
Panel K: Studies on the effects on consumers and the general public (Section 6.3.2) 
References Disclosure type Reaction in terms of / effect on 
Antonetti & Anesa (2017) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Sentiment / perception 
- Purchase intention 
Asay et al. (2018) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Awareness / sensitivity 
- Purchase intention 
Gallemore et al. (2014) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Sentiment / perception 
Hardeck & Hertl (2014) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Sentiment / perception 
- Purchase intention 
- Willingness to pay 
Hardeck et al. (forthcoming) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Sentiment / perception 
- Willingness to pay 
Hoopes et al. (2018) Public tax return disclosure by tax au-
thorities 
- Sentiment / perception 
- Purchase intention 
Jemiolo (2019) Disclosure in press articles or by 
NGOs / leaks 
- Sentiment / perception 
- Willingness to pay 




Panel L: Studies on the effects on tax authorities (Section 6.3.3) 
References Disclosure type Reaction in terms of / effect on 
Bozanic et al. (2017) UTB disclosures (FIN 48) - Utilization & processing of the 
information 
Notes: This table provides a structured overview of extant empirical literature on tax transparency. The different 
panels of the table follow the structure of our review in Sections 4-6. Studies investigating multiple research 
questions may appear in multiple panels of the table. Within each panel, the references are sorted alphabetically. 
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